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Despite regulatory guidelines, unreliable financial reporting exists in organizations, 
creating undue financial risk-harm for their stakeholders. Normal accident theory (NAT) 
identifies factors in highly complex integrated systems that can have unexpected, 
undetected, and uncorrected system failures. High-reliability organization (HRO) theory 
constructs promote reliability in complex, integrated systems prone to NAT factors. 
Enterprise risk management (ERM) integrates NAT factors and HRO constructs under a 
holistic framework to achieve organizational goals and mitigate the potential for 
stakeholder risk-harm. Literature on how HRO constructs promote ERM in responsible 
integrated financial systems has been limited. The purpose of this qualitative, grounded 
theory study was to use HRO constructs to identify and define the psychological factors 
involved in the effective ERM of responsible organizational financial reporting. 
Standardized, open-ended interviews were used to collect inductive data from a 
purposeful sample of 13 reporting agents stratifying different positions in organizations 
that have maintained consistent operational success while attenuating stakeholder risk-
harm. The data were interpreted via transcription, and subsequent iterative open, axial, 
and narrative coding.  Results showed that elements of culture and leadership found in 
the HRO construct of disaster foresightedness and mitigation fostered an internal 
environment of successful enterprise reporting risk management to ethically achieve 
organizational goals and abate third-party stakeholder risk-harm. The findings will 
contribute to positive social change by suggesting an approach for organizations to 
optimize strategic objectives while minimizing stakeholders’ financial risk-harm. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Introduction 
Organizations possess competing fiscal, legal, ethical, and philanthropic 
responsibilities to produce their goals (Carroll, 1991). Stakeholders are collective others 
who have varied interests in the organizations (WebFinance, 2016) and can be affected 
by organizational leadership decisions (Carroll, 1991). Organizational efforts do not 
always lead to positive outcomes, causing stakeholders to incur undue risk (Reason, 
1997). For example, the Enron scandal (McLean & Elkind, 2004) showed how 
irresponsible financial reporting adversely affected innocent third parties, despite the 
existence of measures to detect and mitigate risk.  
The Challenger and Columbia space shuttle mishaps and the Exxon Valdez and 
British Petroleum oil spills are widely studied cases of high-performing organizations 
experiencing exceptionally negative outcomes because of improper risk identification and 
mitigation (Gill, Picou, & Ritchie, 2011; Graham et al., 2011; Harrald, Marcus, & 
Wallace, 1990; Vaughan, 1990, 2009). Catastrophic failures are events causing 
immediate physical, environmental, and fiscal harm, and they can have devastating long-
term effects on organizations, their workforces, and even industry as a whole (Reason, 
1997). Perrow (1999) studied what he termed normal accidents in high-risk industries 
like aerospace and petrochemical, and he deduced that the intensity of catastrophic failure 
is dependent upon the structural interactions of organizations’ human and technical 
systems. Perrow added that applying the concept of normal accidents to financial systems 




The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission 
(COSO, 2004) created the enterprise risk management (ERM) framework as a response 
to the increasing frequency of business failures in an attempt to reduce the harm from 
undue risk experienced by stakeholders. In this study, reduction of third-party risk-harm 
through responsible financial reporting was viewed through the lens of high-reliability 
organizations (HROs; K. H. Roberts, 1990), which are businesses defined by highly 
integrated technical operating systems described in normal accident theory (NAT; 
Perrow, 1999). Furthermore, the incubation of system failure events was examined 
through man-made disaster (MMD) theory (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997). Each theory is 
unique, yet the literature often has referred to the relationship of one or more of them 
when discussing risk management (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991; Leveson, Dulac, Marais, 
& Carroll, 2009; Müssig, 2009; Pidgeon & O’Leary, 2000; Ramanujam & Goodman, 
2003; Scheytt, Soin, Sahlin‐Andersson, & Power, 2006; Taylor-Gooby & Zinn, 2006; 
Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2008).  
Some organization systems and processes are so highly integrated and tightly 
coupled that one slight interruption can reverberate throughout the interdependent 
components (Perrow, 1999). Such interruptions can have catastrophic outcomes (Rijpma, 
1997). The catastrophic impact of failures is dependent upon the degree of functional 
interaction and coupling within operating systems (Leveson et al., 2009). Perrow (1999) 
developed NAT for framing the complexities of organizational systems related to 
integrated risk. Perrow contended that industries with technological complexities and 
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high-risk operations create the potential for inevitable, or normal, accidents. As defined 
by NAT, an accident is a failure in one component of the system that causes disruption in 
the interaction with another component, resulting in a disruption or a discontinuation of 
organizational output (Perrow, 1999).  
Perrow did not assert that failures occur frequently in such organizations; rather, 
he declared that they are likely to occur because of the high-risk nature of the technical 
systems in given industries, such as nuclear power, air transportation, and petrochemical 
plants. To achieve and maintain a high level of performance, organizations in these 
industries depend upon their tightly coupled and highly integrated technical systems 
working without interruption. Perrow suggested that although they are not predisposed to 
producing catastrophic physical outcomes, the highly integrated and tightly coupled 
nature of financial systems can provide a platform for disasters that result in significant 
financial harm or disaster.  
Perrow (1999) developed an interaction/coupling chart to frame the potential for 
catastrophic events based upon variable levels of interaction ranging from complex to 
linear and coupling ranging from tight to loose (see Figure 1). It is widely used to 
interpret, analyze, and diagnose potential and actual risk (Weick, 2004). Organizations 
with highly complex, interactive, and tightly coupled integrated operations have no room 
or slack for trial and error for testing systems, processes, and procedures to ensure 
uninterrupted operations; therefore, they require a high degree of initial and continual 





Figure 1. Interaction/Coupling chart. Reprinted from Normal Accidents: Living with High 
Risk Technologies (3rd ed., p. 97), by C. Perrow, 1999, Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. Copyright 1999 by Princeton University Press. Reprinted with 
permission. 
 
Because unexpected, unrecognized, and uncorrected interruptions in highly 
integrated systems can produce catastrophic outcomes, the HRO theory was developed to 
define the need for “attempting to attain near failure free performance” (LaPorte & 
Consolini, 1991, p. 20). Organizations in industries subject to normal accidents are 
required to maintain a high level of operating reliability (Weick, 2004). Defined as 
HROs, these businesses attempt to attenuate and mitigate accidents by implementing 
stringent processes and practices to minimize the risk and maximize the reliability of 
their integrated systems (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991; Rijpma, 1997). Organizational 
financial systems also contain processes and procedures intended to minimize financial 
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risk and maximize reliable financial reporting (Nobles, Mattison, & Matsumura, 2014; 
Wild, 2013).  
Despite the implementation of risk management measures intended to achieve the 
overarching goal of high levels of system-integrated reliability, human beings can 
contribute to the degradation of highly integrated systems, resulting in occasional MMDs 
(Pidgeon & O’Leary, 2000; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997). Turner and Pidgeon (1997) 
emphasized that despite disasters appearing to be sudden and acute, they often are the 
result of human and sociotechnical breakdowns developing during incubation periods, the 
passage of time when production appears to occur normally, yet a series of unnoticed or 
misunderstood events that conflict with the espoused beliefs of hazard and harm 
avoidance are latently culminating into potential disasters. 
Risk management has been uniquely discussed in NAT, MMD, and HRO theory. 
However, there have been overlapping and related tenets. Empirical discussion of normal 
accidents in industries where high-risk technical systems are prevalent has elucidated 
organizational characteristics that have contributed to nuclear meltdowns, oil spills, and 
aircraft accidents (Perrow, 1999; Qureshi, 2007; Sagan, 1993; Smith-Crowe, Burke, & 
Landis, 2003). Risk and crisis management researchers have defined certain HRO 
characteristics that have allowed organizations operating in environments laden with 
disastrous systemic threats to achieve consistent and reliable execution of their 
interdependent systems and processes to run effectively, efficiently, and safely (Flin, 
Mearns, O’Connor, & Bryden, 2000; Klein, Bigley, & Roberts, 1995; Rijpma, 1997; K. 
H. Roberts, 1990; Weick, 1987; Weick et al., 2008). Researchers of seminal accident 
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mitigation have addressed the human factor as applied to human-made physical, tactical, 
and technical failures related to the design characteristics of integrated systems (LaPorte 
& Consolini, 1991; Perrow, 1999; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997). The risk and crisis 
management literature has defined organizational characteristics such as structure, 
decision making, management, communication, and culture as contributors to effective 
HROs (Flin et al., 2000; Klein et al., 1995; K. H. Roberts, 1990; Weick et al., 2008). In a 
meta-analysis of HRO research, Lekka (2011) summarized six overarching human factor 
characteristics that influence effective HRO operations: containment of unexpected 
events, problem anticipation, learning orientation, just culture, and mindful leadership.  
Although the aforementioned high-reliability tenets were founded in studies of 
traditional HROs from high-risk industries, such unexpected event management 
knowledge is valuable and should be transferred to other non-HROs to cope with current 
volatile business conditions (Waller & Roberts, 2003). The characteristics of reliable 
system performance described in studies of high-risk industries generated other studies 
applying HRO characteristics to risk mitigation in a broader set of organizations 
operating under prosaic conditions (Ramanujam & Goodman, 2003; Vogus & 
Welbourne, 2003). The health care literature has included several studies applying HRO 
prevention tenets to risk mitigation in patient care (Bagnara, Parlangeli, & Tartaglia, 
2010; Baker, Day, & Salas, 2006; Pronovost et al., 2006).  
There also has been research to improve education and increase teaching 
outcomes through HRO concepts (Bellamy, Crawford, Marshall, & Coulter, 2005; 
Stringfield, Reynolds, & Schaffer, 2008). In addition, researchers have considered HRO 
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features to mitigate pecuniary risk resulting from economic, market, and financial 
uncertainties (Lo, 2009; K. H. Roberts & Libuser, 1993). Regarding the last listed HRO 
application, Perrow (1999) noted increased of global commerce, market sophistication, 
and rapid trading have led to greater complexity of interactions and increased dependent 
tightened coupling in financial systems, making them vulnerable to interruptions and 
imminent catastrophes.  
COSO (2004) engaged PriceWaterhouse Coopers (PwC) to study the causal 
factors leading to fraudulent financial reporting, which led to the production of the ERM 
integrated framework. ERM is a comprehensive approach to managing risk in 
organizations by aligning risk appetite and strategy; enhancing risk response decisions; 
and reducing operational surprises and losses while integrating communication, 
teamwork, and leadership (COSO, 2004; Gifun & Karydas, 2010). Beasley, Clune, and 
Hermanson (2005) investigated the reasons only some organizations adopt ERM, which 
provided a foundation for further ERM use research. Gifun and Karydas (2010), in their 
study of integrating ERM with other organizational models, created a variation on HROs 
called the high-reliability resilient organization, which provided a model for integrating 
ERM as an attribute of high reliability in complex systems. The ERM framework affects 
every aspect of a business and requires the full participation and engagement of every 
person in the organization to ensure successful and effective implementation (COSO, 
2004). 
As discussed previously, HRO theory outlines various constructs that contribute 
to reliable and safe operations, such as collective mindfulness, reluctance to simplify, 
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culture, sensitivity to operations, and resilience (Lekka, 2011). Despite empirical 
evidence showing that all employees must own responsibility for some aspect of ERM to 
mitigate accidents (Arena, Arnaboldi, & Azzone, 2011; COSO, 2004), there has been a 
gap in the organizational literature addressing the psychological constructs required to 
mitigate financial disasters proactively that can cause significant harm to stakeholders 
resulting from disruptions in highly integrated financial management and reporting 
systems.  
The literature has contained studies addressing the psychological factors of extant 
financial crises and disasters but has not offered psychological concepts for mitigating 
future financial crises and disasters resulting from unreliable financial reporting. For 
example, Power (2009), in studying the financial crises of 2006 to 2008, addressed the 
intellectual failure of control-based ERM systems to manage the entrepreneurial and risk-
taking characteristics of individuals. Lo (2009) addressed the inattention to the effect of 
“hardwired” specific neurocognitive human behaviors as a contributing factor to 
economic failure. Power and Lo offer different lenses regarding the influence of human 
factors in financial crises, but neither of them offered evidence on ways to integrate 
human factors with successful ERM in financial reporting systems effectively. 
Furthermore, Argote and Miron-Spektor (2011) discussed the importance of 
learning from rare events, including those that result in financial disasters, but they did 
not specifically address how said learning could influence financial systems. In her call 
for practical business communication research to better prepare students for ethical 
business decision making, Jameson (2009) credited a series of communication failures as 
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contributing to the financial disasters and the resulting negative global effects of the 2008 
era, but she also did not offer a specific human-oriented solution. Ostas (2007) posited 
that motivation and moral saliency are factors of executive fraud involving 
embezzlement, financial reporting, insider trading, and larceny, and charged 
“gatekeepers” (p. 597) for failing to protect investors from negative factors. Although 
Ostas tied incentive motivation and rewards to the promulgation of financial fraud, he did 
not offer a methodology for correction. 
Current HRO theory literature contains research regarding HRO characteristics 
such as learning, decision making, communication, and reward incentives, all of which 
are integral to preventing accidents in nonfinancial, technologically complex, and highly 
integrated systems (Lekka, 2011; Rijpma, 1997; K. H. Roberts, 1990; Schulman, 1993; 
Weick et al., 2008). Gifun and Karydas (2010) provided research supporting the 
integration of ERM in HROs, and the risk management literature has outlined the need 
for comprehensive human resource engagement to implement the ERM framework 
successfully (COSO, 2004; Lo, 2009; Power, 2009). More research is necessary to 
investigate the psychological factors of ERM in HROs to address the failures in financial 
reporting and management systems so that innocent third-party stakeholders are less 
likely to suffer from fiscal risk-harm (Finkelstein, 2003). 
Problem Statement 
Fraudulent financial reporting and fiscal management practices caused risk-harm 
to thousands of stakeholders and innocent third parties when Enron could not continue its 
masquerade as a stock market leader (McLean & Elkind, 2004). Thousands of employees 
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who invested their retirement savings wisely in the future of their company were 
deceived by the fraudulent reporting of the company’s financial state of affairs, resulting 
in thousands of employees losing their life savings. This case offered compelling 
evidence that regulatory statutory constraints (i.e. auditing standards, security exchange 
regulations, internal control mandates) alone failed to mitigate financial disaster. HROs 
operate reliably and safely, despite the high propensity of accident risk harm (Lekka, 
2011; Perrow, 1999; Rijpma, 1997; K. H. Roberts, 1990; Sagan, 1993; Schulman, 1993; 
Weick et al., 2008), and human resources are integral factors in managing risk exposure 
(Arena et al., 2011; Christian, Bradley, Wallace, & Burke, 2009; COSO, 2004).  
Waller and Roberts (2003) pointed out that despite the specific contexts of their 
operational environments, “HROs possess valuable transferable knowledge for non-HRO 
organizations to minimize unexpected events” (p. 814). Although attempts are being 
made to apply HRO constructs to other prosaic organizations, research is needed 
regarding the applicability of HRO constructs in other organizations with profit motives; 
market constraints; and volatile, or “messy,” environments (Lekka, 2011). Therefore, it 
was reasonable to address the gap in the literature by defining the psychological factors 
contributing to organizational ERM effectiveness in HROs as they apply to 
organizational financial responsibility in an attempt to reduce negative financial 
outcomes resulting from damaging disruptions in financial reporting and fiscal 
management systems (Martinez-Moyano, McCaffrey, & Oliva, 2013). 
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Purpose of the Study 
Some industries not traditionally defined as HROs have found it useful to apply 
high-reliability tenets to enhance the effectiveness of their operations (Bagnara et al., 
2010; Baker et al., 2006; Bellamy et al., 2005; Pronovost et al., 2006; Ramanujam & 
Goodman, 2003; Stringfield et al., 2008; Vogus & Welbourne, 2003); however, to date, 
researchers of organizational psychology have paid little attention to learning about the 
ways in which the HRO constructs of ERM can promote organizational financial 
responsibility (Libuser, 1994; Müssig, 2009; K. H. Roberts & Libuser, 1993). The 
purpose of this qualitative, grounded theory study was to use HRO constructs as a frame 
to identify and define the psychological factors of ERM effectiveness in organizational 
financial reporting responsibility. The intention of this study was to establish a 
foundation that could provide the leadership of organizations not traditionally defined as 
HROs with the information necessary to promote effective financial risk-harm 
management through ERM.  
Research Questions 
Three research questions (RQs) were designed to address the gap in the literature: 
1. What HRO constructs applied in ERM are present in reliable financial 
reporting? 
2. How can HRO constructs applied in ERM minimize organizational 
stakeholder financial risk-harm? 
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3. How can HRO constructs applied in ERM inform other organizations to 
motivate leadership and employees to promote fiscal fiduciary responsibility 
while maximizing profitability? 
Theoretical Framework 
Studies of financial crises have used variants of NAT, HRO, MMDs, and 
enterprise management theoretical constructs to frame the research (Calandro, 2012; J. 
Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 2017; Jameson, 2009; Lo, 2009; Martinez-Moyano et 
al., 2013; Müssig, 2009; Perrow, 2010; Power, 2005, 2009; Webel, 2010); therefore, it 
was appropriate to ground a study defining the psychological constructs of organizational 
financial responsibility with the same theories. As stated previously, an accident, as 
defined by NAT, is a failure in one component of the system that causes disruption in the 
interaction with another component, resulting in a disruption, or discontinuation, of 
organizational output (Perrow, 1999).  
Perrow (1999) discussed the inevitability of normal or systematic accidents in 
organizations whose systems are interactively complex and tightly coupled. The 
interaction can be linear (expected or planned) or complex (unexpected or unplanned), 
the nature of which dictates the remedy and reaction to a disruption in order to avert a 
catastrophic accident. Whereas other safety literature has been notably concerned with 
the safety of first- or second-party victims such as operators and other personnel subject 
to the system, NAT is primarily concerned with the safety of third- and fourth-party 
victims such as innocent bystanders and future generations (Perrow, 1999). NAT 
approaches ERM from an almost pessimistic perspective that accidents in high-risk, 
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complexly interactive, and tightly coupled organizations are inevitable (Perrow, 1999). 
With no slack for trial and error, these types of organizations implement ERM by 
understanding the factors that influence their systemic interactions and anticipate, plan, 
and account for any disruptions as a coping mechanism to reduce accidents (K. H. 
Roberts, 1990; Weick, 1987). 
HRO theory (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991) outlines the characteristics for coping 
with the NAT factors inherent in complex organizations to promote reliability in effective 
system interaction. HROs possess the potential for hazard, risk, or error that could affect 
others egregiously, yet they implement and operate within an HRO theory framework of 
nearly no failure (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991; Rijpma, 1997; K. H. Roberts, 1990). 
Because HROs operate within a normal accident nontolerant environment, a robust ERM 
framework is required to minimize risk, error, and hazard (K. H. Roberts, 1990). Whereas 
NAT focuses on the inevitability of accident occurrence due to system operationalization 
(Perrow, 1999), HRO theory focuses on the system operationalization of HROs to 
promote ERM (Lekka, 2011). 
Some characteristics of HROs are redundancy, operational procedure and policy 
adherence, safety protocol culture, and unique hierarchal decision-making strategies (K. 
H. Roberts, 1990). HROs often implement a comprehensive approach to manage risk 
such as ERM in an effort to optimize system operation while promoting reliability 
(Beasley et al., 2005; COSO, 2004). Literature on risk and crisis management has 
identified the leading indicators of reliability as culture, communication, leadership, and 
processes and activities that are integral in managing accidents (Flin et al., 2000). 
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Although ERM is integral in promoting reliability, a robust risk management system, if 
not monitored and adjusted regularly, can contribute to a culture of complacency by 
personnel believing that the rules, processes, and compliance measures in place will 
anticipate and manage every contingency (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991). HRO theory and 
ERM as related to normal accidents align with the concept of defining the organizational 
psychology factors of HRO effectiveness to minimize financial risk-harm to others while 
maximizing organizational effectiveness and consequential success.  
Nature of the Study 
The aim of this grounded theory, qualitative study was to identify and define the 
psychological factors of ERM effectiveness in organizational financial reporting 
responsibility, using HRO and NAT factors as a frame. Because the study wanted to 
generate or expand rather than simply test extant theory, a grounded theory methodology 
was deemed appropriate for this study (Patton, 2002). Data were collected by 
interviewing participants identified using a maximum variation purposeful sampling 
strategy (Patton, 2002). This sampling strategy was appropriate to understand a 
phenomenon within a certain type of job responsibility (homogeneity) in organizations 
with different business purposes (heterogeneity). The sample stratified individuals 
involved in the financial environment and the ERM framework of organizations from 
different business sectors. 
A semistructured interviewing method of inquiry was used to gather information 
from the participants, transcribe the interviews, and perform the iterative process of 
validating the transcriptions by using member checking and text modifications based on 
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participant feedback. To triangulate the data from a deviant case perspective, data were 
reviewed and analyzed from the Enron (McLean & Elkind, 2004) financial disaster case 
reports to explore possible HRO psychology factors found in the reputable company 
cases of this study yet missing in the fiscal systemic interruptions of this failed 
organization. Using different strategies of inquiry facilitated triangulation of the data, 
which lent support to the emergent themes and phenomenon (Trochim, 2006a). After 
completing the transcription process, MS Excel and CAQAS such as NVivo v.11 were 
used to elucidate and triangulate the emergent data through coding. Open coding was 
used to expose commonalities in the data, axial coding to assemble the commonalities 
into categories or groupings as they related to each other, and selective coding to tell the 
story of the data and how the data contributed to or expanded extant theory (Creswell, 
2013).  
Definitions of Terms 
The following terms and associated operational definitions were used in this 
study: 
Enterprise risk management (ERM): A comprehensive framework involving 
organization-wide strategic, compliance, reporting, and operational components to 
minimize risk while maximizing the opportunity to achieve an entity’s objectives (COSO, 
2004). 
 High-reliability organizations (HROs): Enterprises that continuously and 
effectively manage unpredictable factors in risk-laden environments defined by the 
integrated technical nature of their operations (K. H. Roberts, 1990; Weick et al., 2008). 
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 Man-made disasters (MMDs): The prohibition of disaster foresight and an 
increase in vulnerability that occur when there is a discordant existence between 
espoused organizational safety measures and the reality of precautionary norms, 
assumptions, beliefs, and values of the organizational actors (Pidgeon, 1997; Pidgeon & 
O’Leary, 2000; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997). 
Normal accident theory (NAT): The belief that organizations defined by highly 
integrated and deeply interdependent systems are vulnerable to disasters caused by active 
system failures exacerbated by discreet social organizational interactions (Perrow, 1999). 
Perrow (1999) further defined the following ordinary terms in the context of 
organizational accidents: 
Accident: Involves a reasonably substantial and serious failure of a subsystem that 
damages more than one unit and, in doing so, disrupts the ongoing or future 
output of an entire defined system. 
Catastrophe: Large-scale systemic accident that can cause extensive damage to 
unwitting bystanders not involved in the system. 
Coupling: The connective reaction of what happens in one organizational system 
affects what happens in another. 
Disruption: An occasion that causes the output in a subsystem or system to cease, 
causing a correction or repair to the system.  
Incident: Involves a failure of a subsystem or system that causes limited damage 
to related parts or a unit, but does not damage the entire system. 
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Interaction: The relationship of interdependent systems in relationship to linear or 
complex functionality. 
Subsystem: Integration of the various units of organizations that create the third 
level of a system. 
System: Interactive functioning of subsystems to produce the desired output. 
Unit: The functional compilation of parts of the second level of a system. 
Organizational culture: The learned norms, values, assumptions, and beliefs of 
organizational actors that shape the paradigm in which organizations operate (Schein, 
1984). 
Risk appetite: The assessed risk allowed to be taken by an organization within the 
purview of specific reporting and compliance measurements to promote its strategic and 
operation position (COSO, 2004). 
Risk harm: The notion in contrast to risk appetite that exposure to risk can cause a 
setback to an individual’s welfare, thus causing them harm (Finkelstein, 2003). 
Assumptions 
 The ontological assumption of this study was that HRO psychological constructs 
exist and are identifiable and definable. I assumed that I could locate and secure an 
adequate sample of qualified participants to interview and that they would be 
forthcoming, truthful, and honest about their observations, experiences, and activities. I 
also assumed that the participants chosen via purposeful sampling of the homogeneous 
population of organizations that were fiscally responsible and sustainable actually sought 
and promoted reliability. Considering the epistemological concerns with generalizing 
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qualitative findings (Patton, 2002), the overarching assumption was that HRO 
psychological constructs were transferrable to financial reporting risk management 
systems. 
Scope and Delimitations 
Researchers have used the efficient, safe, and dependable operations exhibited by 
HROs as a foundation to investigate the applicability of HRO factors to other reliability- 
seeking organizations (K. H. Roberts, 1990; Sammarco, 2005; Vogus & Welbourne, 
2003). The scope of this study was to use NAT factors and HRO constructs in an ERM 
framework to understand organizational financial responsibility and reporting. A 
delimiting factor was the choice of participants.  
Grounded theorists seek a homogeneous sample (Creswell, 2013) because the 
credibility of qualitative inquiry relies upon data elucidated from information-rich cases 
(Patton, 2002). Yet, Patton (2002) asserted that the lack of heterogeneity also might limit 
the transferability of the findings across groups. To address this concern, the target 
population included individuals involved in the financial and fiscal risk management 
systems in organizations with varied business purposes. 
Limitations 
 The key instrument for capturing the data in qualitative inquiry is the researcher; 
therefore, the credibility of qualitative findings can be negated if the researcher’s biases 
and variety of reactivity and reflexivity are not effectively managed (Creswell, 2013; 
Patton, 2002; Trochim, 2006a, 2006b). My experience as a Maryland certified public 
accountant (CPA) lent credibility to my ability to mine and analyze the data from a 
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financial perspective. However, this professional status also might have created 
limitations such as the presumption that the individuals involved in financial reporting are 
subject to and abide by the overarching professional standards. This presumption might 
not have allowed me to be open to emerging trends and themes involving HRO 
psychological constructs in actors responsible for the overall financial health of their 
respective organizations. Furthermore, any possible professional association or 
relationship that I might have had with any of the participants could have led to the halo 
effect (Patton, 2002), meaning that the participants might not have provided truthful 
information in order to present them and their organizations in a more positive light. 
Outside of the halo effect, some participants simply might not have been 
forthcoming by nature and that despite the assurances of confidentiality and participant 
protection, they might not have been willing to disclose actions performed that were in 
conflict with responsible financial reporting. A limitation also existed because of the 
possible inability to obtain sample organizations within the industry specifications 
outlined in the sampling strategy. I tried to stratify the sample within the organizations by 
obtaining employees from various levels of the corporate hierarchy (i.e. a member of the 
C-suite, manager, and staff), so the data came from various perspectives. Limitations are 
discussed in more depth in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5. 
Significance of the Study 
Reducing the disruptive financial occurrences decreases negative environmental 
and situational impacts on human beings and on the future profits of local and global 
organizations. To achieve this goal, not all businesses warrant the robust ERM 
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requirements evident in traditionally defined HROs, such as redundancy, safety 
protocols, and hierarchal decision-making structures (K. H. Roberts, 1990) because they 
have different purposes, processes, and operations. However, all businesses require 
employee commitment to operationalize reliable systems and processes. Employee 
engagement embodies the involvement, commitment, and passion by which employees 
work (Macey & Schneider, 2008) and is meaningful to system outcomes (Harter, 
Schmidt, & Hayes, 2002), regardless of the organizational purpose. Classifying, 
categorizing, and defining HRO psychological factors with respect to reducing return on 
investment losses as applied to financial reporting and fiscal responsibility will contribute 
to the global good by providing a framework that organizations can use to optimize 
human capital investment and organizational effectiveness while minimizing risk harm to 
stakeholders’ physical, financial, and emotional security, and to the larger social 
economy. 
Summary and Transition 
 When a system disruption or failure occurs in the integrated and synchronized 
system of an organization, disaster can happen, and stakeholders and innocent third 
parties can suffer. The level of negative effect is dependent upon the degree of integrated 
system interaction and coupling; human interaction with the systems; existence and 
implementation of an effective ERM framework; and ability to operate at a high level of 
reliability, despite the chance of normal accidents occurring from disruptions in their 
technically integrated systems (COSO, 2004; Perrow, 1999; K. H. Roberts, 1990; Sagan, 
1993; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997). The quest for high reliability as a contributor to positive 
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outcomes with minimal risk harm has been the basis for application of HRO 
characteristics in other less technical, nonnormal accident, prosaic business settings 
(Bagnara et al., 2010; Baker et al., 2006; Bellamy et al., 2005; Pronovost et al., 2006; 
Stringfield et al., 2008).  
Scientific literature has been thin regarding the application of HRO constructs to 
define the psychological factors of reliable financial reporting and fiscal management. I 
conducted this qualitative, grounded theory study using NAT factors and HRO constructs 
to identify and define the psychological factors of ERM effectiveness in responsible 
organizational financial reporting. The results of the study will assist organizations and 
their leaders to operationalize the human psychological factors that encourage and 
promote financial reporting reliability to minimize stakeholder financial risk harm while 
maximizing the triple bottom line (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012) of organizational 
performance. 
 Chapter 2 provides an overview of integrated financial reporting and management 
systems. It then provides an in-depth literature review focused on disaster factors, risk 
management, and HRO research related to the applicable psychological factors of 
responsible financial reporting. NAT and supporting socio-organizational tenets 
regarding how disruption in one component of highly integrated financial accounting and 
management subsystems can affect other systems, resulting in catastrophic financial 
outcomes. The ERM concept is then presented and tied into managing the financial risk 
harm of unsuspecting third parties. Then HRO theory and supporting tenets are explained 
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in relation to their use as a frame to define the psychological factors applicable to 
effective ERM in promoting reliable financial reporting.  
Chapter 3 presents the research methodology. Outlined are the research design 
and rationale, my role as the researcher, instrumentation, data collection, and qualitative 
analyses. Also discussed are participant matters such as selection, recruitment, and ethical 
treatment. Chapter 3 also includes a discussion of the importance of trustworthiness and 
the protection of human research subjects.  
Chapter 4 provides a summary of the data gathered from the participants in 
reputable responsible financial reporting systems. The influencing human factors of 
responsible financial reporting systems are revealed by showing how the data were 
organized and analyzed from the initial core category to subcategories, and how the data 
within the subcategories were applied to the RQs. I present the data in tables, figures, and 
narratives using quotations from the participants and juxtaposed examples from the 
discrepant Enron (McLean & Elkind, 2004) case to support the thematic trends.  
In Chapter 5, I explain how the data relate to HRO and ERM theory, and I provide 
a human-related theoretical model for organizations to promote the accurate and reliable 
reporting of entity financial activity in ways that mitigate risk-harm to third-party 
stakeholders. Chapter 5 also contains information about the delimitations, limitations, 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
Professional accounting regulatory standards and statutes exist to protect the 
individuals who rely on organizational financial statements (American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants [AICPA], 2013), yet the occurrence of large-scale financial 
fraud cases (Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, & Neal, 2010) has indicated that rules and 
regulations alone are not sufficient to mitigate fraudulent financial reporting and 
irresponsible fiscal management (Ball, 2009). The literature on risk and crisis 
management has defined certain characteristics of operations, leadership, risk 
management, and culture as contributors to effective HROs (Flin et al., 2000; Klein et al., 
1995; K. H. Roberts, 1990; Weick et al., 2008). Other ordinary industries outside the 
purview of large physical disasters have applied HRO tenets to promote reliable 
operations (Bagnara et al., 2010; Baker et al., 2006; Bellamy et al., 2005; Pronovost et 
al., 2006; Ramanujam & Goodman, 2003; Stringfield et al., 2008; Vogus & Welbourne, 
2003), yet to date, literature on organizational psychology pertaining to the HRO 
constructs of ERM in organizational financial responsibility has been minimal (Libuser, 
1994; Müssig, 2009; K. H. Roberts & Libuser, 1993). The purpose of this grounded 
theory study was to use NAT factors and HRO constructs as a frame to identify the 
psychological factors of ERM in responsible organizational financial reporting.  
This chapter first provides an overview of financial system integration and then 
continues with a synthesis of relevant accident, risk, and HRO literature pertaining to 
disaster factors of financial catastrophes, management of risk to mitigate stakeholder risk-
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harm, and HRO constructs to frame this study of psychological factors in responsible 
financial reporting. Perrow’s NAT (1999), the focus for discussing disaster factors, was 
supported by related discussions in human and latent errors, MMDs, near misses, and 
production pressures. The literature on ERM (COSO, 2004) has supported the theoretical 
basis for financial risk-harm mitigation, and the literature on HRO (Rijpma, 1997) has 
provided the theoretical support for the study’s inductive inquiry into the psychological 
factors of responsible organizational financial reporting. 
Literature Search Strategy 
I located peer-reviewed journal articles using Google Scholar and expanded my 
resources by contemporaneously searching Walden University’s research database 
subscription via the library link in Google Scholar. I also used the private source 
databases with free access available through Google Scholar and professional websites. 
The literature came from databases such as EBSCOhost, ERIC, ProQuest, 
PsycARTICLES, PsycBOOKS, PsycINFO, SAGEjournals, ScienceDirect, AMLStores, 
CRPIT, and InformsPubsOnLine. Bibliographies of particularly informative articles or 
meta-analyses provided further reference sources. In addition, clicking the “Related 
articles” link in Google Scholar located the title of salient theoretical articles that 
provided an alternative stream of literature. 
I used combinations and derivations of the following search terms: high 
reliability, high-reliability organization, HRO, financial, finance, fiscal, accounting, 
systems, normal accident, risk, risk management, enterprise risk management, 
catastrophe, debacle, and disaster. Initially, to ensure the capture of seminal research on 
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the topic of this study, I did not use date limiters. However, to locate current literature, I 
used the “Since 2011” time parameter located in Google Scholar. 
The search strategy returned substantive literature on HRO theory and 
organizations, NAT, and ERM. The largest return came from the term high reliability, 
with 3,240,000 results. The search for normal accident resulted in 2,100,000 hits. There 
was an overlap in the literature on HROs and NAT because of the relative nature of the 
constructs (Klein et al., 1995; Lekka, 2011; Leveson et al., 2009; K. H. Roberts, 1990; K. 
H. Roberts & Bea, 2001; Vogus & Welbourne, 2003; Weick, 2004). A search using 
enterprise risk management as the search term produced 1,810,000 results. I used 
quotation marks as Boolean phrase search limiters, “enterprise risk management,” which 
narrowed the results to 21,600. Because ERM has many industry applications, I used the 
Boolean nesting search parameters (high reliability), and (WebFinance) to narrow the 
results to fit the scope of this study. The search produced a substantial amount of 
scholarly information to ground this study in theory.  
Financial Systems Overview 
The theoretical framework grounding this study centered on error-free-related 
system integration and effective risk management to produce reliable and sustained 
organizational operations. Because the study was an attempt to define these theoretical 
constructs as they applied to organizational financial responsibility, following is a 





An accounting system is predicated on the need to identify, record, and culminate 
the transactions of businesses and communicate their effects to organizational 
stakeholders (Wild, 2013). Bookkeepers in the transaction processing system document 
the minutiae of the transactions of businesses in monetary units using a double-entry 
method of accounting (Nobles et al., 2014; Wild, 2013). Every transaction is balanced 
between at least two accounts by debiting one account and crediting another. The choice 
of accounts and the decision to debit or credit is determined by the nature of the 
transaction and the natural balance of the account according to its position in the financial 
statements (Nobles et al., 2014). The listing of the accounts available for use is referred to 
as the chart of accounts. When operationalized with entries specific to a unit of business, 
the list of accounts becomes the general ledger (GL), which is an organization’s main 
transactional recording system. Generally, small business owners or their accountants 
post company transactions directly to the GL. However, because this study was 
concerned with mitigating failures in a financial reporting and management system, this 
discussion includes a simplified explanation of how large public organizations 
matriculate transactions to the GL using a more complex subsidiary ledger system. 
Subsidiary Account System 
Organizations with voluminous, complex, or multistep transactions use subsidiary 
reporting systems called subledgers to record voluminous amounts of related 
transactions. Examples of common subledgers are cash, accounts receivable (AR), 
accounts payable (AP), inventory, job costs, and payroll ledgers. Examples of subledgers 
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containing fewer day-to-day operational items are those that record capital expenditures 
for property, plant, and equipment (fixed assets), or financing transactions such as funds 
borrowed and loaned. The depth and structural sophistication of the subsidiary system 
depends on the volume and type or nature of the transactions.  
For this overview, the following is a simplistic example of how subsidiary ledger 
systems integrate with the overarching GL reporting system. Transactions in the AR 
subsidiary ledger of a large retailer with stores all over the United States might include 
the combined results of several regional AR subledgers. The regional AR ledgers reflect 
the AR activity of the various stores located in the region. The individual stores in the 
region populate their AR ledgers with the subsidiary ledger data from the various 
departmental AR systems. Each department’s subsidiary ledger reflects the minutiae of 
customer transaction data relating to sales, order fulfillment, payments, returns, credits, 
and write-offs (Nobles et al., 2014). The transactional entries in each subsystem are 
periodically reconciled and summarized, and the results are posted to the preceding 
organizational level’s subsidiary. The culmination of the subledger entries is posted to the 
GL control account with the same name (i.e. AR, AP, Fixed Assets, etc.). 
Offering a comprehensive education regarding the effects of the detailed 
interactions among the separate subledgers on the various GL accounts was beyond the 
scope of this overview. The previous example was used only to demonstrate the 
interaction and coupling (Perrow, 1999) nature of financial reporting systems. Accurate 
management and recordation of voluminous segmented transactional minutiae within 
each subsidiary affects the interactive integrity of subsidiary ledger systems, which has a 
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direct effect on the integrity of the GL and the validity of the compiled financial 
information. A failure in one component of the financial reporting system can affect the 
entire system. 
Financial Reporting System 
The accountants prepare a periodic comprehensive report called a trial balance, 
which lists the initial ending balances of all the GL accounts. This report is the first pass 
at making certain that the books balance, that is, the aggregate debit entries equal the 
aggregate credit entries. The accountants analyze the accounts and, if necessary, make 
appropriate adjustments, such as accruals. When the accountants are satisfied with the 
account balances, they compile the data into informational reports called financial 
statements (Wild, 2013). 
The financial statements, which generally include a balance sheet, income 
statement, statement of cash flows, and statement of owner’s equity, are used to inform 
internal users such as management and leadership, and external users such as banks and 
investors about the economic viability of the company (Nobles et al., 2014; Wild, 2013). 
Management reviews the statements and determines whether the information accurately 
represents the financial condition of the company. If deemed necessary, further 
adjustments to the journal entries are made, and the books are closed. When the books are 
closed, no changes can be made without approval. Management disseminates the 
financial statements to interested stakeholders as required by loan covenants, reporting 
standards, or investor relation needs. The financial reporting system provides a means of 
communicating information regarding the financial condition of the company to internal 
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and external users. The accuracy of these statements is imperative because ratios such as 
debt equity, earnings per share, and net leverage are used to make integral business 
decisions. 
Quality and Risk Control Systems 
Users depend upon the integrity of an organization’s financial reporting system to 
portray the financial condition of the business accurately. An organization’s financial 
quality and risk control systems contain internal and external control mechanisms 
designed to protect users from risk-harm resulting from misrepresentation of an 
organization’s financial position (Nobles et al., 2014). Individuals and processes within 
the organization execute internal control systems. COSO (2013) developed the internal 
control-integrated framework to assist organizations in developing applicable internal 
control principles to ensure stakeholder confidence in the entity’s ability to achieve 
operational, reporting, and compliance goals within the business’s economic and 
operating environment. Internal control principles provide a guideline by which 
organizations “establish responsibilities, maintain accurate records, insure assets and 
bond key employees, separate record keeping responsibilities from asset custody, divide 
responsibility and related transactions, apply technological controls, and perform regular 
and independent reviews” (Wild, 2013, p. 259).  
Individuals outside of the organization perform the functions and processes of an 
external control system. External control systems were designed to protect users of the 
organization’s financial information by engaging qualified auditors who are independent 
from the company to evaluate and opine on the company’s internal controls, reporting 
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processes, and financial condition. If the auditors conclude that there are breaches in the 
internal controls or that the financial statements do not fairly represent the financial 
condition of the company, professional ethical and regulatory standards require them to 
disclose this opinion to the public in an auditor’s report (AICPA, 2014). When the 
internal and external control systems are compromised, the risk of financial disaster 
increases. 
Failures in the internal and external control systems in the Enron (McLean & 
Elkind, 2004), and other renowned financial reporting scandals of the time, prodded the 
U.S. Congress to enact the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX; Civic Impulse, 2015), 
which established statutes holding the management of publicly traded companies 
responsible for maintaining, documenting, and certifying a robust system of internal 
controls (Nobles et al., 2014; Wild, 2013). SOX addressed external control breaches 
stemming from the lack of independence by restricting the types of consulting services 
that an audit firm can provide to a company while performing its independent audit and 
by limiting the number of years that an accountant can lead an audit to no more than 7 
years without a 2-year break (Wild, 2013). Furthermore, SOX provisions outlined harsh 
penalties on individuals and committees responsible for audit and financial reporting 
activities for not adhering to strict independence, disclosure, governance, and 
transparency requirements (Ernst & Young LLP, 2012). Congress also established the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (2015) to oversee the work of independent 




The reliable interaction of an organization’s accounting, financial reporting, and 
control systems is key to generating accurate and dependable information regarding the 
financial condition of a company. Just as disruptions in complex, integrated, tangible 
systems create the potential for physical catastrophes (Perrow, 1999), interruptions in 
complex organizational financial systems can result in a distorted view of the company’s 
economic outlook, which provides a platform for fiscal disaster (Calandro, 2012). 
Internal and external control systems use risk management processes and procedures to 
expose, correct, and mitigate financial systemic disruptions to protect stakeholders, the 
public, and the larger economy from the effects of catastrophic financial meltdowns. Just 
as habitual disregard for harm avoidance measures can incubate and precipitate physical 
disasters (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997), financial control system failures permit erroneous, 
negligent, and fraudulent acts to evolve into egregious financial disasters (Calandro, 
2012; Perrow, 2010). 
Disaster Factors, Management of Risk, and High-Reliability Organizations 
The theoretical tenets of this study were distinctly independent yet interrelated. 
Perrow (1999) stated that although seemingly contradictory, HRO theory and NAT 
inform one another. Sagan (1993) used both theories to analyze risk management in the 
context of near misses in the U.S. nuclear weaponry sector. In the analysis of MMDs, 
Turner and Pidgeon (1997) listed NAT and HRO theory as complementary theoretical 
frameworks. Finally, because risk is an integral factor in understanding and preventing 
disasters, the literature on NAT, HRO theory, and MMDs has addressed ERM in some 
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manner. This theoretical tapestry, coupled with underlying constructs, made organizing 
and arranging the unique constructs logical and methodical (C. M. Roberts, 2010). 
Therefore, the theories were addressed as they related to disaster factors, management of 
risk, and promotion of reliability. 
Disaster Factors 
Normal accident theory. Perrow (2004, 2010) widened the scope of high-risk 
technical disaster research from a single-component failure approach and examined 
discreet failures in social organizational system interactions as the cause of accidents. 
Perrow (1999) maintained that the nature of the interactions among interdependent 
organizational systems dictates the propensity for accidents and the inevitability of 
disasters, which is the premise of NAT. In a normal accident environment, organizational 
system interactions can range from complex, where heterogeneous, independent systems 
integrate in no predetermined sequential time or relationship to produce a desired 
organizational outcome, to linear, sequentially arranged systemic integration, where the 
outcome of one system is time dependent upon and directly related to the outcome of 
another (Perrow, 1999). The degree of integration or dependency, whether complex or 
linear, is coupling (Perrow, 1999). K. H. Roberts (1990) pointed out that coupling is not 
an indication of the number of interactions, but the brittleness and reactivity of the 
systemic connection. 
A loosely coupled organization has equifinality, which is the idea that integrated 
systems can possess their own logical functions and interests yet integrate with other 
systems to achieve the desired collective outcome (Von Bertalanffy, 1972). Room for 
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trial and error, or slack as Perrow (1999) referred to it, cushions the effect of disruptions 
in these independent systems, limiting intense negative reverberations throughout the 
organization. A tightly coupled organization is one in which the systems are so intricately 
integrated that there is little or no time to react to a system disruption or failure. In the 
absence of immediate and effective remedial actions, reactions to unanticipated failures 
in a tightly coupled system can emerge as the source of a critical accident (Perrow, 2010). 
Perrow (1999) developed the 2 X 2 interaction coupling chart, shown previously in 
Chapter 1, to classify organizations according to the blend of linear-complex interaction 
and tight-loose coupling.  
Accident investigations tend to begin with operator error as the cause of 
catastrophic accidents in error-inducing systems (Reason, 1997), but NAT provides a 
platform for looking beyond the operator to the organizational characteristics that 
contribute to faulty systemic interactions for the cause (Perrow, 2010; Sagan, 1993). 
Reason (1997) observed that on-the-job investigative approaches and accident research 
findings have an inverse relationship. Investigators first look to the person or team 
members who performed the unsafe act, then to the local workplace setting, and then to 
the organizational factors to determine accident causes. Conversely, the literature on 
accident research has shown that organizational factors influence local workplace 
performance, which allows unsafe acts to occur. Although researchers have found NAT’s 
subjectively plotted interaction/coupling categorization inadequate for detailed accident 
cause analysis (Leveson et al., 2009; Sagan, 1993; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997), assigning an 
accident like the Columbia shuttle explosion to a cell in the 2 X 2 interactive coupling 
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framework initiates a systemic dissection of the accident from a socio-organizational lens 
rather than from a purely component or active failure perspective (Weick, 2004). Lo 
(2009) maintained that the intricate credit, legal, accounting, regulatory, and liquidity 
relationships in financial systems fit the complexity and coupling criterion that defines 
financial crises as normal accidents. Research has indicated that HRO characteristics such 
as redundancies and organizational learning (Lekka, 2011; K. H. Roberts & Bea, 2001; 
Weick et al., 2008) can increase interaction complexity and tighten coupling, both of 
which are factors of NAT (Perrow, 1999; Sagan, 1993).   
Human error. Human beings are integral to successful system integration, so it is 
only reasonable that individual human error can be blamed as the initial cause of 
organizational disasters (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997). Perhaps a reason for “blaming 
individuals is [that] it is emotionally more satisfying than targeting institutions” (Reason, 
2000, p. 768). However, Reason (2000) suggested that there are two worldviews of 
human error, namely, the person approach and the system approach, to address accident 
prevention. The person approach is a traditional view that accidents are caused by unsafe 
acts of individuals such as forgetfulness, inattention, poor motivation, carelessness, 
negligence, and recklessness. The system approach assumes that because human beings 
make mistakes, organizations account for this assumption during system development 
and evaluation to ameliorate the effects of human mistakes (Reason, 2000). 
Perrow (1999, 2010) addressed the individual effect by cautioning that the agentic 
factor not be overlooked when individual decisions influence system failure in financial 
crises. Rochlin (1999) supported the importance of agent actions and judgments at every 
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level of the safety process in securing a safe climate. In his effort to design control and 
safety systems for hazardous industrial process plants, Rasmussen (1997) found that an 
initial investigation of human-machine interaction led to a comprehensive top-down 
systemic analysis, which included contemplation of decision-making mechanics, the 
reporting culture, regulation, legislation, and the adaptation of humans to dynamic 
changes in the sociotechnical system. The computerized stock-trading system debacle of 
1987 was an example of how society’s attempt to control human task error and 
promulgate safe operations by rules and regulations worked in a stable environment, but 
when dynamic changes in technology increased integration and coupling, social and 
behavioral factors became critical in maintaining a safe environment (Rasmussen, 1997).  
Individual errors often are recurrent and allowed to perpetuate because of system 
weaknesses; therefore, documenting and analyzing accidents from a personal task 
analysis perspective is key to locating certain systemic dysfunctions; however, securing 
total safe and reliable operations exceeds the simple decomposition of individual task 
performance and mandated rules and regulations (Rasmussen, 1997; Reason, 2000). This 
tenet was evident in the “tsunami of accounting scandals” (Ball, 2009, p. 277) from the 
turn of the millennium, with Enron being one of the more notorious cases.  
Accounting and governmental sectors responded to the financial crises of the time 
with further regulation in the form of SOX in 2002 (COSO, 2004). The subsequent 
Lehman Brothers banking scandal (Valukas, 2010) prompted Congress to enact the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Webel, 2010), and the 
Madoff Ponzi scheme (Markopolos, 2010) spurred the Securities and Exchange 
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Commission (SEC, 2012) to take “decisive and comprehensive steps to reduce the 
chances that such frauds would occur undetected in the future” (p. 1). Cullinan (2004) 
maintained that although some SOX provisions might have mitigated risk-harm to third 
parties, the act “does not contain provisions designed to enhance intellectual ability and 
diligence of auditors to recognize problems” and prevent future fraud (p. 862). Cullinan 
posited that the focused reaction of Congress to the symptoms of Enron’s audit process 
failure limited the act’s provisions from “engaging in a more serious effort to identify and 
treat the underlying disease of a lack of a sense of public duty, and inadequate emphasis 
on audit competence in the audit profession’s culture” (p. 862). Even with stricter 
standards, mandates, and other regulatory intercessions in place, human acts of financial 
fraud still occur (Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2014).  
Latent errors. Latent errors are uncorrected organizational deviations. On their 
own, they might not result in an accident, but they can develop into or combine with 
other latent errors to create system weaknesses (Ramanujam & Goodman, 2003; Reason, 
1997). Ramanujam and Goodman (2003 conducted a content analysis of internal audit 
reports to investigate the construct validity, antecedents, and adverse consequences of 
latent errors in the Barings Bank collapse. They identified the distribution of work, 
interdependence upon work activities, and stability of the organizational culture affect the 
linkage between latent errors and adverse consequences. When controls such as internal 
audits fail to detect latent errors, or when cultural constraints negate appropriate actions, 
an external event, even one as unlikely as an earthquake in Japan (Ramanujam & 
Goodman, 2003) can trigger an adverse financial consequence.  
37 
 
Reason (1997) proposed a schema commonly known as the Swiss cheese model 
to communicate how active failures and latent risk conditions can result in disasters (see 
Figure 2). Simply summarized, the model illustrates that active failures and latent 
conditions create holes in otherwise solid planes, or slices, of organizational systemic 
defenses. Poor design, gaps in supervision, and weak processes and procedures allow an 
accident causal trajectory to pass through a hole in a control layer, and in most cases, a 
defensive subsequent solid layer will stop the trajectory, alleviating the chance of disaster 
(Reason, 1997). The holes open and close as the organization learns from the failures and 
makes corrections. When soft (i.e., training, regulations, learning, etc.) and hard (i.e., 
safety features, alarms, working equipment, etc.) defensive measures are in place and 
operational, the adverse effect of a single unsafe act on the system is minimal if existent. 
However, in reality, culturally shaped active failures, and latent errors created by poor 
executive, regulative, and managerial decision making create various random holes in the 
defensive planes. When a failure or a latent error is not recognized or corrected, the hole 
does not close, and the chance that subsequent weaknesses will align increases. The 
aligned holes eliminate defensive layers, which creates an unobstructed accident 
trajectory for an unchecked hazardous event to gain momentum through the organization, 




Figure 2. Reason’s Swiss cheese model of risk. Reprinted from Managing the Risks of 
Organizational Accidents (p. 12), by J. Reason, 1997, Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 
Copyright 1997. Reprinted with permission. 
 
The notion of latent conditions and the breakdown of defenses was important to 
this study because although purported dubious technical accounting, reporting, and 
disclosure measures were seen as the root cause of financial disasters such as Enron 
(Jickling, 2002; SEC, 2009), latent conditions such as leadership centered on pecuniary 





Man-made disasters. Turner (1976) performed a detailed qualitative, grounded 
theory analysis of 84 official accident reports logged with the British Government during 
1965 through 1975 and developed the MMD model to explain catastrophic events from 
the discordant perspective of espoused organizational values and beliefs (i.e., what is 
intended) and organizational realties (i.e., what is actual). Most case reports 
acknowledged the existence of psychological factors of proximal actors and conditions in 
the preaccident phase (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997). However, Turner and Pidgeon (1997) 
further found that overarching shared intentions, assumptions, and actions of safety 
culture actors embodied an environment prohibiting disaster foresight and increasing 
vulnerability.  
According to the MMD model, the initial culturally accepted beliefs and 
associated precautionary norms as set forth in laws, codes of practice, mores and 
folkways provide the platform for Stage I of the sequential events predicating disasters 
(Turner, 1976; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997). Stage II, the disaster incubation period (Turner 
& Pidgeon, 1997), is the passage of time when discrepant, unnoticed interactions between 
culturally accepted beliefs and actions and the potential for real hazard accumulate. 
During this stage, intentional or unintentional disregard for information and its 
processing, bounded rationale, power-influenced hierarchal decision making, 
organizational learning ability, and misdirected assumptions during “business as usual” 
allow energies, resources, and manpower to stealthily fester into a culminating negative 
event, or as Turner labeled, Stage III of MMDs. 
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In Stage IV, organizations absorb the consequences of the incubating chains of 
discrepant events, which inform organizations of the inaccuracies of their cultural 
assumptions and beliefs. The organizations interpret these data to reform the 
organizational norms (Scheytt et al., 2006). The resulting rescue and salvage efforts of 
Stage V make ready the way for learning from the events. Operationalizing the newfound 
knowledge gained in Stage IV and Stage V by reshaping the organizational cultural to 
prevent future disasters occurs in Stage VI (Turner, 1976). The difficulty with 
effectuating learning in Stage VI is that the same breadth and depth of cultural 
assumptions and norms that allowed the disaster to occur in the first place might skew 
inquiry, which could inhibit or prohibit substantive corrective adjustments (Turner & 
Pidgeon, 1997). The MMD theory informed this study from the perspective that financial 
disasters are not acute, sudden, and unexpected events; rather, they are the resulting 
culmination of intentional or unintentional fiscal systemic latent errors.  
 Near misses. Sagan (1993) grounded his analysis of the U.S. nuclear weapons 
industry in NAT and HRO theory. He found that apparent accident-free operations were 
not necessarily the result of systems designed to promote reliability, but were fortuitous 
actions not credited to a specific preventative protocol. Political in-fighting and deflection 
of blame can cause a serious near miss to be overlooked as a sign of an emergent 
incubating disaster, meaning that if the near miss is ignored, it might go away (Pidgeon & 
O’Leary, 2000; Sagan, 1993). Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) provided an example of such 
ignorance when patients expressing concerns were not recognized as opportunities for 
learning but were dismissed by staff as “complaints.” 
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Sagan (1993) asserted that organizational culture grounded in politics and self-
interest stifled learning from previous near misses. The point of Sagan’s research was that 
apparent safe and reliable operations do not dismiss the need for disaster awareness in 
highly complex, tightly coupled organizations. The value of individual alertness and 
readiness to respond to anomalies and irregularities is critical to averting catastrophes 
more than creating additional systems to increase reliability. Sagan’s near-miss research 
was used in this study to point out that what might appear to be proper organizational 
reporting might not be representative of reality and the underlying developing financial 
disasters. 
Production pressures. Perrow (1999) argued that the call for efficiencies in 
tangible systems to get there faster and do things quicker, better, and cheaper puts undue 
pressures on systems and their members to perform in ways that outweigh their social and 
moderated capacity for safety. Decisions to improve the cost effectiveness of an 
operation increase the chances of causal accident factors to align and result in a tragic 
event (Rasmussen, 1997). Organizational “elites” are at fault for putting profits ahead of 
safety because they feel insulated from risk. Private gain, power, and self-interests direct 
the pressure to perform and are difficult to adjust in the interest of risk management 
(Christian et al., 2009; Perrow, 1999; Vaughan, 1990; Weick, 2004). 
Production pressures not only impair physical systems but also push financial 
systems to produce beyond their intended capacity (Müssig, 2009). The drive for 
financial institutions such as banks, brokerage houses, and insurance companies to gain 
competitive advantage for finite consumer financial resources promulgated the 
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development of innovative investment instruments fraught with financial risk and 
potential collapse (Lo, 2009). Financial performance pressures often resolve in the abuse 
of earnings management tactics (Lou & Wang, 2011). Earnings management, when used 
in a reasonable manner that does not violate federal antifraud statutes (Beasley et al., 
2010) or generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP; Nobles et al., 2014), is a legal 
but often questionably ethical, financial reporting tool used to smooth volatile financial 
activity via reasonable adjustments to the books (Ball, 2009; Rosenfield, 2000). 
However, when used to support share price artificially and as a basis for 
executive/managerial remuneration plans, earnings management becomes a manipulation 
tool for fraudulent reporting (Ball, 2009; Beasley et al., 2010; Lou & Wang, 2011; 
O’Connell, 2004). 
When pressures to perform financially outweigh the moral saliency of proper 
reporting, executives breach their fiduciary responsibility and commit financial reporting 
fraud (Lou & Wang, 2011). Ostas (2007) investigated the determinants of executive fraud 
decisions and reported that because fiduciary fiscal infractions were not associated with 
physical human harm, executives perceived financial reporting fraud as less immoral than 
breaking workplace safety regulations. The need to maintain earnings levels for Wall 
Street and executives’ immoral and unethical decision making were at the heart of 
Enron’s catastrophic financial system failure (Arnold & De Lange, 2004). Ostas used 
Enron to demonstrate how financial systems, including controls, fail when a corporate 
culture tolerates executives’ decisions to breach their fiduciary duty to pursue pecuniary 
gain rather than exercise moral self-restraint. 
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In their discussion of the keys to enhancing reliability in complex organizations, 
K. H. Roberts and Bea (2001) iterated the need for aggressive error seeking and 
containment mindfulness, and integrated communication outlined by other HRO 
theorists, and they added a cost-benefit analysis perspective by pointing out that HROs 
address the tension between rewarding efficiency and rewarding reliability. This notion is 
important when discussing the reliability of financial reporting because the expense of 
accident-avoiding strategies can appear to erode profitability if management’s focus is on 
short-term monetary gain. When an organization’s focus is on profit or benefit 
sustainability through reliable operations, the apparent erosion of short-term gain from 
increased training, maintenance, testing, and other redundant HRO strategies is accepted, 
measured, incentivized, and rewarded (K. H. Roberts & Bea, 2001).  
Workers often are conflicted by leadership rhetoric regarding organizational goals 
for safe and reliable operations while basing rewarding and incentivizing programs on 
fiscal performance only. The pressure to produce earnings often outweighs espoused 
goals for reliable operations, making K. H. Roberts and Bea’s (2001) point particularly 
salient in promoting reliable financial reporting. HROs appreciate and manage the 
delicate balance between fiscal and reliable performance by quantifying the cost of 
accidents as well as the value of mitigating these costs, continually evaluating reward and 
incentive plans, and assessing the alignment of espoused goals with real goals (K. H. 
Roberts & Bea, 2001). Vaughan (2009) observed that historic political budgetary 
decisions created a collusion of bureaucratic, technical, and cost/schedule/efficiency 
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mandates in NASA’s desirable safe culture, transforming it to an environment ripe for 
cultivating disaster. 
Learning failure. On January 28, 1986, the space shuttle Challenger exploded 
only 72 seconds after liftoff (Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger 
Accident, 1986). A technical O-ring failure was the component failure of the Challenger 
accident, but deep-seated organizational factors such as decision making, organizational 
learning, culture, and hierarchal structure caused the accident (Vaughan, 1990, 2003, 
2009). In 2003, 17 years after the Challenger disaster, the space shuttle Columbia 
exploded upon reentry into the Earth’s atmosphere (Columbia Accident Investigation 
Board, 2003). Again, although the physical cause of the accident was a technical breach 
in the thermal protection system caused by a piece of insulating foam, investigative 
reports indicated that dysfunctional organizational factors such as communication, 
information processing, decision making, learning, and culture factors were at fault 
(Deal, 2004; Pidgeon & O’Leary, 2000; Vaughan, 1990, 2009).  
Experiences of failed task performance can transfer into knowledge to be shared 
with other organizational members. However, the successful transfer of this knowledge 
into learning is contingent upon the latent context of the organization (Argote & Miron-
Spektor, 2011). Failure to respond in accordance to generally accepted advice can cause 
harm to victims (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997), yet Vaughan (2009) pointed out that even 
when generally accepted advice dictates needed change, negative patterns embedded in 
the organizational culture can continue because of external, political, and other 
unpredictable control agents.  
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Carmeli and Gittell (2009) found that the probability of losing a lot by admitting a 
mistake often prohibits learning. When this happens, the depth of learning is limited to 
detecting and correcting superficial errors rather than investigating and challenging the 
deep organizational causes. Superficial single-loop learning leads to band-aid fixes rather 
than adjustments to the underlying culture. A culture of trust, psychological safety, and 
high-quality interpersonal relationships are variables that correlate to successful learning 
from experience, or deep-seated double-loop learning that challenges the underlying 
beliefs and assumptions of the organization (Argote & Miron-Spektor, 2011; Carmeli & 
Gittell, 2009).  
  Schein (1993) posited that psychological safety is a variable in group change 
because it promotes learning through substantive communication or dialogue between 
and among hierarchal corporate levels. However, Schein also pointed out that latent 
hierarchy-based subcultures hinder learning, organizational integration, and coordination 
because organizational learning cannot occur until the learning first takes place in the 
executive subculture, which is doubtful when executives resist self-analysis. Effecting 
cultural change by learning from mistakes is difficult for an organization because of the 
underlying culture.  
Management of Risk 
Risk management. Risk management research has been a prevalent and relevant 
paradigm worthy of investigation and implementation, as indicated by the increase in the 
number of articles referencing ERM and risk management officers (Liebenberg & Hoyt, 
2003). Because the current study was concerned with providing empirical evidence to 
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assist in managing integrated financial systems risk to ameliorate financial disaster, the 
predominant source of risk management literature for the study has centered on the risk 
factors of catastrophes caused by failures in complex technical systems. Managing 
catastrophic risk is essential because even though space shuttle explosions (Vaughan, 
2003); oil spills (Gill et al., 2011; Graham et al., 2011; Harrald et al., 1990); nuclear 
power plant meltdowns (Perrow, 1999); nuclear weapons near misses (Sagan, 1993); 
chemical plant leaks and explosions; and mass transit accidents are rare, the damage is 
generally devastating, tangible, and easily observed. However, the risk management 
literature also has included research in less formidable yet vital technical systems as 
information technology (Sammarco, 2005) and health care services (Bagnara et al., 2010; 
Pronovost et al., 2006). Institutions manage market risk by using mathematical equations 
to quantitatively analyze the effects of business practices or specific transactions used to 
protect assets, realize returns on investments, or mitigate losses associated with capital 
market activity uncertainties (Ernst & Young, 2013; Lo, 2009; Power, 2005). 
Furthermore, often overlooked in the discussion of risk management has been the 
strategic risk in protecting an organization’s most valuable intangible asset, namely, its 
reputation (O’Rourke, 2004) or headline news exposure (Levine, 2004; Valukas, 2010). 
In their discussion of reputation risk management, Bebbington, Larrinaga, and 
Moneva (2008) stated that reputation is a valuable intangible asset that “produces 
tangible benefits such as charging premium prices in exchange for quality, lower resource 
costs, customer and employee loyalty, and cushion when a crisis occurs” (p. 339). 
Valukas’s (2010) report on the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy included comments from 
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the then-global financial controller regarding concerns about the reputational and 
headline risk inherent in certain transactions used to reduce the balance sheet and impact 
the publicly reported net leverage ratio. Irresponsible financial reporting agents 
manipulated fiscal data and breached their fiduciary duty to achieve pecuniary gain, 
disregarding the long-term effect of their decisions on the organization or other 
stakeholders (Valukas, 2010). 
Executive disregard for policies and perpetual warnings from internal and external 
sources, a nontransparent reporting culture, and negligent external control on the part of 
independent auditors Ernst & Young allowed Lehman’s questionable accounting 
practices to incubate into a financial disaster adversely affecting the organization and 
related stakeholders, including the U.S. economy (Valukas, 2010). Reputational capital 
can be managed through strategic operational compliance and financial (reporting) 
interactions with stakeholders (Bebbington et al., 2008). 
Enterprise risk management. COSO (2004) designed the ERM framework to 
provide a common language and guide to operationalize stakeholder organizational value 
by maximizing opportunity while minimizing risk to achieve the organization’s strategic, 
operational, reporting, and compliance goal objectives.  
COSO (2004) defined ERM as 
A process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management and other 
personnel, applied in a strategy setting and across the enterprise, designed to 
identify potential events that may affect the entity, and manage risk to be within 
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its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of 
entity objectives. (p. 2) 
  The ERM framework also expanded the previously established internal control 
framework of operational, reporting, and compliance goal achievement to anticipate, 
assess, and embrace uncertainties from a strategic goal achievement perspective (COSO, 
2004). Furthermore, where the internal control framework included risk assessment as a 
forensic component of quality internal control, the ERM model expanded the risk 
assessment component into three segments that when coupled with components from the 
internal control framework make up the total risk management components in COSO’s 
ERM framework (DeLoach & Thomson, 2014).  
Eight ERM components integrate with the management process of an 
organization. The checkpoints ensure that the tenor of the organization is centered on risk 
appetite values and ideals (internal environment), then it ensures that objectives are set 
(objective setting) so that internal and external threats or opportunities can be identified 
(event identification), assessed (risk assessment), and actions developed to respond to the 
events (risk response). Procedures and processes (control activities) operationalize 
effective risk response actions. Capturing, analyzing, and effectively disseminating 
relevant information (i.e., communication) to all members of the organization is integral 
to the fluid, iterative, and interactive nature of ERM. As organizations change, so may the 
requirements of ERM. Therefore, regularly evaluating (i.e., monitoring) the ERM process 
ensures that the framework is modified and adjusted accordingly to accomplish its goal 
(COSO, 2004). A comprehensive and fluid integrated ERM system facilitates insight into 
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all aspects of business planning because it approaches risk management from various 
organizational perspectives and provides a standard for implementation and monitoring. 
Some organizations have adopted ERM’s holistic risk management system to 
increase stakeholder value, but others have not (Beasley et al., 2005). Determinants of 
ERM system adoption include dictates from boards of directors or other senior 
leadership, external regulatory standards, and the presence of risk managers or other such 
designated executives whose duty it is to focus on risk matters (Kleffner, Lee, & 
McGannon, 2003; Liebenberg & Hoyt, 2003). Other organizational factors that influence 
ERM adoption are organization size, auditor type, industry categorization, and statute 
requirements (Beasley et al., 2005). ERM does not look the same in every organization. 
However, Peter Frank, PwC partner, stated that successful ERM programs have one thing 
in common, a robust risk process culture (as cited in Essaides, 2013). 
J. Cohen et al. (2017) used the ERM framework outlined by COSO (2004) to 
examine the linkage between ERM and the quality of financial reporting by performing a 
qualitative analysis of 11 organizations’ governance triad that they defined as chief 
financial officers (CFOs), audit committee members, and external audit partners. They 
found that ERM influenced the quality of financial reporting and internal controls but had 
less impact on the quality of external audits. J. Cohen et al. attributed this lowered impact 
to the propensity for auditors to focus on audit compliance standards and lack of ERM 
knowledge or value. Although the ERM framework was intended to provide an objective 
structure to implement a comprehensive risk management platform, Power (2009) 
purported that without more emphasis on governance quality rather than regulatory 
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compliance, ERM might be reduced to a “corporate policy document only to provide 
symbolic security” (p. 851). Clarke (1999) referred to plans that try to control dangers as 
fantasy documents “set in rhetoric of technical competence, and often in one of national 
interest, providing a context that helps persuade audiences (internal and external) of their 
legitimacy” (p. 16). The frequency with which external auditors have played a role in 
financial disasters (e.g., Enron, Madoff, Lehman Brothers, and others) raises the question 
whether financial audit documents are simply fantasy documents designed to assert 
tenuous confidence in the financial condition of a company. 
Although the ERM framework was intended to assure stakeholders that inclusive 
goal achievement would be at minimal risk, it has limitations. ERM is a system 
addressed, developed, and implemented by individuals, and the human resource system 
drives its success (COSO, 2004). It is reasonable that similar factors causing technical 
system failures, such as misguided cultural assumptions and values, fiscal pressures, 
errors, injudicious agentic decisions, and control failure, can cause an ERM system to fail 
(DeLoach & Thomson, 2014).  
Power (2009) expounded on the systemic risk of ERM by outlining the conflicts 
of a holistic risk appetite concept built on compliance-driven notions. Power maintained 
that harnessing an organization’s entire risk scenario under one premise is nearly 
impossible because of the behavioral subjective biases and predispositions of the 
individuals involved. The critical imagination necessary to excavate unknown future 
events requires an arena of discomfort and ambiguity, yet this appears to be in conflict 
with an ERM designed as an auditable tool of due process (Power, 2009). A compliance- 
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driven risk management approach prohibits the intricate view of interconnectivity that 
organizations have with their environment, which in itself limits the scope of risk 
assessment. Scheytt et al. (2006) maintained that regulatory process side effects can be 
counterproductive to risk management in that they create their own subset of procedural, 
reputational, and legal risks. A comprehensive, firm-wide ERM framework provides 
value to organizations and their stakeholders. However, excessive emphasis on 
compliance and regulation limits ERM effectiveness by placing a wedge between 
managing uncertainties and the overarching purpose of supporting goal objective 
achievement.  
High-Reliability Organizations 
Certain technical high-risk operations cannot implement trial-and-error risk 
management methods because the cost of a system failure to a population or an 
environment outweighs the benefit of learning from an error (LaPorte & Consolini, 
1991), which precipitates the need to operate at a high rate of reliability from the start. 
Groups of researchers investigated the unique characteristics of these high-risk technical 
organizations operating with unusually high rates of reliability and developed the HRO 
theory and the concept of HROs (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991; Orlitzky et al., 2003; K. H. 
Roberts, 1990; Schulman, 1993). HRO theory defines the deliberate systemic 
organizational paradigm, meaning that despite the normal accident tendency, some 
organizations are able to manage risk where they operate nearly failure free (Lekka, 
2011; Perrow, 1999; Rijpma, 1997; K. H. Roberts, 1990; Sagan, 1993; Schulman, 1993; 
Weick et al., 2008). 
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HRO theory parallels NAT’s premise, wherein deeper organizational 
characteristics and system interaction failures often are the antecedents to accidents in 
high-risk technical industries, even when it appears initially to be operator error (LaPorte 
& Consolini, 1991; Perrow, 1999). Furthermore, like the MMD model, HRO theory 
acknowledges that certain organizational factors allow active and latent failures to 
compile and incubate to a point where the rules and regulations in place to mitigate 
accidents lose their defensibility (Pidgeon, 1997; Reason, 1997; Sagan, 1993; Turner & 
Pidgeon, 1997).  
HROs reduce the risks associated with human-technical system interaction by 
designing initial systems to address the organizational factors outlined in NAT’s complex 
and highly coupled inevitable accident model (Perrow, 1999) and the MMD model of 
accumulated latent and active errors (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997), which increases an 
organization’s vulnerability paradigm (Sagan, 1993). The accident-causing literature 
regarding risk factors in high-risk industries has contained theories developed from a 
posteriori analyses of accident case reports, but the HRO literature has contained research 
about the antecedents and determinants of reliability from a concurrent ethnographic 
approach to identify the factors that contribute to nearly accident-free operations in high-
risk organizations (Bourrier, 2011). 
Leveson et al. (2009) outlined the fallibility of high reliability as the prominent 
construct in safe operations from a systems theory engineering perspective, in that 
dysfunctional yet reliable systemic interaction can lead to accidents. When production 
pressures or migration in processes influence safety constraints and processes negatively, 
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system interactions become dysfunctional, creating an accident-prone environment 
(Leveson et al., 2009). From this idea, Leveson et al. developed a fluid, enterprise-wide 
systems/control safety risk model that includes mathematical risk analysis processes to 
combat system degradation resulting from active pressures or constraints on the system. 
Control and communication between and among levels maintain the hierarchical system 
control process in the desired model. Leveson et al.’s application of an active and 
iterative enterprise systems/control risk model to promote reliable and safe operations in 
high-risk organizations supports the application of a fluid ERM model to control system 
degradation for managing risk in less highly technical operations not subject to 
immediate safety breaches. 
HROs are not error free. They are organizations recognized by their lack of 
catastrophic events, despite advanced technological capabilities and complex 
interdependent systems (K. H. Roberts, 1990). Seminal HRO theorists recognized this 
characteristic and conducted studies to investigate performance reliability traits of the 
U.S. Federal Aviation Administration air traffic control system; the Pacific Gas and 
Electric Company’s electric power system, which includes the Diablo Canyon nuclear 
power plant; and the flight operations of U.S. aircraft carriers and other similar 
organizations (Bourrier, 2011; Sagan, 1993; Schulman, 1993). The literature generated by 
these and other studies outlined specific thematic characteristics germane to HROs, with 
the overarching characteristic being the continued mind set to actively and aggressively 
seek, gather, analyze, and synthesize data regarding the current operating environment to 
diligently and vigilantly search out system failures or errors that would lead to disastrous 
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outcomes if not addressed (Lekka, 2011; K. H. Roberts & Bea, 2001; Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2007; Weick et al., 2008). However, error awareness without actions to mitigate danger 
are useless and allow errors to accrue into disastrous events (Weick et al., 2008). 
 Collective mindfulness. HROs anticipate, contain, respond to, and rebound from 
errors through collective and mindful attention to errors operationalized by a 
preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify interpretations, sensitivity to 
operations, commitment to resilience, and deference to expertise (Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2007; Weick et al., 2008). Collective mindfulness was significant to the theoretical basis 
of the current study as an antithetic construct to the unreliable irresponsible financial 
reporting that led to the Enron case (McLean & Elkind, 2004). Financial reporting agents 
in this case observed and understood some of the latent errors and active failures in the 
reporting system, yet they either chose not to, or were unable to, act to correct them 
(McLean & Elkind, 2004), which engendered unreliable reporting and potential financial 
debacle.   
Preoccupation with failure. HROs exist in a constant state of failure 
anticipation, that is, they expect the unexpected (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). As stated 
earlier, failure is a precursor to learning how to avert disaster. However, if HROs rarely 
experience failure, the opportunity to learn is not apparent. Therefore, how can 
preoccupation with failure be a factor of successful ERM in an organization with limited 
failure? Weick et al. (2008) surmised that any lapse in system or component operation is 
reason for investigation and that one deviation, no matter how small, if left unaddressed 
could breed disaster. Examples include “recent changes in supervision, issues delegated 
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without follow-up, lack of a questioning attitude, missed steps in a procedure, people not 
on the same page, and staff spread thin, distraction from schedule pressures” (Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2007, pp. 47-48). Broadening the definition of error from only egregious and 
interrupting to include commonplace changes makes seemingly mundane maintenance 
activities high order for locating small incidents or weaknesses for accident prevention 
learning (LaPorte, 1996; K. H. Roberts & Bea, 2001; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007; Weick et 
al., 2008). Taking from Sagan’s (1993) near-miss discussion, even those actions used to 
avert accidents are opportunities to learn. 
Consistent success promulgates complacency and self-reliance, both of which can 
increase the tendency for human error (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991). Lo (2009) suggested 
that long periods of economic growth and prosperity lead to investor complacency, which 
reduces the diligent seeking of latent errors and failures that could lead to financial crises. 
Even during periods of continued operational success, HROs diligently combat failure 
potentials that emerge from diminished vigilance, discontinued adjustments, and the 
failure to strive in a complacent environment (Weick et al., 2008). An organization 
preoccupied with failure assumes that something is wrong, even when it appears not to 
be. 
Reluctance to simplify interpretations. Non-HROs strive to simplify or 
streamline processes and procedures in the interests of efficiency, productivity, and 
profitability by arriving at consensus about which data to ignore and which to act upon 
(Shawn Burke, Wilson, & Salas, 2005). Simplification in HROs is slower and evolves 
differently, and the need for simplification diminishes with each analytical challenge 
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(Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). Reluctance to simplify interpretations means continuously 
dissecting and analyzing organized processes and procedures from divergent perspectives 
to combat risk inertia created by complacency (Weick et al., 2008). HROs seek and 
embrace reasons to challenge the system status because they are never satisfied with the 
accident-prevention status quo. 
Heterogeneous inquiry instigated by team members diverse in experience, 
training, and organizational status can generate redundant system analysis through 
skepticism and disagreement (Shawn Burke et al., 2005). Vogus and Welbourne (2003) 
suggested that organizations use skilled temporary employees to provide fresh insight to 
mindless routines. Resulting consensus from challenged perspectives can generate 
additional skepticism from other members, which generates yet more probing and 
analysis of processes and procedures (Weick et al., 2008). Managing the various 
perspectives of individual challenge and debate for the good of operations requires a 
culture of interpersonal excellence, such as active communication, employee 
engagement, trust, and mutual respect, to mitigate potential issues resulting from hubris, 
bullying, and self-importance (Vogus & Welbourne, 2003; Weick et al., 2008). The HRO 
concept of reluctance to simplify interpretations was relevant to this study as a construct 
to combat the simplification of auditing and reporting techniques, processes, and 
procedures simplified in the interest of profitability. 
  Redundancy. NAT theorists have argued that redundant measures create an 
atmosphere of complacency (Rijpma, 1997). HROs value the redundancy of 
informational technology components, parts, and personnel duties because it ameliorates 
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the brittleness of tight coupling, so they use methods to actively address complacency 
from reliance on duplicity (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991; Lekka, 2011; Rijpma, 2003; K. 
H. Roberts, 1990; Weick et al., 2008). Extra efforts to implement redundant technologies, 
components, and extensive cross training come at a cost. Therefore, the decision to invest 
in high-reliability measures depends upon the weight of avoiding hazardous accidents 
versus the cost of hazardous disasters (K. H. Roberts, 1990).  
Sensitivity to operations. The notion of sensitivity to operations questions 
whether the reality of the work is being performed as prescribed by the analyses, plans, 
and designs developed to address the complexity of the operations (Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2007). Sensitivity to operations means taking a step away from the objective, measured, 
and quantified operational constraints to view operations from an experiential and 
comprehensive perspective for thematic anomalies, or other evidence of changes in 
operational condition that can pose safety threats. Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) provided an 
example of sensitivity to operations when a high level of needle stick injuries was 
occurring among medical cleaning personnel. By analyzing the process, management 
realized that the injuries were not the result of careless individual error; instead, they 
occurred because trash receptacles resided under old needle dispensers. The trash 
receptacles were moved, and the injuries stopped. Reacting insightfully to an existing 
error to correct it is one indication of sensitivity to operations. However, an HRO that 
successfully operationalizes sensitivity to operations will look at a near miss as an active 
failure or an error worthy of investigation and learning, not as evidence of its satisfactory 
safety and reliability processes (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). 
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Saturated awareness and alertness to every situational aspect of the current 
operating environment requires effective communication, valid interpretation, and higher 
level cognitive interaction between team members and the social construct of the system. 
Weick and Roberts (1993) surmised that collective, heedful actions of system actors 
creates a platform upon which sense making can occur to validate and confirm that 
operations are going as planned. When the collective group’s “knowledge of failure, 
details, potential for recovery, and relevant experience” indicate that operations do not 
make sense within the confines of the system, the same collective effort is used to 
reconstruct the system to make sense (Weick et al., 2008, p. 45). When the social 
construct of the human resource system promotes heedless actions dissociated from the 
system, errors accumulate, and accidents occur (Weick & Roberts, 1993). 
  Commitment to resilience. The ability to reconstruct a system 
contemporaneously or asynchronously to make sense of adverse conditions and to 
contain and bounce back from disruptions (Weick et al., 2008) distinguishes HROs from 
other organizations. Resilient organizations learn from adversity caused by internal (i.e. 
production pressures) and external (i.e. investor and market) influences, with the result 
being reliable operations. Resilient commitment assumes that current knowledge is not 
adequate to manage what is unexpected, so HROs continue to press and challenge the 
system’s perceived accurate interactions, even when the system appears to be stronger 
after having addressed a particular error (Vogus & Welbourne, 2003; Weick et al., 2008). 
The medical maintenance team whose members suffered from accidental needle pricks 
responded to the repetitive and unsafe occurrences in a manner that made their operations 
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stronger and posed less threat to employees and possible greater societal danger, had 
disease been spread by unintended needle pricks. However, the team’s knowledge of and 
effective response to the needle prick threat unwittingly stifled anticipation of a similar 
yet unrelated error because the actors might simply have applied the successful removal 
strategy of the trash receptacles as a fix rather than investigate other failure outcroppings.  
Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) defined resilience in the form of control as 
A system able to minimize or eliminate unwanted variability, either in its own 
performance, in the environment, or in both…The fundamental characteristic of a 
resilient organization is that it does not lose control of what it does but is able to 
continue and rebound. (p. 70)  
Taking control can refer to the ad hoc convergence of informed and 
knowledgeable individuals to contain an emerging crisis stemming from an adverse 
system disruption, to fighting ambivalence occurring from the orderliness of successful 
past performance (Weick et al., 2008). The reflexivity of response and reaction to a 
situation depends upon the accessibility of information needed at the time, regardless of 
decision-making authority. 
Structure and deference to expertise. As a participant observer in an in-depth 
case study aboard two nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, K. H. Roberts (1990) recognized 
that structured hierarchical differentiation facilitated routine operations through a rigid 
chain of responsibility and extensive communication methods facilitated access to 
expertise in critical situations. However, in a moment of crisis, personnel of hierarchical 
rank could invoke their specific expertise to make emergent decisions in the name of 
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safety (Bigley & Roberts, 2001; LaPorte & Consolini, 1991; Vogus & Welbourne, 2003; 
Weick et al., 2008). Members of the team closest to frontline operations often are the 
most proximal to error events and are, therefore, the best people to make quick decisions 
to prevent conversions of system disruptions to serious accidents (Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2007). The apparent decentralization of the hierarchical decision-making dimension of 
HROs seems paradoxical, but Leveson et al. (2009) pointed out that the immediate 
limited decision-making nature of lower ranking individuals, such as the authority of 
aircraft carriers’ seamen to abort landings, mitigates disaster, but does not change policy 
or process unless leadership addresses the effect of the decisions on the system.  
When the hierarchical structure is impenetrable, lower ranking corporate members 
often are reluctant to speak up, challenge authority, and push the matter of correcting 
discovered latent failures (Weick et al., 2008). Furthermore, higher power-ranked 
members generally operate in a bounded and rational decision-making zone (Turner & 
Pidgeon, 1997) because they do not have the hands-on work experience knowledge to 
value the information offered. In some cases, underling concerns are ignored so as not to 
interrupt a seemingly profitable status quo. When a lower level error combines with a 
higher order error such as bounded and rational decision making, unethical leadership, or 
poor communication, the resulting effect can be complex and difficult to reconcile 
(Weick et al., 2008). 
When higher ranked corporate members who possess the hierarchical power to 
make permanent change do not address errors declared by lower ranked members, 
normalization of acceptable deviance develops (Vaughan, 2003). Ordered reliability in a 
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culture of normalized deviance is dangerous because it allows risk inertia to multiply 
exponentially as the hazard slips through the holes in the organization’s defenses that 
leadership refuses to plug (K. H. Roberts & Bea, 2001; Weick et al., 2008). Turner and 
Pidgeon (1997) referred to the structured nature of unintended consequences as antitasks. 
If the purpose of hierarchically structured systems is to accomplish the organization’s 
tasks, then the unintended consequences that arise from these negentropic, order-seeking 
systems are considered antitasks rather than completely random errors. Antitasks of a 
hierarchical structure can amplify a failed system component in such an orderly fashion 
that problem acceptance integrates into the organization’s culture and that even when 
higher ranked members finally acknowledge and deem the deviance formidable, the 
inertia cannot be stopped, and disaster occurs (Vaughan, 2009).  
This notion is particularly salient to irresponsible financial reporting. McLean and 
Elkind (2004) provided various examples of lower ranked stakeholders questioning the 
financial reporting practices of Enron, with no heedful reactions from the executives for 
various self-centered reasons. Enron’s aggressive, individual success-seeking, 
competitive, unethical, and rule-stretching culture allowed the orderly, negentropic nature 
of financial reporting systems to promulgate its financial accounting system failures in an 
orderly fashion all the way to Wall Street’s unsupported earnings reports (Sims & 
Brinkmann, 2003). Sims and Brinkman (2003) posited that Enron’s culminated financial 
collapse was the direct result of decisions and actions permitted by Enron’s culture.  
Organizational culture. A culture embodies the embedded shared assumptions, 
values, and beliefs developed to make sense of organizational problems and solutions 
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(Schein, 1983). Leaders establish and drive organizational culture, and culture shapes the 
paradigm in which organizations operate (Schein, 1983, 1984). Weick and Sutcliffe 
(2007) used O’Reilly’s (1989) model of corporate culture conditions to corroborate their 
notion of reporting, justice, flexibility, and learning in HRO culture (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Managing culture. Reprinted from “Corporations, Culture, and Commitment: 
Motivation and Social Control in Organizations,” by C. O’Reilly in California 
Management Review, 32(4), p. 23. Copyright 1989 by the Regents of the University of 
California. Reprinted with permission.  
 
Organizational culture eventually resolves in financial outcomes, often referred to 
as the “bottom line” of a business (Denison, 1984; Glaser, 2014). Negative cultural 
influences can soften the boundaries of control systems, thus allowing latent risk 
conditions to normalize into business as usual, which sets the stage for a socio-
organizationally caused technical disaster (Martinez-Moyano et al., 2013; Rasmussen, 
1997; Vaughan, 2009). 
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Sims and Brinkman (2003) used Schein’s (1984) five primary cultural influencing 
leadership mechanisms (i.e., attention, reaction to crisis, role modeling, allocation of 
rewards, and criteria for selection and dismissal) to analyze the effect of leadership on 
Enron’s demise. The analysis detailed various examples of negative leadership influences 
responsible for generating a culture of antitask development. To protect stakeholders 
from the harmful effects of negative influences, authorities designed and implemented 
regulatory, legislative, and industry controls. However, if the organizational culture does 
not embrace and promote the control system, stakeholders can experience risk-harm. 
In the wake of Enron, O’Connell (2004) analyzed accounting practices, corporate 
governance, and regulations, positing that “fundamental failure of contemporary 
regulatory and corporate governance systems means that ongoing abuses and costly 
failures will continue to plague our capitalist system” (p. 737). Calandro (2012) used 
NAT to define and assess methodologies for analyzing global systemic financial risk, and 
argued that although quantitative and regulatory measures can moderate risk and decrease 
the probability of financial crises, financial risk management methodologies must 
acknowledge and account for qualitative social and behavioral factors to be truly 
effective. HROs operate in a rules-and-regulation schema, but they also engender and 
nurture a culture that addresses the human social factors to operationalize the regulations 
and controls designed for risk management effectively (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991).  
 Informed culture. An organizational culture develops from the stories, artifacts, 
and common language of the members (Schein, 1983). Storytelling is a natural 
mechanism used to transfer knowledge between and among organizational constituents. 
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Initial reactions to what organizational members learn upon assimilation are integral in 
determining their reactions to pressure-driven factors during performance (Weick, 1987). 
By telling stories of previous incidents, problematic situations, and subsequent 
resolutions or difficulties, HROs send the message that it is safe to report to others 
information about potential errors and possible solutions (K. H. Roberts & Bea, 2001; 
Weick, 1987).  
  Just culture. To foster open communication, there must exist a trusting 
atmosphere where members report errors, both theirs and the errors of others, without 
fear of retribution. Reason (2000) conveyed that a reporting culture requires the key 
element of trust and that even though trust exists in a just culture where the boundary 
between blameless and blameworthy actions is blurred, accountability remains for those 
who intentionally engage in unacceptable and unsafe behavior. K. H. Roberts and Bea 
(2001) indicated that systems of reward and incentive must encourage open 
communication of all organizational information, including safety issues, to embellish a 
culture of trust in the interest of safety. Rewards skewed toward financial performance 
will extinguish espoused values of failure avoidance and affect reliable operations 
negatively.  
Diverse culture. As a culture develops, team members assimilate to the culture 
and share like-minded thinking. A diverse culture creates the requisite variety of 
individual characteristics to address potential errors and accident mitigation in HROs 
(Weick, 1987). This thought contradicts the homogeneous nature of redundant safeguards 
and further supports the need for a just culture whose members are less likely to trust 
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individuals who are different from them (Weick, 1987). Gifun and Karydas (2010) 
promoted the value of diverse perspectives in the analytic-deliberative decision making 
process of the highly reliable resilient organization model. 
The various functions of financial reporting systems create an integrated web of 
operations manifested under one set of overarching general accounting, auditing, and 
reporting rules and regulations. Organizational complexity increases when processes and 
procedures require participatory and coordinated integration across departmental lines 
(Schulman, 1993). At Enron, internal competing constraints such as compensation 
structures linked to profit and revenue production, and external performance pressures to 
produce earnings, generate and maintain viable market presence, and meet financing 
covenants fostered a culture of fiefdoms operating out of self-interest (Arnold & De 
Lange, 2004; McLean & Elkind, 2004). Lekka’s (2011) review of HRO literature 
emphasized the importance of organizational culture factors to ensure consistent and 
reliable operations in organizations subject to catastrophic events. 
Summary and Transition 
The purpose of this qualitative, grounded theory study was to use HRO constructs 
as a frame to identify and define the psychological factors of ERM effectiveness in 
organizational financial reporting responsibility. Chapter 2 provided an overview of 
financial reporting and management systems, along with a review of relevant literature, to 
showcase the theoretical basis for the study as it pertained to mitigating disaster factors, 
managing risk, and organizing for high reliability. The NAT and error literature have 
explained possible socio-organizational factors of financial system collapse and resulting 
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disaster (Perrow, 1999; Pidgeon & O’Leary, 2000; Reason, 2000; Sagan, 1993; Turner & 
Pidgeon, 1997). The ERM literature was presented as an established framework for 
operationalizing the human factor in risk management (Beasley et al., 2005; COSO, 
2004; Power, 2009; Rasmussen, 1997; Reason, 1997). The HRO literature served as an 
applicable guidance to frame this investigative study to define the psychological factors 
integral in reliable and responsible financial reporting systems (K. H. Roberts, 1990; 
Schulman, 1993; Vogus & Welbourne, 2003; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007; Weick et al., 
2008).  
The interaction of an organization’s accounting, financial reporting, and control 
subsystems is key to generating accurate and dependable information about the financial 
condition of a company. Interruptions in complex organizational financial systems can 
result in distorted views of the economic outlooks of companies that can become a 
platform for fiscal disaster (Calandro, 2012). Perrow (1999) developed NAT to explain 
how disruptions in complex, integrated, and tangible systems create the potential for 
physical catastrophes. Regulations, statutes, and professional standards provide internal 
and external control risk management processes and procedures to protect stakeholders, 
the public, and the larger economy from the effects of catastrophic financial meltdowns. 
Just as habitual disregard for harm avoidance measures can incubate and precipitate 
physical disasters, as outlined in the MMD model (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997), financial 
control system failures permit erroneous, negligent, and fraudulent acts to evolve into 
egregious financial disasters (Calandro, 2012; Perrow, 2010). 
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Also bound by regulations, rules, and standards to protect third parties, highly 
technical and complexly integrated organizations such as petrochemical and nuclear 
power plants use HRO constructs to conduct operations in nearly accident-free 
environments. HROs address potential risk-harm to third parties by developing and 
nurturing organizational cultures that promote collective and mindful ERM through 
learning, preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify, redundant training and safety 
measures, sensitivity to operations, and fluid structural decision making with deference to 
expertise. Although the literature on financial risk and crises management has addressed 
the human factor in minimizing financial disasters, the ERM factors outlined in these 
sources primarily have addressed quantitative measures balancing risk-taking 
transactional activities with reward and minimal negative impact on organizational 
stakeholders, a tenet known as risk appetite (Arena et al., 2011; Beasley et al., 2005). 
There has been a gap in the literature regarding the psychological constructs of successful 
human interaction with organizational factors to mitigate the risk of financial reporting 
system disaster (Calandro, 2012; Müssig, 2009; Power, 2009). 
Chapter 3 outlines the rationale for choosing a grounded theory research design, 
my influence as the data collection instrument in the study, the recruitment and selection 
of the participants, and the criteria for saturation and sample size. In addition, information 
regarding data collection, analysis, and coding is included in Chapter 3, along with 




  Chapter 4 presents the data revealed from interviewing 13 participants engaged in 
reputable responsible financial reporting systems. The influencing human factors of 
responsible financial reporting systems data are organized and analyzed from a core 
category to subcategories, and applied to the RQs based on the subcategorical groupings. 
Tables, figures, and narratives using quotations from the participants and juxtaposed 
examples from the discrepant Enron (McLean & Elkind, 2004) case to support the 
thematic trends used to present the data. Chapter 5 summarizes the data related to HRO 
and ERM theory, and provides theoretical modeling to address the human factors that 
support the accurate and reliable reporting of entity financial activity in a manner to 
mitigate risk-harm to third-party stakeholders. Chapter 5 also presents information about 
the delimitations and limitations of the study, opportunities for further research, and the 




Chapter 3: Research Methods 
Introduction 
Despite preventive regulatory constraints and best practice policies and 
procedures, financial disasters resulting from irresponsible fiscal management and 
reporting occur, causing risk-harm to unsuspecting stakeholders, innocent other third-
parties, and the greater economic environment. HROs are subject to regulatory 
constraints and best practice policies and procedures, but they also possess organizational 
characteristics that promote reliable operations, despite the tendency for accidents to 
happen (LaPorte, 1996; K. H. Roberts, 1990; K. H. Roberts & Bea, 2001). Understanding 
the psychological factors of HROs as they apply to responsible fiscal management would 
assist in promoting reliability in the less tangible yet highly integrated systems of 
financial management. The organizational psychology literature discussing such an 
application has been sparse and disconnected; therefore, the purpose of this study was to 
use NAT factors and HRO constructs as a frame to identify characteristics of ERM 
effectiveness in organizational financial reporting responsibility.  
This chapter includes an explanation of the research design as well as the 
rationale for the choice of design, including participant selection logic, sampling strategy, 
instrumentation, and data analysis methodology. Because researchers are the instrument 
in qualitative studies (Creswell, 2013; Patton, 2002), the chapter also includes a detailed 
discussion about my role as the researcher. Matters of trustworthiness and the ethical 
procedures used to protect the participants also are presented in this chapter. 
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Research Design and Rationale 
Grounded theory inquiry uses objective induction to elucidate empirical 
knowledge from a target population involved in a common practice or process that will 
generate or expand, rather than simply test, theory (Patton, 2002). The rigors of grounded 
theory inquiry provide organizing and coding tools useful for the in-depth analysis of 
potentially large amounts of data by subjective and penetrative exploration through 
interviews while applying extant theory to maintain objectivity during inquiry (Patton, 
2002). This method of inquiry was appropriate to explicate the unique dimensions of 
HRO psychological constructs germane to effective ERM in fiscal management and 
financial reporting. 
The following RQs were designed to generate relative interpretable data: 
1. What HRO constructs applied in ERM are present in reliable financial 
reporting? 
2. How can HRO constructs applied in ERM minimize organizational 
stakeholder financial risk-harm? 
3. How can HRO constructs applied in ERM inform other organizations to 
motivate leadership and employees to promote fiscal fiduciary responsibility 
while maximizing profitability? 
Role of the Researcher 
The measurement instrument in qualitative research is the researcher (Creswell, 
2013; Patton, 2002). As an observer participant, my experience, knowledge, feelings, 
beliefs, and values affected the variety of reactivity in the study (Patton, 2002). A 
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philosophical assumption in qualitative inquiry is that by acknowledging personal factors 
or biases that might affect data analysis and interpretation, researchers engage in epoche, 
or the setting aside of their experiences, as much as possible to facilitate discovery of an 
original perspective of the phenomenon being studied (Creswell, 2013). Because biases 
can affect data coding, analysis, and interpretation, all of which can reduce the credibility 
or validity of the findings (Creswell, 2013; Patton, 2002; Trochim, 2006a, 2006b), I 
managed my personal influencing factors by understanding my predispositions, 
contemplating how they could have affected the study, and reserving them until the study 
was complete. Furthermore, I used an initial coding scheme (see Appendix A) to remain 
objective and focused on the thematic concepts relevant to this study (Corbin & Strauss, 
2008). This coding scheme allowed me to remain open to all possible data defining HRO 
psychology constructs as they might have applied to organizational financial risk-harm 
management without straying into unrelated areas. 
I am a CPA licensed in the state of Maryland. In line with the AICPA’s (2014) 
Code of Professional Conduct, CPAs are qualified professionals whose overarching 
ethical responsibility is to serve the public interest with integrity and due care by 
providing objective and independent third-party assurance regarding the validity and 
accuracy of the financial activities reported by the management of organizations. CPAs 
perform attest, tax, managerial, and other derivations of related professional services, 
depending on the needs of the user. Assurance services such as audit and review 
engagements are designed to inform third-party users of the integrity of the information 
72 
 
presented by management in the statements of financial position (AICPA, 2013). The 
precept of third-party reliance upon financial reporting was central to this study.  
My credentialing lent credibility to my ability to mine and analyze the data from a 
financial perspective. A possible bias arising from my credentialing was the presumption 
that all individuals involved in accounting inherently abide by the specific regulatory, 
ethical, and reporting standards set forth by the governing agencies guiding assurance 
servicers. This presupposition might have restricted my openness to emerging trends and 
themes of HRO constructs apparent in responsible financial reporting and management. 
However, although I have some experience with assurance services, the preponderance of 
my public accounting experience has been with tax compliance and managerial 
consulting, which might have ameliorated the constricting effects of the presumption 
allowing me to be open to apparent HRO constructs of responsible financial reporting. 
Furthermore, I reviewed cases of fraudulent financial reporting evidencing that not all 
individuals subject to the AICPA assurance standards have exercised their professional 
responsibility to third-party users with objectivity and integrity (Calandro, 2012; Ernst & 
Young, 2013; Markopolos, 2010; McLean & Elkind, 2004).  
As the measurement tool in this study, I was aware that any professional 
association or relationship with any of the participants, coupled with the sensitive and 
revealing nature of financial reporting and fiscal performance, could have resulted in the 
halo effect (Patton, 2002). I had to be cognizant of the possibility of participants 
providing false information to portray themselves and their organizations positively 
rather than realistically. To mitigate the variety of reactivity of this effect, I asserted my 
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position as a researcher, not as a CPA, a colleague, or a professional network contact. I 
provided assurance that the identities of the participants and their organizations would be 
protected, as outlined in the informed consent. To mitigate a halo effect further, I used 
my accounting knowledge to mine truthful and honest information from the participants 
by analyzing publicly published or requested financial statements and reports. This 
procedure facilitated triangulation of the data provided by the participants (see Appendix 
B). I also was cognizant of the fact that some participants simply were not forthcoming 
and truthful about their actions if they were contrary to responsible reporting, regardless 
of my association with them.  
Gender could have been a factor in my role in this study in that I am a female 
CPA. According to the Current Population Survey (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
2014), women represent more than 60% of the accountant and auditor population. 
However, according to the same survey results, women represent less than 30% of chief 
organizational officers, which could include CFOs. Because I sought participants who 
were predominantly responsible for promoting accurate and responsible financial 
reporting and mitigating financial risk-harm, some participants were CFOs and were 
male. Men and women have different financial risk tolerance (Francis, Hasan, Park, & 
Wu, 2014), a factor that could have had a bearing on my interpretation of the data. I was 
cognizant of this factor when analyzing the data. 
In some qualitative settings, the role of the researcher as observer participant 
affects the variety of reactivity simply by being present (Patton, 2002). This situation was 
not a concern in this study because my short-term presence as an interviewer did not 
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affect the characteristically longitudinal outcome of the embedded financial reporting and 
management practices of the organization with which I was associated at the time of the 
study. 
Target Population 
The target population comprised individuals responsible for or involved in 
organizational fiscal risk management and financial reporting. I anticipated that CFOs, 
CROs, controllers, auditors (external or internal), and accounting staff of organizations 
possessing sound financial management would fit this inclusion criterion. The SEC cited 
the need to meet internal or external earnings expectations as the most common 
motivations for fraud (as cited in Beasley et al., 2010). I sought participants who were 
members of fiscally solvent, publicly traded companies who used certain procedures to 
reveal indicators of sound financial position (AICPA, 2015). Because meeting earnings 
expectations is limited not only to Wall Street expectations but also is used in securing 
debt financing and as the basis for compensation structures, securing participants from 
smaller private organizations was appropriate and helped me to triangulate the data, 
adding trustworthiness to the findings (Patton, 2002). 
In the COSO-sponsored study authored by Beasley et al. (2010), the most 
frequent industries cited as engaging in fraudulent reporting were computer hardware and 
software, other manufacturing, health care/health products, retailers/wholesalers, 
telecommunications, and other service providers. These conclusions were consistent with 
COSO’s (1999) study (as cited in Beasley et al., 2010). Therefore, to qualify the target 
population further, I chose organizations whose primary business purpose was similar to 
75 
 
those listed for a more comparable yet still heterogeneous sample frame. The participants 
chosen to be in the study shouldered the burden of the research, but they also became the 
beneficiaries of the research in that they might be able to use the psychological factors 
defined by this research to further their mission of promoting responsible financial 
reporting and management while maximizing organizational goals. 
Participants were selected using a maximum variation purposeful sampling 
strategy (Patton, 2002), an approach that supported the credibility and transferability of 
the results (Creswell, 2013; Patton, 2002). Participants were screened to ascertain their 
knowledge of financial reporting, as dictated by the rules, regulations, and standards of 
the accounting profession, so that I could consider the level of knowledge during data 
analysis. The deep inquiry of the critical homogeneous sample frame of actors 
responsible for fiscal risk management and financial reporting revealed the rich and thick 
data required to define HRO psychological constructs in organizational financial 
responsibility, and the heterogeneity of organizations across business purposes provided a 
breadth of understanding and support for theoretical application across groups (Patton, 
2002).  
Data richness was further enhanced by exploring the phenomenon under study 
from different perspectives (Creswell, 2013); therefore, the sample frame also stratified 
employees, leadership, and external accountants related to the financial environment and 
the ERM framework of organizations. The goal was to obtain participants from different 
levels of power in organizational reporting systems. Doing so provided information from 
different work experiences, system involvement, and output angles, thus improving the 
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likelihood of retrieving valid data. To approach the data from yet another perspective, I 
used the Enron (McLean & Elkind, 2004) financial disaster as a deviant case to contrast 
and compare the emergent HRO psychological constructs with the deleterious factors of 
irresponsible financial management that contributed to fiscal systemic interruptions and 
ultimate third-party risk-harm in these cases.  
Theoretical sample size is determined by the research purpose, the data 
elucidated, and phenomenological emergence (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Patton, 2002). At 
a certain point in inductive inquiry, gathering a larger quantity of information does not 
contribute to the phenomenological model. When this happens, the data are considered 
saturated (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Creswell, 2013; Patton, 2002). Theoretical 
development research is an iterative process with no definitive precepts other than to do 
the necessary work to extract the relative theoretical data (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; 
Creswell, 2013; Patton, 2002). Based on this notion, I determined that the direction of the 
research and the availability of the organizational constituents dictated a sample size of 
eight to 10 participants. I was satisfied with the final sample of 13 participants. 
Participant Recruitment 
After receiving approval from Walden University’s Institutional Review Board 
(IRB approval #08-10-16-0331125), I recruited the qualified participants via nondirect 
and direct personal invitation. Nondirect invitations were made by posting an invitation 
to join the study on the professional social media site LinkedIn, the Maryland Association 
of Certified Public Accounts’ (MACPA) volunteer opportunity webpage and through its 
listserv, and Walden University’s Participant Pool. Although the LinkedIn call for 
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participants received 41 views, no participants were generated from that venue or the 
indirect invitations posted on the Walden University Participant Pool or the MACPA 
volunteer page or listserv. However, association with MACPA proved fruitful because it 
solidified the credibility of the study in the local professional community and generated 
an opportunity for a direct invitation to one participant who subsequently agreed to join 
the study. 
Personalized e-mail has positive effects on response rates (Heerwegh, 2005). Any 
confidentiality and privacy concerns regarding the use of e-mail are addressed in the 
Human Research Protection section of this chapter. I sent direct e-mail invitations to 
individuals of organizations that were financially sound, as indicated from public 
knowledge, such as in Forbes Magazine’s list of America’s 100 most trustworthy 
companies that was generated by GMI Ratings, a provider of governance research and 
ratings, and public financial data found in the annual Form 10-K, which is the public 
financial disclosure of publicly traded organizations. No responses were generated from 
these direct e-mail invitations; however, direct invitations sent to individuals responsible 
for the sound, ethical, and responsible financial reporting of reputable companies known 
professionally by me and referred to me by others generated the remaining participants.  
After a recruited individual agreed to participate, I generated an e-mail from 
SurveyMonkey’s Email Survey Collector, which provided more information and a link to 
the informed consent and the demographics survey. In an effort to secure further 
participants, the invitation also contained the following information: 
78 
 
NOTE: If you have personal contacts outside of your place of employment, whom 
you believe may meet the requirements to participate in this study, please forward 
this invitation to participate to them so they can contact me and I can send them 
their personal SurveyMonkey link. A forwarded link will not work. 
Because participation in the study was voluntary, no questions, with the exception 
of Question 1, which consented to participating in the study, required an answer before 
moving on. If this question was not answered, the participant received the following 
message: “You must consent to participate to continue; otherwise, you can exit the survey 
and not participate, or, if you need more information before agreeing, please contact the 
researcher.” 
I used the self-reported information in the demographics survey (see Appendix C) 
to determine the eligibility of the participants to be in the study. For example, if the 
company was privately held and did not issue reviewed or audited financial statements 
for third-party reliance, the individual was not qualified to participate. Had any 
disqualifying events occurred, the individuals would have been sent private e-mails 
thanking them for their time and advising them they did not meet the participation 
criteria. I did not need to send any disqualification e-mail notices because there were no 
contraindications in the survey responses indicating that any participants were not 
qualified to be in the study.  
Instrumentation 
I used a demographics questionnaire to collect specific information about the 
eligibility of the participants, and I collected inductive data using a standardized, open-
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ended interview approach (Patton, 2002). Using a rigid questionnaire would have 
inhibited the natural phenomenological discovery and data elucidation germane to 
qualitative inquiry (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Creswell, 2013; Patton, 2002). However, 
conducting the interviews without using a guideline in this grounded theory study might 
not have mined the consistent thematic data required to develop or advance extant theory 
(Patton, 2002). A semistructured interview protocol acted as the framework to gather 
related emergent qualitative data (Patton, 2002) and as an agenda for collecting and 
analyzing voluminous narrative data that assured interested third parties such as IRBs or 
subsequent researchers of the dependability and confirmability of the results (Corbin & 
Strauss, 2008). 
To address the RQs, I developed the interview protocol from an NAT, HRO, and 
ERM lens using analysis of the deviant Enron case and my professional knowledge of 
financial reporting and management. Analyzing historical financial disaster information 
from the Enron scandal (McLean & Elkind, 2004) facilitated the data triangulation 
regarding responsible financial reporting and fiscal management. I formatted the open-
ended interview questions (IQs) to seek data about promoting as well as prohibiting 
responsible financial management to add descriptive richness by triangulating the data 
from negative and positive perspectives (Patton, 2002). Ethical standards and 
professional principles in accounting are operationalized through rules and regulations 
guided by GAAP (Nobles et al., 2014). They promote integrity, objectivity, uniformity, 
and comparability of financial reports to protect users relying on the financial information 
contained in the reports from risk-harm (AICPA, 2014). 
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To ensure credibility, I sought peer-debriefing (Chenail, 2011) or peer-auditing 
(Seale, 1999) feedback from professional colleagues regarding the ability of the IQs to 
elucidate rich and valuable data pertinent to the RQs. Most valuable was the feedback 
from forensic accounting colleagues. These peers did not qualify as participants in the 
study because of our employment relationship or contractual professional association. 
Data Collection 
After the qualified participants consented to join the study voluntarily, I contacted 
them to schedule private interviews at times and locations convenient to them, suggesting 
quiet locations with limited distractions (Creswell, 2013). If time or distance did not 
allow any participants to meet with me in person, I offered to conduct the interviews via 
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP)/video calls such as Skype and record the calls, or via 
non-video-recorded calls. Of the 13 interviews, eight were face-to-face meetings in the 
participants’ office settings. One interview took place in my office, another in a 
conference room at the educational institution where the participant taught, one in the 
participant’s home, and one in a local coffee shop. Initially, I was concerned about the 
audibility of the recorded interview in the coffee shop, but we were able to sit in a private 
area of the shop. I also tested the recording device before we started. I had no trouble 
hearing the recording while transcribing the participants’ responses. Only one interview 
was conducted via recorded telephone call because the participant’s schedule was such 
that an arranged location could not be set. At the onset of the interview, I informed this 
particular participant that the call was being recorded. Consent to record the call was 
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obtained and recorded before the interview began. No other interview methods were used 
to collect the data. 
No personal or organizational conditions negatively influenced the respondents’ 
participation. However, one organization was in a period of reorganization with regard to 
structure and strategy, a situation that provided a unique perspective of the ERM of 
responsible financial reporting and management. Also worthy of noting is the fact that 
although financial reporting deadlines loom throughout the year, the interview period 
occurred during the fall and winter holidays, which provided a more relaxed platform that 
encouraged fluid and easy conversation. This time-induced setting was not anticipated 
when outlining the interview process, but it did give me more time to extract substantial 
data from the respondents than might have been possible under more stressful 
circumstances and tighter time constraints.  
At the scheduled times of the face-to-face interviews, I arrived early enough to set 
up and test the Olympus WS-853 digital voice recorder that I used to record the 
interviews before the participants arrived. I tested the digital recorder before the 
respondents arrived and again after their arrival by introducing myself and then asking 
the participants to state their first names and the date. At that point, I stopped the 
recording so that each participant and I could listen to it to ensure that we had quality 
audio for the interview. We then proceeded with the actual interview. Testing the 
equipment before recording ensured quality audio reception and negated the need to 
repeat the initial interview (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Creswell, 2013; Patton, 2002).  
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I noticed that when the face-to-face interviews commenced, the participants 
fixated on the audio recorder that I had placed on the table or desk, which made the start 
to each interview slightly stilted. Because building trust and rapport between researcher 
and participant elucidates richer data (Patton, 2002), I was concerned that the focus on 
the equipment would prohibit rich data mining. However, additional questions in the 
interview protocol regarding job duties, involvement with rules and regulations, and 
expertise took the focus from the equipment and placed it on the participants, which 
provided a platform for me to build rapport with them and for the participants to relax 
and speak freely and often passionately about the topic thereafter.  
I followed the same protocol for each interview, modifying it as the interviews 
progressed for redundancy, clarity, and to fit each participant’s situation and 
circumstances. The open-ended IQs were successful in focusing the dialogue on the 
purpose of the study while also encouraging the participants to share their unique 
experiences in responsible financial reporting. At times, the participants became so 
passionate and informative that I had to redirect some participants back to the essence of 
the IQs.  
If I believed that I could excavate more data from any of the interviews, or if any 
participants offered data that deserved to be pursued, I obtained their permission to 
follow up with them for clarification or verification (Creswell, 2013). All but three cases 
went no longer than the 1 hour promised. I advised the participants in the three extended 
interviews that my allotted time had expired and that unless they wished to continue, I 
would thank them for their time and conclude the interviews. The participants 
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appreciated my respect for their time but wished to continue because they felt that they 
had more information to provide. One participant was contacted via e-mail after the 
interview for additional information. I downloaded the audio files to my laptop 
immediately after the interviews for redundant storage in the event that the data on the 
recorder were accidentally erased or corrupted.  
In all data collection scenarios, there were no debriefing procedures. I thanked the 
participants for their time and reminded them that as a part of member checking, I would 
send them copies of their individual transcribed responses to review and summaries of 
the preliminary interpretation of the data derived from the interviews to provide feedback 
concerning accuracy. I also advised the participants that they would receive an executive 
summary of the study upon completion. 
Data Reduction 
I designed the IQs to elucidate data connected to each RQ. The IQs relevant to 
RQ1 were intended to investigate the presence of HRO constructs that promote reliability 
in organizational financial reporting. The IQs pertaining to RQ2 addressed adherence to 
the rules, regulations, standards, and statutes intended to mitigate financial risk-harm.  
Some peers have argued that “doing the right thing” and maximizing 
organizational net income rarely coexist in successful organizational reality. They have 
not been alone in this thought: Many researchers have addressed variations of 
dichotomous relationships between corporate social responsibility, that is, doing the right 
thing, and financial organizational success (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012; Frooman, 1997; 
Orlitzky et al., 2003; Peloza, 2009). The IQs relevant to RQ3 were intended to address 
84 
 
how leadership and employees in currently financially sound organizations value, 
operationalize, and promote this seemingly paradoxical relationship in practice and how 
this knowledge can be transferred to other organizations. Defining the motivational 
psychological constructs of leaders who promote fiscal fiduciary responsibility within 
their organizations’ ERM while achieving sustained financial success in practice will 
provide evidence to other leaders that there are contributing psychological factors to 
acknowledge when promoting fiscal responsibility without harming the sought-after 
profitability of the organizations. The data extracted using these IQs supported RQ3 in 
providing tools for leadership to select and motivate employees to achieve organizational 
goals by performing their duties and tasks in the realm of responsible financial reporting 
and management. 
I looked to embodied transcription (ET; Brooks, 2010) and Matheson’s (2007) 
detailed and iterative transcribing methodologies as the first step in reducing and coding 
the data. Transcribing is the first step in qualitative data analysis (Bailey, 2008), yet 
descriptions of the transcription stage in qualitative literature often have been limited to 
brief mention that the data were transcribed, with little attention to the interpretive 
process occurring during this step (Brooks, 2010; Lapadat & Lindsay, 1999; Matheson, 
2007). The iterative process of listening and speaking the words of the interviewees 
repeatedly immerses researchers in the information provided by the interviewees, 
allowing for better detection of converging data, thematic commonalities, and emerging 
theory (Brooks, 2010). Brooks (2010) defined the iterative three-cycle process of 
transcribing, that is, (a) revisit and repeat, (b) revision, and (c) refinement and reflection, 
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as ET. I used and adapted to my purpose the descriptive methods of ET provided by 
Brooks and the detailed methodology outlined by Matheson (2007).  
The iterative ET process in this study went as follows: 
1. I listened to the interview responses with earphones while speaking what I 
heard so that the voice recognition software, Dragon NaturallySpeaking v.13 
(DNS) could transcribe my spoken words. This process included rewinding 
and repeatedly listening to various phrases to ensure that I heard the words 
correctly and understood their meaning. 
2. I listened to the interview responses with earphones again while following the 
original rough transcriptions to correct misinterpretations by DNS of 
substantive content and correct typographical errors. This step also included 
various instances of rewinding and repetitive listening.  
3. I then read the transcriptions for sensibility and corrected nonsubstantive 
content, such as they’re/there, and/in, and we’re/were.  
4. Although the conversational nature of each interview resulted in 
grammatically imperfect transcriptions, I used Microsoft Word’s spell and 
grammar check capabilities to correct items that would not affect content but 
would make the transcriptions easier to read and interpret. These checks 
included items such as mistyped words, capitalizations, and punctuation not 
caught during previous content reviews. 
5. I then sought credibility of the data by giving the participants the opportunity 
to review their individual transcriptions for errors, a validation method called 
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member checking (Creswell, 2013). This process occurred as soon after the 
interviews as possible to take advantage of personal recollections of the 
responses.  
During the interviews, I took brief field notes of body language such as smirks or 
shrugs that were impossible to capture in the recordings. Doing so proved useful in 
interpreting the participants’ spoken words. I incorporated these notes in the memos 
documenting my interpretive thoughts (Creswell, 2013). Field notes and memos 
contributed to the credibility of the data analysis by providing a framework to 
conceptualize the thematic trends, patterns, and models (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Patton, 
2002). Memoing while transcribing the interview responses helped me to recognize when 
the data collection efforts reached data saturation (Patton, 2002) and acted as a precursor 
to open coding (Lapadat & Lindsay, 1999), the first step in the data analysis process. 
Experiencing the transcription process segued naturally into the open, axial, and selective 
coding required in grounded theory (Creswell, 2013). After transcribing the interview 
responses and receiving no changes from the participants during member checking, I 
imported the raw transcriptions into NVivo v.11 and used the documents to create initial 
case nodes.  
I used NVivo v.11, Microsoft Excel, and Microsoft Word to elucidate and 
triangulate the emergent data. I used open coding to manipulate and assemble the data to 
capture commonalities in the data and axial coding to assemble these commonalities into 
categories or groupings as they related to each other. To explain further any relationship 
between the categories and the central phenomenon, I used selective coding by RQ to 
87 
 
show how the data contributed to the emergent theory (Creswell, 2013). However, the 
raw data contained in the participants’ experiences and captured in their transcriptions 
were complex and multifarious, requiring intricate analysis to elucidate theoretical 
meaning. This process began by organizing the data.  
Data Analysis 
The analytic process in qualitative research is not static; rather, it continuously 
evolves, possibly requiring several iterations and methodical attempts to reveal linkages 
and relationships within the data, thus exposing the developing theory (Patton, 2002). 
Analyzing the data in this case proved no different. I scrutinized and manipulated the data 
from various perspectives as needed to complete the coding process. 
Open Coding 
During the interviews, some participants answered the IQs in an orderly way that 
allowed the data to fall naturally into various categories established by the IQs as they 
related to the RQs. However, other participants responded to one IQ and continued to 
share information that answered or provided data for various other IQs without 
prompting. Because the initial coding schema and interview protocol aligned with the 
RQs, I attempted to organize the initial transcribed responses by copying and pasting 
them into a Microsoft Word document formatted with headings by IQ to import and auto 
code in NVivo v.11. To ensure that I had captured all of the raw data in the transcriptions, 
I highlighted the responses in the raw transcriptions in yellow to indicate that I had 
reviewed and addressed them. Organizing the data gives qualitative researchers a preview 
of the analytic process (Saldana, 2013).  
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The IQs generated integrated and related data, which signaled possible 
overlapping discussions in the constructs of reliable procedural adherence in the ERM of 
responsible financial reporting. Participants often responded as if I had already asked 
them the IQ previously by using words like, “As stated previously” or “Like I said 
before.” In situations where the answers fit more than one IQ, I copied the responses to 
both questions in the formatted Word document.  
After organizing the responses per IQ, I further exposed the data by importing the 
formatted documents into NVivo v.11 for auto coding, creating parent nodes from the 
RQs and child nodes for the IQs as they related to the RQs. I then read the interview 
responses again and created categorical nodes within the IQ nodes to code relevant data. 
Because the amount of data generated was overwhelming and unruly, I attempted to 
cultivate the data by coding via a priori coding schema initially developed from the HRO 
and NAT theoretical frameworks. Glimpses of concepts and themes emerged, but the data 
still seemed to be static rather than forthcoming in a manner conducive to theoretical 
construction. Therefore, I approached the coding from yet another perspective by creating 
an outline of the RQs and the supporting interview prompts in Excel, coding the 
applicable phrases with the questions, and labeling the answers with the applicable ERM 
component and HRO construct. Although frustrating, this iterative process is typical of 
qualitative analysis and facilitates reduction and analysis from various perspectives in 




Raw coded data alone do not determine the substantive significance of the 
information provided by study participants (Patton, 2002). Per Corbin and Strauss (2008), 
grounded theory researchers benefit by using the “flip-flop” technique of turning a 
concept “inside out” and “upside down” to microanalyze the data through a combination 
of open and axial coding to expose categorical relationships. I compared, manipulated, 
and analyzed the data to group themes logically from a holistic perspective to construct a 
platform for theme emergence and ultimate theory production. Reducing the data by 
revisiting the processes and information was a challenging and time-consuming yet 
enlightening process because it converged the essence of inductive, open-minded analysis 
through an interpretive lens of relational data interaction to produce cogent theoretical 
direction.  
Discrepant Cases 
The only discrepant case in this study was the Enron case, which was used for 
deviant case comparative research analysis to support the data from a juxtaposed 
perspective by illustrating factors related to fraudulent or irresponsible reporting that 
were missing or converse to the factors identified in this study. To analyze the data from 
this case, I read The Smartest Guys in the Room: The Rise and Fall of Enron (McLean & 
Elkind, 2004); marked pages; highlighted text; and made notations in the margins. I also 
obtained trial proceedings and antidotal and empirical literature regarding the Enron case. 
I used NVivo v.11 to assist in the analysis of the data gleaned from the 13 interviews.  
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After completing the coding, I analyzed the path of emergence and created a 
narrative to support the findings by outlining the propositions and schemas for a new 
theory (Patton, 2002). I then developed a model to illustrate my findings when such a 
process was deemed appropriate. I anticipated that the emergent theory would define 
HRO psychological constructs applicable to the ERM of responsible financial 
management. 
Trustworthiness 
Because qualitative research does not derive empirical knowledge based upon 
quantitative numerical methods, matters of trustworthiness are different from those 
relevant to validity, reliability, generalizability, and objectivity seen in quantitative 
research (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Creswell, 2013; Patton, 2002; Trochim, 2006a, 
2006b). Although various criteria exist to measure a qualitative study’s counterpart to 
quantitative validity and reliability (Creswell, 2013), in this qualitative study, I addressed 
matters of trustworthiness using Lincoln and Guba’s postpositivism evaluative criteria of 
credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability (as cited in Creswell, 2013).  
Throughout the study, I accounted for credibility through such processes as 
triangulation, member checking, data saturation, reflexivity, and peer debriefing (Patton, 
2002). I addressed transferability by seeking a homogeneous sample from heterogenetic 
industries to generate detailed descriptions to support the findings (Creswell, 2013). Field 
notes, memoing, and peer review supported dependability (Creswell, 2013); I addressed 
confirmability by outlining the research procedures and methods in detail and reflexivity 
by discussing my role as the researcher.  
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Human Research Protection 
Participant risk analysis performed using Walden University’s IRB application 
revealed no participant risk-harm in regard to psychological stress, jeopardy of personal 
information irrelevant to the study, or physical harm. However, there was the potential 
for minimal beneficence, justice, and respect (American Psychological Association, 
2002) risk-harm in regard to confidentiality, unsolicited interruption to the participants’ 
work routines and workplace environments, impact on social or economic standing, and 
coercion to participate because of any possible professional relationship with me. 
To address confidentiality risks, participants were assured upon initial verbal or e-
mail contact that all information provided by them and reported in the study would not be 
specifically linked to any personally identifiable information (PII). Participants provided 
their preferred e-mail addresses to link to the informed consent and demographics survey. 
Unless the participants chose to change them, those e-mail addresses were used 
throughout the study. I used alphanumeric nonspecific identifiers consisting of letters to 
identify the source (i.e. EXT for external accountant, IPR for private company, and IPU 
for public company) and numbers to identify the participants within the source (i.e. 
EXT01, IPR02, IPU03). All data were stored on my personal, password-protected 
computer. A backup of the data was made and stored on a separate removable hard drive 
and locked in my personal office desk. No PII or interview recordings were uploaded to 
any virtual online storage platform.  
To limit the negative impact on the participants’ work routines and the work 
routines of their colleagues, I clarified when, where, and how it was appropriate for me to 
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contact them. I respected their privacy and professional duties by not interrupting them 
needlessly and at inopportune times. The participants’ positions or statuses in the 
organizations were not negatively impacted by their involvement in the study. No 
specific financial information about any of the organizations was revealed by any 
participants. 
My credentials as a CPA further bound my ethical treatment of any revealed 
financial data. To mitigate any coercion factor brought on by any professional 
relationships with any of the participants, I reiterated that during the study, I was acting 
as a researcher, not a professional colleague. The informed consent form read and agreed 
to by the participants before the interviews educated them about the study, including the 
fact that their participation was voluntary and that they could withdraw from the study or 
stop the interviews at any time, including not agreeing to any follow-up interview 
requests. Participants agreed to participate only if they were compelled to contribute to 
scientific knowledge; they were not coerced into participating.  
Summary and Transition 
This chapter presented information about the rationale for using grounded theory 
inquiry to define the HRO constructs as they applied to responsible financial reporting. 
Also included was information about the research methods, including the overarching 
influence of my role as the data collection instrument and my control of bias in 
reflexivity. The participant selection criteria and recruitment procedures, including the 
relationship between data saturation and sample size specific to this study, were 
explained. Information about collecting the data using a semistructured interview 
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protocol and analyzing the data was included. The chapter concluded by addressing 
matters of trustworthiness and the ethical treatment and protection of the participants.  
Chapter 4 outlines the data elucidated from reputable, responsible financial 
reporting systems. The influencing human factors of responsible financial reporting 
systems are revealed by showing how the data were organized and analyzed and how the 
data within the subcategories were applied to the RQs. The data are presented in tables, 
figures, and narratives using quotations from the participants and juxtaposed examples 
from the discrepant Enron (McLean & Elkind, 2004) case to support the thematic trends. 
Chapter 5 discusses the results, provides a conclusive theoretical summary, and offers 




Chapter 4: Results  
Introduction 
Rules, regulations, standards, and statutes guide actors in the financial reporting 
arena to protect those who depend on financial statements as a reflection of an 
organization’s fiscal health (Wild, 2013). Although most organizations employ some 
variation of ERM in their financial reporting systems to achieve organizational goals and 
mitigate risk, there are still accounts of fiscal misappropriation, unethical behavior, and 
misguided actions by financial reporting actors that result in third-party harm. Examples 
include Enron (McClean & Elkind, 2004); the Madoff Ponzi scheme (Markopolos, 2010); 
and Lehman Brothers (Valukas, 2010). There has been relevant research regarding 
human factors of financial crises, monetary debacles, and unethical fiscal behavior (Lo, 
2009; Ostas 2007; Power, 2009), yet antipodal research has been limited when 
investigating the beneficial behavior and psychological factors that contribute to 
responsible reporting in organizations that sustain positive operational goals while 
mitigating third-party risk harm (Finkelstein, 2003; Jameson, 2009). Guided by NAT and 
HRO research, I investigated the presence of human-related constructs in the effective 
and reliable ERM of highly integrated yet less tangible responsible financial reporting 
systems.  
Three RQs guided the study: 




2. How can HRO constructs applied in ERM minimize organizational 
stakeholder financial risk-harm? 
3. How can HRO constructs applied in ERM inform other organizations to 
motivate leadership and employees to promote fiscal fiduciary responsibility 
while maximizing profitability? 
This chapter includes a discussion of the personal and organizational conditions 
that influenced the interpretation of the study results, participant demographics, and 
characteristics relevant to the results, as well as pertinent details about the data collection, 
reduction, and analysis processes. To address trustworthiness, the chapter also includes a 
discussion of matters relevant to credibility, transferability, dependability, and 
confirmability.  
Participant Demographics 
The 13 participants in the study came from three groups of accounting 
professionals. Four individuals were external accountants (EXT) with experience in 
auditing and consulting; five members represented private companies from industry (IPR 
) that issue financial statements reviewed or audited by external accountants; and four 
participants represented publicly traded companies (IPU), whose financial statements are 
readily available via their investor relations or investor services site on the Internet. The 
industries represented were public accounting firms (31%), financial services (15%), 
health care/health products (8%), manufacturing (8%), telecommunications/technology 
(23%), mass communications (8%), and distribution/logistics (8%). This representation 
of industries was consistent with the target population outlined in Chapter 3. The gross 
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revenue of the represented companies averaged from under $10 million (8%) to over 
$100 million (39%), with the majority in the $10 million to $100 million range (54%). 




Participant Industry, Reporting Status, and Average Gross Revenue 
 
Classification n % 
Industry   
External accounting 4 31% 
Financial services 2 15% 
Health care/Health products 1 8% 
Manufacturing 1 8% 
Other services provider 2 15% 
Telecommunications/Technology 3 23% 
Reporting status   
Privately held public accounting firms 4 31% 
Privately held with issued statements 5 38% 
Publicly traded 4 31% 
Average gross revenue rank   
> $100 million 5 38% 
$10 million-$100 million 7 54% 
< $10 Million 1 8% 
Note. N = 13      
 
Personnel positions stratified three external accounting managers and one external 
accounting partner, five industry members from the C-suite, two internal accounting 
managers, and two internal staff accountants. Participant gender was distributed as evenly 
as possible with an odd number of participants (women at 54%; men at 46%). Ten 
participants were CPAs, with two CPAs also achieving a master’s of business 
administration (MBA) degree, and one of them further certified as a charted global 
management accountant (CGMA) and certified merger & acquisition advisor® 
(CM&AA). One participant, an IPU CFO, achieved the MBA degree, and two 
participants held undergraduate accounting degrees. The average participant age was 
97 
 
49.00 (SD = 11.56), with average experience in financial reporting and management 
being 23.85 (SD = 10.11) years (see Table 2). Six participants reported years of 
experience in enterprise risk management (M = 14.17, SD = 11.48).  
Table 2 
Participant Organizational Position, Gender, and Credentials 
Classification n % 
Position 
External: Manager 3 23% 
External: Partner 1 8% 
Internal: C-Suite 5 39% 
Internal: Management 2 15% 
Internal: Staff 2 15% 
Gender 
Female 7 54% 
Male 6 46% 
Credentials 
Accounting degree 2 15% 
CPA 7 54% 
CPA, CGMA, MBA, CM&AA 1 8% 
CPA, MBA 2 15% 
MBA 1 8% 
Note. N = 13      
 
Data Saturation 
Repetitive thematic indicators began to emerge about the sixth interview, but 
because I was aware of the tendency for new grounded theory investigators to fall prey to 
theoretical bits (Patton, 2002), I continued to conduct the interviews, using the previous 
transcribed data as a comparative analytic tool for each subsequent interview. Although 
the same thematic sampling seemed to be present in the transcribed data, I was not 
satisfied that the data had become saturated because I had not secured representation 
from the IPU population. Because financial debacles that cause the greatest stakeholder 
financial risk-harm seemingly occur in publicly held and traded companies, obtaining 
participants from this area was critical to the credibility of this study. Therefore, I 
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continued to recruit participants in this financial reporting arena until I secured and 
interviewed three qualified IPU representatives. After hearing the same thematic trends 
from these participants, I felt that gathering more data would not add to the theoretical 
basis of this research, so I ceased recruitment efforts. 
Core Category Identification and Characterization 
According to Patton (2002), “Grounded theory produces a core category and 
continually resolves a main concern, and through sorting the core category, organizes the 
integration of theory” (p. 489). I performed a word frequency query in NVivo v.11 with 
stemmed words and a minimum length of four letters to initialize data theming (Saldana, 
2013). A word frequency query on the auto-coded data identified “people” as the 
prominent theme. Initially, I discounted this result because (a) there were duplicate 
bodies of text coded to different question nodes in the auto-coded data that might have 
skewed the data, and (b) the result appeared to impair credibility because it simply 
seemed too obvious. It made sense that “people” would be the most prominent theme, but 
could this finding be relevant to the theoretical outcome of this study? To test this notion, 
I first eliminated the possibility of excess frequencies from the duplicate references in the 
NVivo v.11 auto-coded data by performing an additional word frequency query using the 
same parameters on the raw interview transcriptions. Again, “people” was the prominent 
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Figure 4. Word cloud comparison. Results of Nvivo v.11 word frequency queries for 
coded data by RQ and raw interview data. 
 
To seek further credence to the theoretical relevance that “people influence the 
ERM in responsible financial reporting,” I performed a case-by-case comparative data 
analysis using a word frequency query in each case. This analysis revealed that although 
people was the most frequently used word in eight cases, the most frequently used words 
in the other five cases were organization, look, different, accounts, and control. 
Furthermore, in four of the five cases in which people was not the most frequently used 
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word, other words relating to individuals, such as managing, management, manager, and 
staff appeared in the top five positions (see Table 3).  
Table 3 
Five Most Frequently Referenced Words in Interview Transcriptions 
Participant identifier 1 2 3 4 5 
EXT01 people talking client look believe 
EXT02 people needs look good help 
EXT03 organization audit people staff firm 
EXT04 people look managing audit organization  
IPR01 people department change management good 
IPR02 look people sure reports managers 
IPR03 people managers business report look 
IPR04 people  needs  talking billing account 
IPR05 different accounts project people organization  
IPU01 people money opportunities balance good 
IPU02 accounts function audit control  manager 
IPU03 people managers process reporting mistake 
IPU04 control sure reporting audit right 
Note. N = 13; “people” mentioned 11 times 
Table 4 shows the results of an analysis of the word frequencies greater than 100 
for the aggregated interview cases, which revealed that although other relevant words 
appeared with great frequency, the word people was mentioned 565 times, more than 300 





Word Frequencies > 100 for Aggregated Interview Transcriptions 
Root word Similar words No. of times 
mentioned 
People Peoples 565 
Manage manage, manageable, managed, management, manager, managers, manages, 
managing 
248 
Look looked, looking, looks 227 
Report reporting, reported, reporter, reports 224 
Talk talked, talking, talks 188 
Account accountability, accountable, accountancy, accountant(s), accounted, 
accounting 
182 
Organization organizations, organizations’, organize 170 
Audit audited, auditing, audits 169 
Sure make sure, making sure 156 
Different differently, difference 138 
Control controller, controllers, controls 123 
Process processes, processing 117 
Right right, “right” 109* 
Culture cultural, culturally, culture, cultures 104 
Responsible response, responses, responsibilities, responsibility, responsible, 
responsibly 
102 
Note. *The word frequency for “right” was 343 times. The word “right” was used in conversation to 
acknowledge statements and end phrases. The data were cleaned to eliminate conversational references and 
retain 109 references in the context of “doing the right thing,” “hiring the right people,” “the right answer,” 
and “making the right choice.”  
 
Finally satisfied with the results of this analysis, I deduced that because not all the 
participants used people the most frequently, other relevant themes could have emerged 
as a core category to describe the factors of ERM in responsible financial reporting. 
Therefore, the finding that people was the most prominent theme in this stage of analysis 
was relevant and provided the basis for data reduction and analysis.  
This induced interpretation provided a starting point for data reduction and theory 
development, and it also gave credence to the value of investigating the psychological 
constructs of human resources in reliable ERM in the reporting systems of fiscally 
reputable organizations. Sole reliance on mandated control mechanisms, compliance 
measures, and other authoritative dictates designed to mitigate third-party risk-harm are 
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not in and of themselves sufficient for responsible financial reporting. If organizational 
psychological human factors prohibit proper implementation and utilization of the 
processes and procedures essential to the ERM framework of financial reporting systems, 
responsible reporting is sabotaged, rendering any existing control and monitoring 
mechanisms fantasy tools (Clarke, 1999) with no purpose than to feign responsible 
reporting activities and protect third parties from risk-harm.  
Subcategory Identification and Characterization 
For further analysis, I reduced and assembled the data into subcategories of 
relative analytical pieces to investigate the structural conditions of the people factor 
integral to the reliable ERM of responsible financial reporting. To do this, I made the 
following open-ended qualitative inquiries: (a) What do they do? (b) How do they do it? 
(c) Why do they do it? (d) Who are they? and (e) Where are they? With the exception of 
the Where data, which I organized and analyzed in table format, I used NVivo v.11 to 
position these questions as child categories under the core category of People and coded 
the frequently used words and themes according to these qualitative inquiries to 
document the thematic data, as discussed next.  
Under this scrutiny, the data revealed thematic commonalities of reliability in 
responsible financial reporting. They are summarized as follows:  
 What do they do?: Internal and external reporting actors of reputable 
organizations have ERM control and monitoring measures and tools in place 
to promote responsible financial reporting. They use processes and procedures 
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such as analytical reporting, metrics, and reconciliations to internally and 
externally audit system controls (see Appendix D). 
 How do they do it?: Through effective communication and information, 
individuals who promote responsible financial reporting take an active role in 
operationalizing the ERM control measures and tools successfully. When 
individuals seek, share, inquire about, and use information pertaining to 
reporting compliance, they do the “right” thing and own the compliant 
reporting process (see Appendix E).  
 Why do they do it?: Internal environment characteristics in the organization’s 
culture and leadership seduce employee engagement, motivation, 
accountability, and reputation sensitivity, all of which influence the 
establishment and maintenance of positive reporting behaviors. Although 
slightly adapted for the nontangible nature of financial reporting, reputable 
organizations’ mind map of ERM of financial reporting appears to possess 
HRO characteristics centered on the internal environment (see Appendix F). 
 Who are they?: The individuals operationalizing the ERM factors in 
responsible financial reporting possess the “right” traits and skills to dictate or 
encourage ethical actions in the context of strategic fiscal decisions. 
Individuals different. They appear to be responsible, knowledgeable, virtuous, 
and they care that they are doing the “right” thing (see Appendix G). 
 Where are they?: I analyzed the references made to organizational positions 
and created a table to analyze these data, which are in Table 5 later in the 
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study. It appeared that individuals occupying various positions inside and 
outside the organization influenced the quality of the reporting system. 
Leadership in the form of C-Suite and Board members was the primary 
internal influencer of ethical behavior and accounting task performance. Yet 
even more reference was made to the employees and managers as the actual 
reporting actors. Surprisingly, although referenced often as a method of 
accountability in monitoring controls, the policing force of the external 
auditor appeared not to be the primary influencer of reliability. 
Analyzing and grouping the data from a subcategory perspective allowed further 
exploration of thematic connections as a progression to theoretical development (Corbin 
& Straus, 2008; Patton, 2002). After exposing the data further, I noticed that some 
subcategories shared conceptual properties and themes. When variations in similar data 
fit into more than one category, I placed them in the most relevant subcategory. 
Research Question Identification and Characterization 
I grouped the subcategories as they best related to the RQs. I realized the 
redundancy of RQ1 and RQ2 in that they were essentially making the same inquiry when 
I felt it appropriate to place the same subcategories in each RQ. Because HROs are 
concerned with mitigating third-party risk-harm, RQ1 was asking RQ2 in the context of 
reliable financial reporting. Because RQ1 did not specifically deal with third-party risk-
harm, I grouped the subcategories outlining the explicit data relevant to tasks and 
procedures with RQ1 and the more underlying human factors with RQ2. 
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Research Question 1 
RQ1: What HRO constructs applied in ERM are present in reliable financial 
reporting?  
What do they do? People in responsible reporting systems of reputable 
organizations tend to the objective setting, event identification, risk response, risk 
assessment, control activities, and monitoring components of COSO’s (2004) ERM 
framework. From a financial reporting perspective, the overall ERM objective setting 
component was focused on reputation management within the purview of overall 
operating strategies and goals.  
Interestingly, all participants provided data indicating that they were actively 
integrating these various components of the ERM framework in their reporting activities, 
yet only six participants indicated years of experience in risk management when 
completing the demographics survey. The element that all participants did not state, 
namely, that they had experience in ERM, could have indicated that they were unaware 
that the activities that they performed were a part of COSO’s ERM framework.  
Control activities. The most common ERM themes to mitigate reporting risk 
while achieving the organization’s objective found in this study were (a) control 
activities, and (b) monitoring tasks. The data revealed that all the participants in reputable 
reporting systems felt that controls (mentioned 123 times) were integral to the activities 
required to mitigate enterprise reporting risk. Participants spoke of internal and external 
audits (169 times) to identify control needs, create the controls, and test controls. 
Furthermore, procedures (75 times), and processes (117 times) were designed to make 
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sure that all controls were in place to detect and report errors and mistakes when they 
occurred. Participants used metrics and budgets as measurements to monitor control 
effectiveness. In line with these methods were regular reconciling activities such as 
checking (60 times), comparing (16 times), forecasting (16 times), balancing (27 times), 
analysis (23 times) and reporting (81 times). Because words can have different meanings, 
“reporting” under these subcategory analyses were modified to exclude references to 
“financial reporting” as a noun because of the frequent use of the phrase in the interviews 
as the topic of the study. Frequencies included the reporting activities only as a verb. 
IPR03 described the company’s attention to dissecting and organizing processes:  
I’ll say this, we analyze everything. If it flies in and around your head, I probably 
have a chart on it. It’s really kind of exhausting but we continually look at 
possibly the same thing many different ways. So we just keep coming back to 
stuff and pounding it and maybe we’ll leave it alone for a while, then we come 
back and say, how’s [that item] doing now, in a different view? And then it 
usually discloses something you didn’t assess when you looked at it 3 years ago.  
The data in my study revealed that the standard professional control procedures 
and processes designed to protect the third-party stakeholders who relied on financial 
statements produced by the organizations were respected and adhered to. 
How do they do it? Information and communication (COSO, 2004) was a strong 
ERM element that influenced the proper operationalization and performance of control 
and monitoring activities in the reputable organizations of this study and was missing 
from the discrepant Enron case. 
108 
 
Inform and communicate. In this study, actions outside the bounds of the typical 
compliance reporting that promoted effective enterprise reporting risk management 
(ERRM) included effective communication (349 times). Communication references in 
these cases included engaging in regular exchanges between leaders and employees, 
asking or being asked questions, actively watching or looking for items or opportunities 
then having conversations about the findings, making documentation for others to follow, 
documenting deviations and errors, and encouraging individuals to raise concerns.  
A sample of the integration of effective professional control and monitoring 
measures and the information/communication connection is present in the quote from 
IPU03: 
A lot of it was communicated and a lot of it was process and policy and 
documentation [italics added to emphasize applicability]. Everything there was 
documented, everything was documented, everything. Every procedure, every 
process, there was as little judgment involved as possible. And in accounting and 
reporting there is a ton of judgment…but every process is documented, and all 
work is documented, and signed off and reviewed…there were questions, if you 
did these 12 steps … and you signed off on them when you did them, and then 
you handed that to your supervisor and your supervisor verified them in some 
way that you did what you said you did. And if there was ever a problem or 
mistake identified it was absolutely clear that you better communicate that up. As 
soon as or before you even know it’s an issue, you need to communicate that. And 
we did that and as soon as you communicated that, the documentation process 
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started as far as evaluating what actually happened, what’s supposed to happen, 
why did this happened and all of that. The legal department was notified, the 
upper management was notified… it was just unbelievable… There would be a 
person designated as the person responsible for getting this issue documented and 
communicated up.  
As mentioned previously, an organization can have procedures, processes, 
policies, and controls in place but if the human resources system does not operationalize 
them through documentation and communication, they become nothing more than 
fantasy documents intended to provide false comfort to unknowing reliant third parties. 
Organizations with reliable financial reporting systems hire the right people and manage 
them to operationalize control activities successfully. The reporting actors at Enron, 
including external auditors and regulatory monitors, were subject to the same compliance 
standards as the participants in the public organizations whom I interviewed, but the 
deviant case organization appeared not to possess the critical human factors and 
psychological constructs relating to communication and information to operationalize 
reliable financial ERM successfully.  
Although at one time Enron hired the right people to perform responsible 
reporting, managing them to do what they believed they were hired to do was tainted by a 
culture and a value system that rewarded revenue-generating reporting. Concerned 
individuals in the Enron reporting system wrote memos and tried to bring up 
irregularities, but their efforts fell on the deaf ears of leadership. Although a contributor 
to some of Enron’s intricate dealings, corporate treasurer Jeff McMahon finally raised 
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concerns about the noneconomic purpose of the self-dealings surrounding the special 
purpose entities created by Enron to manipulate earnings. He was dismissed by a transfer 
to a new start-up special purpose entity. When discussing the effective implementation 
and use of control procedures and processes, the participants in this study emphasized the 
importance of open access to financial, strategic, and operational organizational 
information, and they espoused the benefits of regular and open communication between 
staff and leadership so that all were engaged in promoting the ERRM of the organization.  
Research Question 2 
RQ2: How can HRO constructs applied in ERM minimize organizational 
stakeholder financial risk-harm? 
Why do they do it? The data describing what people do to contribute to the 
responsible financial reporting system and how they do it emphasized the active oversight 
components of COSO’s (2004) ERM framework; the “why” data revealed the less overt 
or latent factors of the internal environment component of the ERM framework. These 
factors aligned with HRO and NAT factors. Participants described the organizations as 
different from other organizations for which they had worked in terms of their internal 
environments and their influence on individual reporting behaviors and reporting 
outcomes. Interestingly, the effect of an organization’s internal environment was not 
mentioned by any governance triad in J. Cohen et al.’s (2017) study as being an ERM 
factor. The researchers, who also were surprised at this omission, stated that it was 
possibly due to the difficulty in measuring factors such as tone at the top and linking 
them to ERM. 
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Culture and leadership qualities. Although there were other noncontrol activity-
related factors of the internal environment in the data, organizational culture and 
leadership attributes and actions were the primary factors referred to by the participants 
as the greatest influencers of organizational success. Reference to the culture or the 
corporate environment was made a collective 149 times, and reference to leadership, 
which included managers and members of governance boards, was mentioned 479 times. 
If culture influences responsible reporting, it would make sense that some form of 
leadership would be a conjoined theme because leaders develop and reinforce an 
organization’s culture (Schein, 1983, 1984),  
Informed culture. Internal environment descriptions of the organizations in this 
study indicated evidence of informed, just, and diverse cultures. The research outlined in 
Chapter 2 showed that similar cultural factors existed in HROs (Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2007). The previous outline of data indicated that the free flow of information and open 
communication contributed to how the people in organizations with responsible reporting 
systems accomplished their goals. This communicative atmosphere created an informed 
culture. The organizations in this study fostered informed cultures through transparency 
and disclosure. An informed culture supported by a transparent society encouraged 
financial information sharing freely between various units of organizations so that the 
other organizational actors could analyze and integrate the financial data with their 
operational data to achieve organizational goals.  
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When answering what factor most influences organizational success, IPR03 
stated, “Communication is huge. Transparency, kind of goes along with that… we don’t 
have anything to hide.”  
IPR05 commented:  
I think …we are pretty transparent, if that’s the right word. We kind of give the 
organization…okay, from a financial reporting viewpoint, going back to my job 
and financial reporting, on a weekly basis I put in front of them a report that tells 
them what our current cash, accounts receivable, and accounts payable is. It gives 
them what our labor is, our utilization is, our headcounts, our turnover is, our 
billings month to date, year to date, what our forecasts are. I mean it’s a ton of 
information at their fingertips. And this is filtered to the executive level; to the 
partners and then it stops at the top layer of management, about 30 or 40 people, 
and financial people are included there.  
In addition to contributing to organizational success, transparency created 
reporting accountability within the organizations. Non-financial-reporting actors fed the 
reporting system information from their operating units, so skewed budget, forecast, or 
result information would taint the outcome of the synthesized financial data, resulting in 
inaccurate reporting. 
The following comment from IPR03 was an example of how an organization used 
metrics reporting to generate communication and foster an informed culture: 
It’s kind of like what we are doing is we are really just saying to the individual, 
really you think estimated costs, are going to be $25,000 to finish? That doesn’t 
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feel right, because last time you told me it was going to take $12,000 and that was 
only a week ago when we met. What’s changed this week? We are helping people 
by reminding them and asking questions. You know we’re clearer in our 
expectations.  
EXT04 credited transparency and the resulting accountability as a factor for 
adherence to policies and procedures in the statement, “The whole big brother concept. 
Unfortunately, you know it is human behavior. And when you know someone is looking 
over your shoulder, you’re gonna behave differently.”  
These organizations were fastidious in disclosing to interested parties 
nonfavorable organizational events that might negatively affect operations and 
subsequently affect their financial well-being. Because the organizations in this study 
were sensitive to their reputations as stable successful companies and not just short-term 
financial results, they disclosed irregular items so that deviations could be addressed and 
fixed to manage reputation risk. In some cases, high-level financial actors reported in 
person periodically to their respective audit committees, and as part of the discussion, 
they were expected to disclose concerns within their control environments that required 
monitoring.  
IPU04 described these meetings: 
And they talk about the area that they are influencing. And about what areas in 
their businesses that they have to pay attention to, I mean you have to pay 
attention to everything for control purposes, but what are the areas they have to 
[concentrate] on…. if there’s been an acquisition, how does integration affect the 
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control environment for that acquisition. What you’re going to say is, here’s a key 
area of my business that I’m concerned about, that I’m working on it and so 
forth…and so you know, if I have a blowup, I’m going to have to tell the audit 
committee. If I [hadn’t told] them or hadn’t highlighted some areas of significant 
control that I have to pay attention to [during that conversation], and then I have a 
blowup in that area, they are going to say to me, why wasn’t that on your radar 
screen. 
Conversely, Sharren Watkins, former vice president of Enron and former 
reporting agent under CFO Andrew Fastow, recalled Skilling, then COO of Enron, 
lamenting about having to report a more than $400 million portfolio loss to the audit 
committee. McClean and Elkind (2004) quoted him as saying, “I don’t want to be the one 
to go tell Enron’s board we’ve had a big loss when we’re supposed to be such great risk 
managers” (p. 131).  
Just culture. There was evidence in the data that indicated that open 
communication and free-flowing information allowed the reporting actors, financial and 
nonfinancial, to feel comfortable enough to voice their observations, concerns, and 
opinions about specific items being reported; the existence of possible errors; and 
impediments in the general flow of information without judgment or negative retribution. 
Cox, Jones, and Collinson (2006) pointed out that open and honest communication 
between and among members provides a sound basis for trust, an element of a safety 
environment. The ability to report, share, and communicate in a safe atmosphere instills a 
certain trust among agents and fosters a just culture (Reason, 2000).  
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Human error can result in honest mistakes, but honest mistakes can incubate into 
extraordinary events that cause unintended harm to third parties relying on the 
organizations’ financial reporting (Reason, 2000). No fear of retribution to report a 
mistake might mitigate a larger reporting mishap, thereby protecting unsuspecting third-
party stakeholders. Lower ranked participants expressed little or no hesitation to 
admitting a mistake or reporting a discovered error for fear of negative reprisal.  
The following quote by high-ranking IPU01 triangulated the lower ranked 
participants’ sentiments from a varied perspective: 
I mean people make mistakes or just [do] sloppy work. And if you make a 
mistake, we don’t crucify you over that. If you make a mistake every now and 
then, we fix it, you know; it’s not the end of the world.  
Conversely, there was evidence that there would be retribution if a mistake was 
not reported:  
When I probed to investigate any existing reflexive relationship between reporting 
mistakes and punishment, IPU03 responded emphatically: 
You would be fired if you didn’t [Italics added] communicate an issue. If you hid 
anything, or if somebody found that you hid something, or if somebody found that 
you checked the procedure and you really didn’t do it, you would be fired.  
 In most cases, if a teammate, a manager, or any other superior found a mistake 
during the review process, the error was brought to the person’s attention, and the 
individual was coached to correct the reporting actions.  
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EXT04 credited transparency and sensitivity to the development of a trusting 
environment that eased corrective conversations: 
Well, in the being totally transparent [environment], he would bring it up to you 
and your supervisor at the same time. So, it may not be comfortable to anyone, 
but if there is any issue, then it’s confronted at the beginning. [Researcher: 
Communication?] Absolutely.  
 In some cases in this study, said employees were sorted, or relocated, to different 
areas of their respective organizations to perhaps find a better fit and remain employed, a 
strategy described by almost half (46%) of the participants. However, if the individuals 
did not improve and grow, but continued to make mistakes, or if behavioral issues were 
the basis for continual errors that created a risk to the responsible reporting system, those 
individuals were counseled out.  
EXT04 explained it this way:  
At some point, if you stop growing where you are, then it’s not beneficial to you 
or the organization. You need to move on to a new place where you can continue 
to grow… and make a more positive contribution to the organization. … they 
refer to that as sorting. And so they basically evaluate skill sets continuously, and 
they work at it. If there is a performance issue or borderline performance issue, 
then [you ask] does that correlate with the skill set. You know, is there a 
deficiency in the skill set for that particular position, and is that individual and 
their skill set, is it valuable to the organization, and is there another better fit? Or 
is it behavioral, and then you’re counseled out.  
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To support the maintenance of a just culture, care was taken as to how the 
discovery of a mistake, corrective coaching, and counseling out of an ineffective actor 
was communicated so that trust among the remaining members was maintained.  
EXT04 continued: 
And that needs to be communicated in the right way not only to that individual 
but to the entire organization, and do I think we’ve done it perfectly? Absolutely 
not, but we certainly tried to do the best job of communicating that. These 
decisions were very difficult to come to, they were difficult to handle, but they 
were done from the right place. And that’s with the idea of having a better 
organization for the future.  
All participants agreed that intentional wrongdoers were terminated immediately, 
and in some cases, the participants shared experiences where the offenders were 
prosecuted. Although it appeared that a just culture contributed to reliable ERRM, there 
was no tolerance for fraud or deception in these organizations. If an employee continued 
to make the same mistake and was not held accountable, there also could be negative 
reverberations in organizational moral and trust (Reason, 1997). The opposite was true at 
Enron when it came to adhering to accounting standards and regulations. Enron rewarded 
those who twisted, pulled, and broke the boundaries of reporting tolerance in the name of 
pure revenue generation.  
In her address to the Academy of Management address shortly after the demise of 
Enron, Watkins (2003) discussed her position in the back office: 
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That’s when I ran into what I thought was the worst accounting fraud I’d ever 
seen. Enron had allowed Andy Fastow to enter into an unprecedented conflict of 
interest: as chief financial officer of Enron, where his fiduciary duties meant 
looking out for the best interests of Enron, while also becoming general partner of 
an investment partnership, LJM, where Andy raised $600 million of limited-
partner monies and was charged with maximizing returns for limited 
partners….Now, I hadn’t practiced accounting in over 10 years, but I knew 
accounting had not gotten that creative; basically, Enron was hedging with itself. 
(pp. 120-121)  
Diverse culture. In addition, although most of the organizations appeared 
hierarchical in structure, the cultures also reflected diversity in regard to experience and 
expertise. In fact, two cases of fraud were detected, not by dictated audit procedures but 
by a staff auditor’s awareness that various transactions did not appear proper.  
EXT03 explained the discovery of fraud: 
And the unique thing is that people would need to recognize is fraud is not 
necessarily caught by doing an audit. This [fraud] was found by “whoopsie,” by 
one of our staff who happened to be reviewing an invoice … And again it was just 
happenstance... And then, this whole thing unraveled from there. 
Although testing the discovered transaction was not in the scope of the audit plan, 
the audit manager acknowledged the staff auditor’s concern at the presence of a possible 
material deviation and acted by allowing further investigation and averted an accounting 
catastrophe by tending to a near miss, a term coined by Sagan (1993). In the interest of 
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time and money, the audit manager could have dismissed the staff auditor’s concern over 
an invoice or chastised the individual for taking the time to dig into the details and 
encourage the person to move forward, leaving the fraud undiscovered. However, the 
manager deferred to the expertise of the auditor by respecting that the individual had the 
knowledge to detect a deviation. Furthermore, the auditor displayed an active role in 
being aware of possible deviations in the reporting system outside the scope of the audit, 
which demonstrated a preoccupation with failure, which is an HRO construct. 
The reporting actors at Enron also displayed active roles. However, their roles 
were not concerned with seeking out financial reporting system deviations and control 
weaknesses; instead, they were actively seeking the next best way to circumvent controls 
and monitoring activities. The culture at Enron cultivated innovation at all costs and 
rewarded unchecked ambition, encouraged fraudulent or deceptive practices to stretch the 
rules to add value, and publicly punished poor revenue-generating performance. 
Leadership at Enron only deferred to the expertise of those from lower ranks when they 
could assist in furthering revenue generation, not in reporting risk management. Sims and 
Brinkmann (2003) deliberated on the juxtaposed term Enron ethics as the contradictory 
reality of words and deeds, that is, what values are espoused and what are actual core 
values. At Enron, there was a definite disconnection between what was held out to the 
public as the code of ethics and what was happening during regular operations. This 
façade degraded, not generated, trust in an organization.  
Allocation of rewards. In an integrated culture, the criteria for allocating rewards 
and punishments determine individual behavior (Schein, 1983). As seen in Table 5, 54% 
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(n = 7) of the participants reported compensation structures of salary with reward 
incentive linked to organizational financial performance, 30% (n = 4) of the participants’ 
compensation was salary with other reward incentives, and 15% (n = 2) received salary 
only.  
Table 5 
Participant Compensation Base 
Classification n % 
Compensation basis   
Salary only 2 15% 
Salary with reward incentive linked to organizational financial performance 7 54% 
Salary with other reward incentive 4 31% 
Note. N = 13 
 
How rewards are allocated signals to the actors what an organization values and 
its expectations (Schein, 1983). The organizations in this study used monetary rewards 
such as incentivized compensation and bonuses based on financial performance. There 
also were cases of nonmonetary rewards such as parties and career opportunities to 
recognize and acknowledge a job well done. Ostas (2007) argued that rewards 
promulgate financial fraud, and K. H. Roberts and Bae (2001) asserted that rewards and 
incentives that encourage open communication of lasting safety issues promote trust. 
However, when they are tied to a short-term focus on profits, the rewards and incentives 
diminish the value of long-term failure and accident avoidance activities that should 
ensure reliable operations. “Enron’s reward system rewarded individuals who embraced 
Enron’s aggressive individualistic culture and were based on short-term profits and 
financial measures” (Sims & Brinkman, 2003, p. 251). The data in this study indicated 
that reward plans in the reputable organizations appeared not to contribute to unethical 
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behavior. This finding provides support that incentivized reward structures are not 
absolute antecedents to fraudulent behavior when implemented within an internal 
environment conducive to ERRM.  
Leadership qualities. The wording “tone at the top” was mentioned 24 times to 
describe the driver of the success of the organizations in this study by seven of the 13 
participants. Another four participants referred to the tenor, or attitude, from the “top” 
being the driver of ethical behavior and responsible reporting. The participants described 
leadership as being communicative, connected, informative, and transparent; possessing 
integrity and honesty; and being referred to as “big brother.” There was evidence of high-
quality leader-member exchange (HQLMX; Gerstner & Day, 1997) in these 
organizations. Cultural composition perceptions and leadership traits of the organizations 
engaged individuals in their jobs toward adhering to reporting compliance tools by 
providing moral expectations, accountability that encouraged ownership in reporting 
outcomes, and motivation to perform properly.  
Employees look to the behaviors exampled by the leadership as indicators of what 
is valued in and by an organization (Sims & Brinkman, 2003). Former Enron Vice-
President Watkins (2003) addressed leadership and the tie to ethics by stating, “All eyes 
are on you, and the slightest erosion in values at the CEO level is magnified in the 
trenches” (p. 123). Enron leadership espoused a code of ethics of commitments to 
communication, respect, integrity, and excellence, but they modeled, condoned, and 
rewarded actions that were in direct contrast with the code, which led to rapid 
degradation in the ethical culture of the company. Furthermore, Watkins alluded to a 
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divisive and elusive tone of leadership when she described how it was not until she took a 
back office job that was less trying and protracted to spend more time with her child, did 
she notice the irregularities, inconsistencies, and absolute fraud that was taking place. As 
leadership, she had been caught up in the “heady” façade, as she described it, as the $1 
billion portfolio manager jet-setting around the globe to find the next deal or to court 
clients at ski weekends or the Master’s Golf Tournament. As a reporting agent, she saw 
what was happening. 
Collective mindfulness. Accountability based on transparency and disclosure 
generated by open communication and the free flow of information of the informed, just, 
and diverse cultures created a platform for mindful awareness and diligence in the search 
for errors. As stated in Chapter 2, the HRO concept of collective mindfulness is a state 
wherein the internal organizational environment engages actors to identify risk by being 
preoccupied with failure, sensitivity to operations, reluctant to simplify interpretations, 
committed to resilience, tolerant of redundancy, aware of the current situation, and open 
to deference to expertise (Weick et al., 2008). Preoccupation with failure and sensitivity 
to operations were the strong HRO themes that embodied collective mindfulness in 
addressing RQ2. 
Preoccupied with failure. Data in the preceding example provided evidence that 
the staff auditor possessed situational awareness of an item that issued a weak signal of a 
deficient control and was allowed to pursue it. In the case of periodic audit committee 
reporting, the reporter was actively seeking points where the system could be weak to 
report on the weakness so that it could be on the “radar” when developing the audit plan. 
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Sensitivity to operations. In four cases, the participants specifically expressed 
sensitivity to operations by actively searching for ways to simplify, improve, or 
streamline processes to promote accuracy in reporting historical activity in order to 
provide better analysis and foresight to achieve organizational outcomes.  
IPR03 shared how the organization wrote a program to compile date from various 
reporters in the organization in order to provide comprehensive data for analysis by 
commenting, “Humans can’t remember a lot of [information] right? I mean, it’s a lot too. 
So, in any event …all the activities and actions are now centralized in one application we 
wrote.”  
Simplifying complex reporting to produce accurate financials for analysis and 
foresight facilitated organizational success while mitigating risk-harm.  
IPU04 described the goals of the financial reporting system: 
We are going to constantly try to simplify [reporting] processes to remove 
complexity. We’re going to constantly try to provide better analysis and insight, 
and we will do that because we always say if we strive to remove complexity and 
due process, simplification creates more time for us to do analysis and insight as 
opposed to reporting numbers. [As company accountants,] we don’t want to be 
people who just report numbers, we want to be your business partner, and we say 






EXT02, who triangulated the data regarding sensitivity to operations, explained:  
I know we are talking about financial reporting, but part of that is forecasting; 
where do you foresee a company, which is actually important…some people think 
it’s just the actuals. Yes, it’s the actual, but sometimes, also it’s the actuals in 
comparison to what they said it was going to be. One of the problems is [reporting 
actors] spend so much time trying to figure out where their actuals are, that they 
have very limited amount of time to even forecast. So the very first thing that we 
do is try to limit the amount of time that you spend trying to compile the actual, to 
shorten that window, so [that] now, you have more time to see how things are 
trending over the year compared to what I thought it was going to be. And then I 
can make better decisions so that hopefully my Quarter 4 forecast is going to be 
pretty close to what it’s actually going to be. And of course, we can’t predict 
everything.  
Some HROs employ skilled temporary employees to bring fresh perspectives to 
the organizations’ systemic routine to combat complacency (Vogus & Welbourne, 2003). 
A participant in an organization with international operations and global reporting 
requirements responded to my inquiry about training or other programs that contributed 
to the ERM internal environment by asserting the use of a global service organization for 
consistency. The organization’s reasoning behind this strategy was that using services 
from this type of enterprise provided best practices to streamline the standard reporting 
activities, such as accounts receivable and accounts payable, which provided assurance in 
consistency and accuracy, thus supporting the control environment. Assuming vendor 
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risk management had a place in the organization’s ERM plan deeming the third-party 
vendor as ethical and reliable, this was an excellent best practice. However, from a 
human factor HRO perspective, this approach flew in the face of reluctance to simplify 
interpretations and complacency tenets (Coutou, 2003).  
Research Question 3 
RQ3: How can HRO constructs applied in ERM inform other organizations to 
motivate leadership and employees to promote fiscal fiduciary responsibility while 
maximizing profitability? 
Where are they? Individuals who influence ERM in reliable and responsible 
reporting hold various positions in organizations. Participants spoke of the employees, 
staff, managers, management, and other reporting actors who performed midlevel, hands-
on reporting duties 357 times in aggregate. Executives, owners, partners, and other 
leadership references aggregated at 166. The board of directors and audit or other 
governance and oversight committees were mentioned 81 times in aggregate (see Table 
6). The frequent references to the midlevel performers might have led one to believe that 
they, as a population, had the greatest influence on reliable and responsible reporting. 
However, data from 12 of the 13 respondents (92%) included words like tone at the top 
and leadership to describe the greatest influencing factor in the successful ERM of 
financial reporting in conjunction with organizational success. Although one participant 
representing the other 8% did not include those exact phrases in the interview responses, 
there were ample references to upper level positional members as facilitators of reporting 




As management, as owners, as supervisors, you have to convey that culture [of 
compliance] to the staff and make them aware of what you’re trying to 
accomplish, how you are trying to accomplish it, and education is a huge part of 
it.  
Table 6 
Where: Reporting Influence Position Frequencies 






Board of directors 41 
Owners 34 




Finance committee 3 
Quality control committee 2 
Management policy committee 2 
Internal control committee 1 
Investment committee 1 
  Based on the data, although the lower level reporting actors contributed to reliable 
responsible reporting because they did much of the day-to-day reporting activities, those 
in leadership positions influenced the reporting actors to adhere to the control and 
monitoring policies and procedural tasks designed to produce the accurate information. 
Who are they? I clustered the individuals from various positions into three 
groups: externals, leadership, and employees. Auditors and consultants were grouped as 
externals; members of governing boards or committees, the C-suite, and other individuals 
who influenced the culture of the organization were grouped as leaders; and staff and 
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managers were grouped as employees.  
Essence of “right” or “good.” Sixty-two percent of the participants described the 
individuals who comprised the human resources responsible for proper and reliable 
reporting and organizational success as the “right people” or “good people.” Following 
are responses given by the participants when prompted to identify factors promoting 
success in organizational reporting and goal achievement: 
IPU01 said, “You surround yourself with good people…Making sure that you have 
the talent that understands the complexity of all the accounting rules and how they need to be 
handled.”  
EXT04 stated, “Organizations that grow and continue to thrive and retain good 
people do so because of the good people that they bring on board and treat fairly.”  
EXT01 remarked, “I think it is really dependent upon the right people.”   
EXT02 commented, “Making sure that I'm hiring the right people to take care of 
implementing those policies, monitoring those policies.”  
Attributes of right or good included knowledgeable, responsible, caring, different, 
honest, possessing integrity, and having a core value to do the “right thing.” Each 
attribute is described next. 
Knowledgeable: IPU03 said, “In many respects, in my opinion they brought in 
people from public accounting because that’s the only place that I know of that you learn 





Responsible: IPU03 stated: 
Yeah well, I guess the thing that just popped out was personal responsibility. That 
everyone is willing to take personal responsibility for their own actions and what 
happened. And that the culture in the organization and the tone at the top making 
it clear that, you know, that they want to do not only what’s legally right but 
what’s morally right.  
Integrity: IPU01 remarked, “So, I just have a simple approach with the financial 
folks and the culture of the financial reporting here is integrity is everything. And if you 
are ever asked to compromise your integrity you should say no. It’s simple.”  
Care: EXT02 noted: 
Because I’ll be honest, I don’t care about [the market]. But you know who I do 
care about? I care about these people, and I care about my clients and making sure 
that I'm giving them the best possible service.  
Different: EXT01 said:  
I think that in our industry, we tend to want the cookie cutter accountant. We have 
an idea of what qualities they should possess, and that’s like what we want. But 
actually, I don’t agree with that. I think that we are better off with people who 
have different ways of thinking about things because maybe they will actually 
stumble upon something that we wouldn’t otherwise have caught.  
Core value or values system: IPR stated, “So if you have solid value oriented 





I think that in the end it boils down to your personal value system. And you know 
like work related, not work related. I would say that who you are is who you are, 
…Okay so me as an example, I am a Christian, so I believe in the bible, I believe 
in integrity, and I believe in honesty and just having an honest side. Therefore, it 
would be contrary to my belief system to swindle a company out of whatever, not 
to say that it can’t happen because I am not perfect, but overall, I hold strongly to 
these things because I feel very…because I understand what I am representing 
and what is important to me.  
IPR02 commented: 
Well you know, your interview is with someone who really was grilled from even 
the early days, that integrity, is important ….say the right thing or do the right 
thing, you know, don’t lie, all that good stuff. This is pretty important. The 
foundational level of attributes of my upbringing and the combination of getting 
that CPA really made me feel like, wow, I’ve got to keep this….I’ve got to do the 
right thing all the time because too many people rely on me. If I don’t have that, 
then basically the organization can’t grow, or move forward, or exist without this 
position, specifically being high in integrity.  
Many participants acknowledged that because the possibility of acting in a 
deviant manner exists in human nature, monitoring for this risk is important. However, 
most participants offered that their sense of responsibility was embedded through their 
upbringing, faith-based beliefs, respect for the CPA designation and/or fear of losing it, 
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karma, doing to others as you want them to do to you, or simply being afraid of getting 
caught and damaging their own reputations or suffering embarrassment. These intangible 
factors were more valuable to the individuals than the achievement of wealth through 
deceptive measures. 
The following quote from EXT03 reflected the sentiments of most participants 
when asked about quality human characteristics and traits of actors in successful 
responsible reporting: “So coupled with being somebody who is honest and has integrity 
and wants to do the right thing, you also have to know and have knowledge that you are 
doing the right thing or have people who do.” 
Commitment to resiliency. The reporting systems in reputable organizations are 
not subject to the quick thinking reinvention of information found in the error response of 
traditional HROs. However, they are more like the previously mentioned needle-pricking 
incident, wherein the analysis and reinvention of a way to combat and correct an adverse 
event develops into a stronger system and more reputable organization worthy of 
stakeholder trust. The data indicated that the reputable organizations represented in this 
study were committed to reputation resiliency.  
A definition of reputation offered by Google is “a widespread belief that someone 
or something has a particular habit or characteristic.” The characteristics of the collective 
individual and organizational value system influence the objective setting of the business, 
which is a strategic component of the ERM framework (COSO, 2004). Although the 
objective of most for-profit companies is to achieve and maintain profitability and 
shareholder market, the organizations in this study also were vigilant in their objective of 
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protecting their reputations via straightforward economic reflections of their actual 
financial health to generate shareholder trust and long-term investment. They did not let 
short-term market decoys distract them in their efforts. 
Perrow (1999) discussed production pressures as a factor of accidents in NAT. A 
factor in the reputation management strategies of the public companies studied was the 
reluctance to concede to the pressures from stock market analysts to show short-term 
revenue for the sole purpose of driving stock prices. The data indicated that these 
reputable, publicly traded organizations held strongly to the long-term objective of 
creating solid value and reputation management through accurate and reliable reporting, 
despite the market effect. This is not to say that they were not concerned with market 
volatility and analyst perception, but as Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) said of organizational 
resiliency, these companies were committed to their objectives and rebound effectively. 
Participants advised that possessing a virtuous character and doing the right thing 
might have meant losing revenue by terminating or not beginning a client relationship 
with a prospective high revenue-producing organization that would not comply with rules 
and regulations to which the accountants attested. In the context of a private organization, 
it might have meant losing high revenue-producing individuals because of questionable 
ethics. In the case of publicly traded organizations, it might have meant losing stock 
market points because of a drop in earnings per share. In all cases, it could have meant 
paying higher provider costs because the organizations terminated vendor relationships 
with organizations as measured vendor risk because of substandard quality, irresponsible 
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ethical practices, or both. Organizations with reputable reporting practices hire the right 
people, who will continue the practice of ethical reporting, no matter the cost. 
Conversely, reputable vendors prospected by Enron refused to do business with 
the company, no matter the cost of lost revenue. In one instance, an expert was recruited 
by Enron to develop hedging techniques for locking in gains on private-equity 
investments to disguise an impending catastrophic loss, but declined, stating that the deal 
was impossible and that he would not be involved because “it’s called equity risk for a 
reason” (as cited in McLean & Elkind, 2004, p. 131). The essence of right or good people 
had a different meaning at Enron. Employees were hired for their competence and ability 
to generate revenue, even to the extent that it involved creative accounting. Because 
generating revenue was valued in the Enron culture and was the criterion for 
advancement, individuals were encouraged to step on other employees in an effort to 
make the company money and were punished for doing the moral or ethical thing.  
Mclean and Elkind (2004) cited Amanda Martin: 
If you made money at the expense of other business units, it was good. To put one 
over on one of your own was a sign of creativity and greatness. After time, those 
who valued teamwork and collaboration were weeded out, and those who 
remained were ruthless in cutting deals and looking out for themselves. (p. 121)  
Generating investor trust in accurate and reliable reporting by doing the right 
thing proved fruitful. IPU01 talked about the pressures of meeting the stock market 
demand using the following metaphor: “[It] would be the tail wagging the dog if [the 
market] dictated your way of operating. So you can’t let that happen.”  
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To demonstrate this observation further, IPU04 acknowledged the market value in 
committing to and being resilient to long-term objectives: 
I just heard two analysts speak in the last month or so about [the Company] and it 
is that we “look at the long-term,” you know. It’s the … consistent performance 
over the long term [that] drives the interest; it’s what drives the shareholder value. 
It’s not any one blip. You can have a really good year, you can even have a really 
bad year…, but it’s over the long haul, you’re consistent and stable and that’s 
what makes the difference, not the “let’s just make this one quarter.” What we 
don’t want is, “Oh, great news they made the year,” and then something come out 
about how we made the year. We get a lot of credit in the analyst community and 
I think this “do the right thing” keeps carrying forward to that high level because 
of that.  
Enron also was sensitive to its reputation, but only as it related to Wall Street’s 
perception of its current earnings per share. A former aide of Skilling, one of Enron’s 
leaders, stated, “The stock price was his report card” (as cited in McClean & Elkind, 
2004, p. 125). Enron’s objective of short-term revenue generation resulted in the 
production of questionable intricate business maneuvers and unreliable financial 
statements (Arnold & de Lange, 2004). In contrast to reputation resiliency at Enron, 
IPU03 responded that reputable organizations “don’t care if they miss earnings by 3 cents 




In one particular case of doing the right thing, the company came forward 
unprompted and absorbed an exorbitant loss to make a sector of third-party stakeholders 
whole after a near $200 million mistake. Although there could have been perceived 
potential financial risk harm to the investing shareholders, the overarching desire to 
maintain its stellar reputation of being shareholder friendly was an asset that the 
organization was unwilling to forfeit for short-term fiscal gain. In another case, a mistake 
resulted in the possibility of losing more than money for a large client and its reputation 
for exemplary customer service.  
When the mistake was disclosed, the group behind the problem was not 
terminated immediately. Conversely, leadership and other employees of an organization 
rallied, or “swarmed,” as the participant stated, to save the multimillion dollar job to 
protect its client and reputation for outstanding customer service at a monetary cost to the 
organization and personal sacrifice to some of the employees, who rectified the problem 
by working “day and night, over a holiday weekend.” Regardless of the expense, the job 
was saved, and the value of the monetary loss was capitalized into intangible customer 
loyalty.  
As discussed in learning failure from Chapter 2, being wholly in the experience of 
correcting a mistake to prevent it from happening again is indicative of a learning 
organization. The organization in this example experienced successful transfer 
knowledge about the root of the mistake and subsequent correction to operationalize the 
deep-seated double-loop learning, as discussed by Argote and Miron-Spektor (2011) and 
Carmeli and Gittell (2009). It also indicated the existence of a psychological safety net, 
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wherein learning by various levels of the organization was facilitated through robust and 
effective communication (Schein, 1993).  
When challenged further about the outcomes of this experience, IPR05 explained:   
They learned from their mistakes….I think it gave them a respect and knowing 
that not that you don’t want to be in that position again but knowing that you had 
a place to turn you’re not just going to turn around and say okay they’re going to 
fire me so I might as well keep screwing up.  
IPR05 commented further about leadership that “I think it builds confidence … I 
think it built a lot of confidence in the leadership.”  
When asked what happened at an organizational level after the mistake was 
corrected, IPR05 answered that “it prevented it from happening again. Learning from our 
mistakes.” 
The reporting agents from the reputable organizations who participated in this 
study used the ERM framework components of objective setting, event identification, 
risk response, and risk assessment as a basis for establishing control and monitoring 
procedures and processes such as checking, comparing, forecasting, balancing, analysis, 
and reporting required to generate accurate and reliable financial reports (i.e., What they 
do). Effective information and communication, another component of ERM, between and 
among the reporting mechanisms from financial, strategic, and operational areas fostered 
engagement between leadership and employees to adhere to the procedures and processes 
(i.e., How do they do it?). The internal environment of the organization, another 
component of the ERM framework, embodied the human factors (i.e., Why do they do 
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it?) relevant to adherence to the procedures and processes. Present were data evidencing 
quality leadership driving an informed, just, and diverse culture, which facilitated 
collective mindfulness, a state wherein the actors are preoccupied with failure, sensitive 
to operations, reluctant to simplify interpretations, committed to resilience, tolerant of 
redundancy, aware of the current situation, and deferent to those with the expertise 
(Weick et al., 2008). Every individual in hierarchical positions in the organizations (i.e., 
Where are they?) played a part in the responsible execution of procedures and policies. 
However, although the lower ranked actors executed the procedural tasks, the HQLMX 
and the oversight of the governing boards encouraged adherence to the rules. The essence 
of the right traits and characteristics of the individuals (i.e., Who are they?) comprised the 
general underlying virtuous tenet of the individuals who worked in these reputable 
organizations.  
Evidence of Trustworthiness 
I was able to ensure confidence in the credibility and transferability of the 
findings by securing participants who possessed common reporting goals yet different 
tasks and duties in various reporting system positions of heterogeneous organizations, 
including external accounting firms, private organizations, and publicly traded 
organizations. Having a diverse sample was essential because the participants provided 
viewpoints from different perspectives to ensure data saturation and to triangulate the 
data. I used member checking to confirm reliability by e-mailing the individual 
transcriptions to the participants as soon as they were fully transcribed and by e-mailing 
the preliminary data interpretation after data reduction and analysis. Although I had asked 
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the participants to respond only if there was a misunderstanding or a misinterpretation of 
the contents of the transcriptions, I received three positive responses confirming their 
accuracy and four positive responses indicating that the interpretation appeared on track. 
Furthermore, the participants who responded were eager to see the study when it was 
finalized and approved. Although there have been scientific discussions regarding the 
drawbacks and problems with member checking (Morrow, 2005), using this method to 
assure validity and verification was appropriate for this study. 
 I used negative case analysis to ascertain dependability by performing 
comparative analyses of the contraindications to the factors found in the data that 
contributed to responsible financial reporting. I did not perform rigorous data analysis to 
discover the factors of financial fraud because that research had been conducted 
previously and was not the purpose of my study. Furthermore, as themes and trends 
emerged, I discussed them with my professional peers as a method to obtain 
dependability.  
Although the researcher is the measurement in any qualitative study, by memoing 
my individual perceptions, I was able to bracket my initial perceptions to limit reflexivity 
and view the data through a more independent lens because I did not perform external 
audits or was part of an internal auditing team at the time of the study. This position, 
coupled with the detailed procedures, addressed confirmability. However, my 
credentialing as a CPA provided the ability to build rapport with the clients, understand 
terms of art, and place myself in a situation described by a participant that allowed me to 
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be open to possible dynamic influencing human factors not evident to a nonaccounting 
professional researcher.  
Summary and Transition 
Findings indicate that reputable organizations have the right people (Who are 
they) in place throughout the financial management system (Where are they) to identify 
financial reporting risk events and create effective control and monitoring processes and 
procedures to mitigate third-party risk-harm (What do they do). Members effectively 
communicate pertinent information throughout the organizations to those responsible for 
operationalizing the procedures and processes, engaging them to take an active role in 
responsible reporting outcomes (How do they do it). The elements of what the people do 
and how they do responsible reporting aligned with the objective setting; control 
activities; information and communication; monitoring; and risk event, assessment, and 
response components of COSO’s (2004) ERM framework. In most organizations, 
governance boards, compliance officers, or their equivalents directly address the above 
oversight elements (J. Cohen et al., 2017; S. Cohen & Falcone, 2016). Answering the 
“Why do they do it?” question revealed integral human factors and organizational 
psychological constructs such as culture and HQLMX that influenced financial reporting 
actors to act ethically, operationalize the procedures, and own responsible reporting 
outcomes.  
Chapter 5 summarizes the study with a discussion of the ways in which the data 
related to HRO and ERM theory, and it provides theoretical modeling as a basis for 
organizations to address the human factors that support the accurate and reliable reporting 
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of entity financial activity in a manner to mitigate risk-harm to third-party stakeholders. 
Chapter 5 also presents information about the delimitations and limitations, opportunities 




Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusion, and Recommendations 
Findings 
HRO theory guided this grounded theory study to identify and define the 
psychological factors of ERM effectiveness in organizational financial reporting 
responsibility. The intention of this study was to establish a theoretical foundation to 
assist the leadership of organizations desiring long-term organizational success through 
reputation management and responsible reporting with the information necessary to 
promote effective financial risk-harm management through ERM. The data showed that 
HRO constructs existed in reputable companies that used ERM framework components 
to manage financial reporting risk, which translated into reputation and third-party risk 
management.  
The interpretation of the findings includes a discussion of the integration of the 
data with HRO literature and the ERM framework, the limitations of the study, and 
recommendations for future research. The chapter concludes with an explanation of the 
ways in which the findings can be used by other organizations to influence positive social 
change. 
Interpretation of the Findings 
Results confirmed that HRO theoretical constructs existed to promote reporting 
compliance via COSO’s (2004) ERM framework in the financial reporting and 
management systems of reputable organizations, thus mitigating financial stakeholder 
risk-harm. This finding aligned with the literature outlining the ways that other non-
HROs have applied high reliability theory (HRT) to achieve organizational goals and 
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limit third-party risk-harm (Bagnara et al., 2010; Baker et al., 2006; Bellamy et al., 2005; 
Pronovost et al., 2006; Ramanujam & Goodman, 2003; Stringfield et al., 2008; Vogus & 
Welbourne, 2003). To arrive at this finding, I analyzed the data via the RQs and then 
applied them in context to reporting systems using the components of COSO’s ERM 
framework. 
Enterprise Risk Management Framework 
Although only about half (46%) of the participants indicated that they had formal 
experience in risk management, evidence existed that these reputable organizations 
actively used various components of COSO’s (2004) ERM framework to promote 
accurate and reliable reporting in their responsible fiscal management systems. In some 
of the organizations, governance boards or other leadership dictated formal ERM 
programs, but in others, risk-mitigating activities and other inherent organizational 
factors required to achieve organizational goals framed informal ERM plans.  
The observation that the participants might have been unaware of their 
participation in an ERM framework was in line with J. Cohen et al.’s (2017) investigation 
into the existence of formal ERM frameworks in financial reporting. In their study, some 
participants from the organizational governance triad (i.e., the audit committee, the CFO, 
and the external auditor) did not definitively declare that a complete ERM program 
existed as formal oversight for financial reporting. These results were concurrent with the 
data from my study suggesting that demonstrated themes of ERM components existed, 
providing risk reduction, accuracy of the financial reporting outcomes, and the integrity 
of the fiscal management of reputable organizations.  
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RQ1 inquired about the HRO constructs applied in the ERM of responsible 
reliable financial reporting. The results indicated a linkage to HROs. The collective 
efforts to mitigate risk, either as a formal ERM program or from an informal ERM 
framework, indicated the existence of an underlying common reporting risk management 
mind set, or collective mindfulness (Weick et al., 2008), among responsible financial 
reporting agents to alleviate the effect of fiscal deviations and financial reporting errors. 
A collectively mindful approach to risk management in these organizations resulted in 
evidence of the HRO constructs found in high-reliability theory; preoccupation with 
failure, reluctance to simplify interpretations, sensitivity to operations, and commitment 
to resiliency. Furthermore, the data showed evidence of HRO culture and leadership as an 
influencing factor in the ERM of responsible reporting. There also were some deviations 
from HRO influences such as less redundancy and reward structures similar to those 
found in fraud cases. These separations from theory could have been related to the 
subsystem coupling or integration differences that reporting systems possess versus 
traditional HROs. 
Objective Setting 
Because some organizations involve dangerous systemic integration to reach their 
goals, any interruptions in their systems have tremendous potential to harm innocent 
bystanders (Perrow, 1999). HROs expend resources and energy to achieve their 
objectives of failure-free performance, and many succeed, despite their highly integrated 
and tightly coupled systems (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991). The strategic objectives set by 
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the organizations in this study were to achieve failure-free reporting in an effort to protect 
the organizations’ reputations by managing stakeholders’ risk-harm.  
When pursuing profit motives, these organizations considered how their efforts to 
achieve profits affected investor trust and long-term market share. They were reluctant to 
concede to market pressures for immediate earnings and were willing to sacrifice short-
term revenue streams for long-term investor interest. They also were committed to 
reputation resiliency. Although not verbatim, reluctance to concede and reputation 
resiliency were variations of the HRO constructs of reluctance to simplify interpretations 
and commitment to resilience. The premise of HRO constructs is the achievement of 
failure-free performance by actively seeking, learning from, and correcting possible 
erroneous situations before they incubate into system interruptions that result in disasters. 
HROs are not satisfied with the status quo.  
Although the organizations with reputable reporting systems that were 
represented in this study were concerned with earnings performance, they looked beyond 
the obvious objective of short-term profits. In the case of the publicly traded companies, 
they looked beyond market performance and valued the investment in resources required 
to protect their reputations via ethical and reliable reporting that protected their 
stakeholders’ interests and built investor trust and reliability. 
Control Activities and Monitoring 
Risk event identification, assessment, and response are the premises of the HRO 
constructs used to search for risk points and then assess their effect on the organizations’ 
reporting goals and overall fiscal risk management. Responsible financial systems in 
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reputable organizations do not overlook or dismiss seemingly unrelated changes, 
deviations, or interruptions, such as staffing shifts or IT modifications; instead, they 
actively investigate whether the change resulted in a negative effect on reporting 
outcomes. Constant awareness, acknowledgment, and action to address possible financial 
system interruptions indicate evidence of a preoccupation with failure in the financial 
reporting system. 
EXT03 gave an example of how the external audit firm was engaged to perform a 
best-practices audit by the leadership of a well-known nonprofit, even though it was 
exempt from preparing disclosure filings. There was dissention in the organization about 
the need to expend the funds for such an engagement, but leadership claimed that it 
wanted to combat arrogance-generated complacency and look actively for errors, 
deviations, and interruptions via whistleblower opportunities, conflict-of-interest 
disclosures, and transparency to protect the reputation of the organization.  
IPU04 gave another example: The CFOs of various divisions of an international 
publicly traded company were encouraged to find possible interruptions to report to the 
audit committee for fear that a systemic collapse would occur and that governance had 
not been informed previously. Being situationally aware of unsuspecting signals that 
could have generated a negative change in the financial system protected the organization 
by reporting the errors or deviations that could have incubated into financial disasters. 
Addressing the event identification, risk assessment, and risk response components 
precipitated the need for control activities and continuous monitoring. With risk points 
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identified and assessed, the organization responded by creating internal and external 
control and monitoring activities.  
Ongoing analysis via reporting and comparing actual and forecasted results, 
reconciling accounts, fully executing checklists, and supporting active initiatives to find 
errors and deviations was evident in the reputable organizations of this study. The 
research literature on Enron indicated that even though some employees dutifully 
performed their compliance activities, the organization still suffered the outcomes of 
fraudulent activities and caused fiscal harm to innocent third parties. In line with a 
premise outlined by Bebbington et al. (2008), the reputable organizations in this study 
used control and monitoring activities to manage and minimize stakeholder risk-harm, 
which resulted in reputation risk management. 
External auditors tested and evaluated the controls, opined as to the quality of the 
internal monitoring system and accuracy of the figures reported, and provided feedback 
on the effectiveness of eliminating or finding deviations and errors to mitigate third-party 
risk-harm. Keeping control and monitoring activities relevant by objectively exposing 
them to review, iteratively referring to them in the context of current situations, and 
revising quality control standards as needed reflected sensitivity to operations and a 
reluctance to simplify interpretations. For instance, according to EXT04, a change in a 
leadership position was an event worthy of revisiting an audit plan. IPU03 asserted that a 
missed check box was a reason to investigate and report up. Weick et al. (2008) posited 
that situational readjustments occur during times of interruption and resolve in individual, 
interactive, and cultural readjustments. 
146 
 
When the reporting system members do not evaluate and challenge the status quo 
of control activities and monitoring processes, deviant behavior normalizes, and financial 
actors become complacent and approach audit procedures and processes by simply 
“checking the box.” This thought was in line with MMD theory (Turner, 1978), which 
posits that inattention to latent errors and collapse in organizational foresightedness 
causes the reporting system to drift into failure (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997), allowing a 
financial disaster to develop and cause financial harm to third-party stakeholders. 
At Enron, leadership sent mixed signals of espoused ethics values. Although to 
the public, Enron leaders held out to value outstanding ethics, what they truly valued was 
the effect of reporting on Wall Street’s reaction to the stock in terms of short-term 
earnings. Even if employees were originally hired as morally principled reporters, they 
soon learned that ethical reporting was not the objective; instead, rewards were given to 
individuals in the company who did whatever it took to show profits and earnings. This 
decoy distracted the reporting actors from taking ethical actions to resolve the errors in 
the reporting system, which then allowed the fraudulent acts to develop into an egregious 
crash of intentionally ignored signs and subsequent financial reporting system disaster 
that harmed thousands of stakeholders. Because the importance of adhering to control 
and monitoring activities, as well as ethics, was not pushed down from the top, the 
reporting control and monitoring procedures and policies at Enron morphed into fantasy 
documents (Clarke, 1999). 
Information regarding the effect of control and monitoring activities is not new or 
theoretically groundbreaking to those individuals who produce reliable and accurate 
147 
 
financial reports for reputable organizations. Expectations set forth by the accounting 
profession’s standard-setting boards and mandated regulations (Nobles et al., 2014; Wild, 
2013) are designed to protect users of the fiscal information contained in the financial 
statements upon which they rely. However, this information is significant within the 
context of HRO theory because it supports attention to the human resource and mindful 
nature of effective ERM control activities and monitoring components, which supports 
effective implementation of procedures, policies, and achievement of the organizational 
goals. 
Information and Communication 
The data showed that the financial reporting systems used control activities and 
monitoring to facilitate accurate and reliable statements. However, the efforts to seek, 
gather, and share significant information and effectively communicate it to pertinent 
individuals in the organizations via documentation, training, and continual learning 
operationalized the control procedures and processes into high-reliability tools. Quality 
communication and the sharing of information created a transparent society, which 
deeply engaged the reporting actors to be involved in the processes and outcomes 
generated by reporting system controls.  
Effective and quality communication between and among units is a key HRO 
element in determining a comprehensive plan for risk management in complex systems 
(Shawn Burke et al., 2005). This observation was in contrast to Jameson’s (2009) 
commentary on communication failures as contributors to financial disasters and the 
resulting economic downturn around 2008. Dysfunctional communication and 
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information processing also were found to contribute to the Space Shuttle Columbia 
explosion (Deal, 2004; Pidgeon & O’Leary, 2000; Vaughan, 1990, 2009). 
  IPU02 provided a comprehensive example of how control and monitoring 
activities, or lack thereof, and the communication and the flow of information, starting at 
the lowest level, affected the financial reporting in an organization that had little or no 
formal control policies. The CFO then described the haphazard methodology of 
reconciling the subsidiary systems that was not working to promote accurate and reliable 
reporting, even though members seemed to be communicating. Having identified the risk, 
the CFO went through a process of risk response by creating control and monitoring tools 
and then putting them in place.  
  However, there were cases where the policies were not being adhered to, so yet 
another policy was created as a response to nonadherence. Monitoring activities were 
also put in place to follow up on the effectiveness of the control activities.  According to 
the data, the presence of control and monitoring activities, quality information, and 
effective communication to operationalize the procedures and policies were essential to 
promote responsible financial reporting and fiscal management. Furthermore, these 
activities contained HRO constructs to further the initiative to achieve ERRM, with the 
goal of protecting organizational reputations.  
Internal Environment 
Like Enron, organizations can have various controls, procedures, and policies in 
place and they can communicate and share information all day long, but if the actors do 
not perform the procedures as intended, or if the information generated is contrary to the 
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purpose of the process, the tools become fantasy documents and become ineffective in 
truly mitigating third-party risk-harm. RQ2 inquired about the HRO constructs in ERM 
that would minimize organizational stakeholder financial risk-harm, and the evidence 
pointing to the overarching themes or filters that motivated, involved, and further 
engaged the participants to adhere to the rules and procedures of successful ERRM was 
found in the internal environment. 
Although individual core values, personal traits, and characteristics contributed to 
ethical reporting, elements of culture and leadership in the internal environment strongly 
influenced the reporting human resource to adhere to the control and monitoring activities 
designed to minimize stakeholder risk-harm. Elements of the internal environment as 
factors that influence reporting compliance have been a theme discussed in the 
accounting literature, but they have not been easily measured or operationalized (J. 
Cohen et al., 2017; S. Cohen & Falcione, 2016). The data showed that signs of HRO 
culture and leadership were similar to those found in HROs, which could have provided a 
basis for measuring and operationalizing the internal environment elements discussed in 
the accounting literature as antecedents to compliant reporting. 
Culture. The overarching HRO factor and antecedent to responsible financial 
reporting was organizational culture. The availability of information and effective 
communication were mechanistic factors in nature and were responsible in 
operationalizing control activities and monitoring processes. The mechanism was 
important because if data were unavailable, inaccurate, or unreliable, internal users could 
make poor decisions that might result in poor outcomes for that division, the entire 
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organization, and eventually innocent stakeholders. However, there was a deeper aspect 
of information and communication embedded in the internal environment that 
psychologically motivated the individual reporting actors to adhere vigorously to the 
procedures and policies in a manner that actively investigated systemic variables to 
manage risk effectively in the reporting environment. 
Informed culture. The sequential effect of uninhibited communication indicated 
the existence of an informed culture that fostered the transparency and accountability 
themes found in HRO constructs. An informed culture in an HRO context contains 
artifacts and stories that create a deep-seated message that it is acceptable to seek out 
errors proactively, admit mistakes, and report deviations.  
In some cases, the informed culture also influenced disclosing or remediating 
possible harmful events to third parties. However, compliance with disclosure 
requirements depended on whether management was aware of any required disclosures, 
and would actually come forth and document the events. If they were not aware, were the 
events discoverable by external auditors during audit activities? Furthermore, if the 
external auditors discovered events, actual disclosure compliance was dependent upon 
the auditors’ dedication to doing the “right thing” and not conceding to revenue 
production pressures to not disclose required items for fear of losing large revenue- 
producing clients. An informed and transparent society encouraged proper disclosure 
because engaged individuals saw the input and outcomes of their actions that reflected 
their share of responsibility to promote ERRM to protect organizational reputations and 
third-party stakeholders.  
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Connecting the individuals involved in financial matters through sharing 
operating and compliance information freely and effectively in an informed culture 
fostered a sense of ownership by nonequity members, which resulted in policy and 
procedural adherence and subsequent accurate and reliable financial reporting. This 
observation was in line with K. H. Roberts and Bea’s (2001) discussion about the need 
for integrated communication during mindful error-seeking containment to enhance 
reliability. Shawn Burke et al. (2005) stated that organizational member involvement in 
decision making is a factor for successful transformation to high reliability.  
Just culture. Humans are fallible: They make mistakes and inadvertent errors. 
However, if left unaddressed nominal errors and mistakes can infiltrate reporting 
systems and culminate in material weakness in financial statements. Transparency of 
information generated trust among members. Reporting actors could find and report 
errors and deviations as a matter of regular control activities because the information 
was available for all to see. Reporting actors had little or no fear of retribution to admit a 
mistake or disclose an error because it was expected that the shared information was 
intended to generate awareness of reporting systemic weaknesses that would affect the 
business reputations. Rather than generating pride in admitting a mistake or finding an 
error, the just culture provided a psychological safety to the reporting actors to expose 
weaknesses. Once exposed and reported, it was up to leadership to acknowledge the 
problems and initiate actions to correct the matters systemically. This phenomenon 
created a circular reference back to effective communication and the sharing of valuable 
information, both of which encouraged transparency and accountability, and so on. 
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Diverse culture. These organizations possessed cultures diverse in experience and 
expertise, embracing differences to generate information that provided rigor to 
discovering errors, control weaknesses, or other deviations. A diverse culture is an HRO 
construct evidenced by robust dialogue to expose and explore corrections and controls 
from various viewpoints to arrive at the best decisions, not just an individual or a team 
consensus (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). One organization represented in the study 
exampled its sensitivity to operations through diversity by understanding that a voluntary 
retirement initiative and reorganization in the finance area were opportunities to review, 
revise, and create standard operating procedures (SOPs) to mitigate risk related to 
transfers in duties.  
Value of an informed culture was evidenced by the forethought that with 
documented procedures to communicate objectives, required tasks, and duties of a 
position, another individual could come in, sit down, and fulfill the job by reading the 
SOPs. A respect for a diverse culture was evidenced by the value shown for all levels of 
expertise in the organization. However, a hierarchical structure was present, as evidenced 
by reporting up and by leadership being accountable by signing off on the SOP process 
before individuals transitioned out of their positions and others took their place.  
The finance department at this organization was not distracted by the upheaval of 
a transition; rather, it used the transition as a learning opportunity to mitigate risk arising 
from the changes in roles and responsibilities. The HRT literature referred to a culture 
committed to learning from mistakes as having a commitment to resilience. The flexible 
and open flow of information between and among levels of the organization found in an 
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informed and diverse culture, coupled with reduced fear in reporting deviations evident in 
just cultures and a commitment to learning from and making the appropriate changes to 
address weaknesses, eventually resolves in the financial outcomes of the organization 
(Denison, 1984).  
The conversation on human resource redundancies was flat, meaning that there 
was not much discussion about the benefits of redundancy or redundant measures to 
cover duties in the case of absences or staffing issues. It could be that they were inherent 
in control activities and monitoring measures, but redundancy did not seem to be 
forefront in the minds of the reporting actors as an influencing factor. Had this been a 
discussion on information technology in financial reporting, there might have been more 
dialogue about redundancies.  
Furthermore, in the private company cases, the number of staff members who 
dealt with financial matters was relatively small in comparison to the transaction load; in 
most cases, there was some form of cross training to cover positions when employees 
were absent. In other cases, the reporting leaders would cover the duties of absent 
employees until they could find proper replacements, and in cases such as reorganization, 
the reporting actors took on additional duties and responsibilities permanently. This 
strategy seemed to be in the face of the HRO construct of reluctance to simplify 
interpretations because as duties are added to individuals’ responsibilities, more 
opportunity happens for errors and mistakes to develop into systemic weaknesses in the 
financial reporting system. Additional rigor would be needed to investigate possible 
weaknesses under the possibility that a task the other person or leadership should be 
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doing was being left undone or if an internal control such as segregation of duties was 
incubating an error for possible reporting system interruption.  
When asked about redundancies, IPU04 identified the benefits of redundant 
performance through the use of service organizations for ordinary transaction reporting to 
promote consistency and reliability. However, HRO theorists have posited that 
outsourcing can degrade a system’s integrity by limiting requisite variety and beneficial 
mindfulness, meaning that the provider is saddled with detecting errors and the buying 
organization is left at risk of complacency in that reporting system (Weick et al., 2008) 
Leadership. The numerous references to “tone at the top” as the influential factor 
of organizational success, defined as achieving profit-making objectives while protecting 
reputations and stakeholders, evidenced that leadership had the most influence on ERRM. 
This observation aligned with the HRO discussion of hierarchical structure. The 
hierarchical arrangement of positions by responsibilities and duties with regard to 
reporting processes and procedures facilitates a fluid flow of information and 
communication (Roberts, 1990). However, when information does not flow because of 
impermeable structures, the individuals performing the reporting tasks do not feel that 
they can reveal mistakes, errors, or deviations upwards (Weick et al., 2008). Thus, a 
normalization of deviance develops (Vaughan, 2003), as was evident in the Enron case. 
The case evidence in this study that leadership can influence responsible reporting 
indicated deference to expertise, in that the hierarchical structure was penetrable by rank-
and-file individuals performing the reporting tasks, allowing higher positioned 
individuals to be informed of and able to address possible reporting risk events to 
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mitigate third-party risk-harm.  
S. Cohen and Falcione (2016), who conducted a study for PwC, concluded that 
only 26% of senior executives spoke of compliance and ethics as part of everyday 
business communications. S. Cohen and Falcione as well as J. Cohen et al. (2017) 
discussed the need for a culture of compliance and a quality internal environment, but 
they did not provide any indication of ways to generate either. In their study on providing 
a climate of compliance, S. Cohen and Falcione addressed such business strategy 
elements as tone at the top, culture, and communication, but they did not indicate the 
psychological connection between leadership and reporting actors that might contribute 
to a compliant environment. 
Results of my data showed that leadership is a central HRO theme in financial 
reporting systems. A discussion about culture must include leadership qualities because 
leadership drives culture (Schein, 1983). If leadership is unable or refuses to address 
system weaknesses, the control environment wanes, and the inertia from the effect of the 
weaknesses multiplies can result in financial disaster (K. H. Roberts & Bea, 2001; Weick 
et al., 2008). Seeger and Ulmer (2003) posited that the responsibilities of a leader in 
championing an ethical financial reporting culture include “communicating appropriate 
values to create a moral climate, maintaining adequate communication to be informed of 
organizational operations, and maintaining openness to signs of problems” (p. 59).  
Leadership in responsible financial reporting cultures expressed having a deep-
seated virtuous quality to do the right thing. Despite many participants being 
compensated by some form of incentive for financial performance, the leaders were 
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concerned about what was right for the stakeholders of the organizations and considered 
them in the decisions that they make and the role that they modeled to protect them and 
the reputations of their organizations. Qualities like honesty, trustworthiness, and 
integrity were used to describe the leaders in this study’s reputable organizations. Similar 
value-oriented elements are present in transformational leaders who motivate their 
followers to look beyond their self-interests for the good of their respective organizations 
(Bass, 1999). Leaders in this study were knowledgeable of compliance matters and took 
responsibility for reporting functions and results, something that generated mutual respect 
and trust among the reporting members. Bass (1990) described transactional leadership, 
the antithesis of transformational leadership, as a “prescription for mediocrity” (p. 2) 
because the leaders get involved only when procedures and standards are not being 
adhered to. Enron’s leader-driven transactional culture of reward for performance and 
punishment for nonperformance resulted in disastrous outcomes because of the lack of 
moral standards generally used by transformational leaders in motivating their team 
members.  
Results also identified a sociorelational dynamic that fostered connectivity 
between leaders and reporting actors in the reputable organizations that encouraged 
communication and motivation. The elements of transformational leadership generated 
HQLMX (Gerstner & Day, 1997), which seemed to foster better compliance and 
operationalize ERRM components. According to LMX theory, the quality of LMX has 
been correlated positively with follower satisfaction, organizational commitment, role 
clarity, and role performance (Krishnan, 2005). Engaged employees who adhere to 
157 
 
policies and procedures because of a high-quality connectivity between leader and 
follower (Krishnan, 2005) and who have little to no fear of reporting errors and mistakes 
might reduce system drift and the incubation of financial control failures (Turner & 
Pidgeon, 1997) that might permit nominal deviations to evolve into egregious frauds. 
Familial compliance environment. RQ3 addressed the ways that HRO 
constructs in ERM can inform other organizations to motivate leadership and employees 
to promote fiscal fiduciary responsibility while maximizing profit. The investigation into 
HRO constructs as a tool to promote reliably accurate financial reporting is premature 
and requires development before practitioners can apply it. However, at the risk of 
drifting from scholarly writing but imagining how HRO constructs in ERRM might be 
applied to practice, the following metaphorical model developed from the interpretation 
of the findings that could be used to communicate to accountants information about the 
human factors that contribute to a compliant internal environment for ERRM. 
Weick et al. (2008) referred to open and frequent communication and effective 
leadership as good “motherhood items” (p. 59) in their discussion of HRO foundational 
tenets. They surmised that in an environment under change, “a good mother is hard to 
find” (p. 59). “Big brother” accountability, or overarching sense of someone watching; 
the reference to HRO motherhood tenets discovered in the data; and the presence of 
transformation leadership and HQLMX simulated a familial-like internal environment 
where responsible reporting systems excelled. Reporting teams were akin to siblings 
looking out for each other by checking and advising each other of in-group mistakes or 
deviations so that as a team, they would be reflected in good light to the management 
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above them (control and monitoring activities). Then teams at that level would make 
certain that they were disclosing events and items among their team (information and 
communication), so that when they reported up, they also would be reflected in good 
light. Because it was expected in this family (culture) that information would circulate 
and reach leadership, with the goal of pleasing the respected “parent.” Leadership, being 
of good integrity, trustworthy, virtuous, and respected, as a well-regarded parent might 
be, would understand an honest mistake and provide a basis for learning from the 
mistake, but would not tolerate intentional wrongdoing without consequences 
(connectivity). As in Enron, if the parents are not emotionally present (too busy looking 
after their own interests), the children will not receive the guidance necessary to develop 
and act properly and will, instead, look to modeling the parents’ behavior as a guide.  
Limitations of the Study 
The study did have some limitations. Although stratification across industries was 
sufficient, there were two cases of participants being stratified over positions within the 
organizations. However, the positions that the participants held in the companies were 
sufficiently heterogeneous to address the topic from various perspectives. The 
representation of five women in leadership positions mediated the possible limitation of 
my gender as a female and gender-related risk tolerance influences.  
The derived model from these organizations presented the panacea for perfectly 
responsible, accurate, and responsible financial reporting and management. However, the 
findings that certain HRO constructs exist in the ERM components of responsible 
financial reporting systems in the studied organizations might not be generalizable to all 
159 
 
organizations. Because culture and leadership characteristics were instrumental in 
providing a platform for HRO constructs in the internal environment, the findings of this 
study could be generalizable only to organizations whose governance boards and 
leadership desire ERRM and are committed to championing the initiative. This limitation 
did not allow me to address the agentic leadership influencing factors of failed reporting 
systems. Furthermore, because there is a cost associated with turning over every stone to 
look for errors (K. H. Roberts & Bea, 2004), there could be cost-benefit decisions that 
create unknown inherent systemic weaknesses in certain integrated systems in 
organizations desiring a responsible and reliable system that could not be detected in this 
study.  
Recommendations 
I conducted this study to define the HRO constructs present in the ERM of 
responsible financial reporting and fiscal management and find evidence of the presence 
of similar constructs. Because this evidence was suggestive in nature, it would be 
beneficial to develop a measurement to assess the state of high reliability in fiscally 
reputable organizations. Doing so might make the descriptive nature of this study 
applicable not only to financial reporting and fiscal management leaders but also the 
accounting profession as a whole to put into practice. Black and McBride (2013) 
referenced previous studies conducted to measure HRO applicability in hospital and 
software startup companies to support their study, whose purpose was to measure and 
assess HRO characteristics on collective and  individual scales for applying HRO 
constructs in fighting wildfires. Therefore, this recommendation for further research in 
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applying HRO concepts in accounting practice is reasonable within the scope of human 
resource and organizational behavior to enhance reliable performance outside of the 
scope of traditional HROs.  
Furthermore, although I referred to the connected nature of leadership to 
individuals performing the control and monitoring tasks, more research is needed to 
define the essence  of connectivity or the quality of the social exchange between the 
leaders, who possess or emit transformational leadership characteristics, and the reporting 
actors, who are motivated by the tone at the top. Mindful leadership is integral to the 
composition of HRO cultures (Lekka, 2011), and LMX and transformational leadership 
have been linked to occupational safety outcomes (Christian et al., 2009). Vogus et al. 
(2014) linked prosocial motivation and emotional ambivalence to mindful organizing and 
warned against routinization because it prohibits the requisite variety and tension to 
trigger prosocial motivation and emotional ambivalence. This tenet against routinization 
could be a problem in the accounting profession, where procedures, policies, and process 
simplification are the norm in compliance. Perhaps measurement of the personal quality 
described by the participants as right would be integral to explaining this assumed benefit 
of HQLMX in a dynamic responsible reporting environment, thus furthering an ERRM 
model by providing a framework or tool for organizations to hire and cultivate the virtues 
in leadership required to champion a responsible financial reporting environment. 
Overlooking this as a first step in managing risk successfully could create risk in 




The premise of this research was to investigate the influencing factors that 
promoted procedure operationalization and rule adherence by the participants from the 
studied organizations to promote responsible reporting and limit third-party risk-harm. 
Because there is a fair amount of judgment in principles-based financial accounting, the 
profession uses rules regulations; standards; and associated policies, procedures, and 
processes to control deviations that incubate into material weaknesses. HROs are well 
versed in controlling errors and system interruptions that might affect the reputations of 
organizations and unwitting third parties if they are allowed to develop into disasters. By 
defining the existence of the HRO psychological constructs that motivated the 
participants, all of whom were in the financial reporting and fiscal management 
environment, the results of this study will provide leaders and governing boards with a 
framework that could influence the individual judgments inherent in principles-based 
accounting.  
Being aware of an HRO conceptual framework will help leadership to develop 
internal policies and procedures that will operationalize the ethical fiscal management 
and representation of their respective organizations’ financial resources to protect the 
organizations’ reputations and third-party stakeholders. On a broader scale, 
understanding the HRO factors of the ERM of responsible financial reporting could 
require modifications to government and professional regulation to mitigate risk to the 
global economy from the effect of undetected errors in the complex financial systems of 
multi-national organizations. Beyond the scope of policy application, the findings of this 
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research could lead to the integration of HRO construct knowledge in the financial 
reporting curriculum to influence the education, training, and certification of accounting 
professionals.  
Conclusion 
Finding the existence of ERM components in responsible fiscal management 
systems was not a surprising outcome because financial reporting actors are required to 
abide by the AICPA (2016), whose guidelines were designed to provide external and 
internal control measures for mitigating the third-party risk-harm associated with errors 
and fraud. However, the development alone of procedures, policies, and procedures will 
not improve reporting compliance. ERRM in responsible financial reporting systems also 
addresses the human factors required to encourage adherence to procedures and policies 
designed to operationalize control and monitoring activities effectively. Results of the 
study revealed the presence of HRO collective disaster foresightedness and mitigation 
constructs in reputable organizations ethically achieving their organizational goals while 
protecting third-party stakeholders from risk-harm and that regardless of individual 
awareness of a formal program, a reduced yet concentrated version of the ERM 
framework emerged that was tailored to ERRM. 
ERRM assumes a profit-making motive, meaning that organizations have 
assessed the risks and identified the events that could interrupt profitable operations, as 
most organizational ERM initiatives do. However, what also seemed to be present in the 
ERRM of these organizations was an overarching emphasis on reputation risk 
management that was accomplished via inherent HRO constructs that contributed to the 
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development of and adherence to adequate control activities and monitoring measures of 
COSO’s (2004) ERM framework and regulations and standards of the accounting 
profession. A better understanding of the effects of an HRO environment on financial 
reporting outcomes to develop and implement HRO constructs in the intangible reporting 
systems of organizations would benefit organizations by helping to protect their 
reputations and, more importantly, the innocent third-party stakeholders who depend on 
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Appendix A: Initial Coding Scheme 
AWARE: Being aware that a deviation does or could exist, opening the door for fraud. 
ACKNOWLEDGE: Speaking up, vocalizing, or stating in some way the presence of a 
deviation to leadership, and leadership acknowledging and embracing the 
problem, instead of down-playing or ignoring it completely. 
ACTION: Containing and correcting the deviation so that it does not escalate into a 
disaster. 
 
As a guide for coding, I will listen for the following HRO and ERM constructs to emerge 




o Preoccupation with failure  
o Reluctance to simplify 
o Sensitivity to operations 
o Situational Awareness: 














 Neglect (i.e. ‘check the box audit and internal control fantasy docs) 
 Monitoring 
 Risk assessment 





ACKNOWLEDGE (RQ2 and RQ3) 
o Commitment to resilience 
o Leadership qualities  
o Focus/Interest 
o Communication 
 Hierarchical Structure 
o Chain of command 
o Deference to expertise 
 Risk Response 
 Control Activities 
o Internal 
o External 
 Information and communication 
 Monitoring 
ACTION (RQ2 & RQ 3) 






o Learning orientation - Resilience 
o Just 




 Inform and communicate 






 Reward Structure 
o Incentives based on…. 
o Bonuses based on… 
o Production pressures 
 Stock market performance 
 Sales 
 Output 




Appendix B: Interview Protocol 
Introduction: 
I invited you to participate in this study because your organization, by way of analytics, 
reputation, or other public information, appears to be financially sound and sustainable, 
while managing risk to investors through organizational governance. As you know, 
various financial debacles occurred despite rules, regulations and procedures in place to 
mitigate financial risk-harm to individuals, yet your organization continues to be 
financially sound while sustaining operational success. I want to define the psychological 
factors that contribute to this coupled success so that other organizations can promote this 
aspect of responsibility. The interview should take no longer than an hour. We are here 
because you consented to participating when taking the demographic survey provided to 
you via Survey Monkey. Do you have any questions regarding the survey or this 
interview for me now? Thank you for assisting me. I am going to record a brief 
introduction where you state your name and the date and then I will stop recording, play 
the recorded message back to make sure I am getting a quality recording. When we are 
satisfied the recording is working well, I will continue with the interview. 
{Start the Recorder} 
 
I am Robin B. Ewers, CPA, doctoral student at Walden University. I am here with- 
Please state your name and today’s date {Insert Name and date}. Do you understand that 
this interview is being recorded? {Consent obtained to meet ‘two party consent’ rules of 
certain states} {Stop recorder and test the sound quality if in person, not applicable if by 
phone or VoIP/phone}  
 
Baseline Screening Questions – designed to determine expertise with regard to regulatory 
knowledge. 
1. Please take a moment and tell me your job duties as they relate to financial 
reporting? 
2. Can you describe for me how you are involved, if at all, in making sure the 
appropriate rules and regs are adhered to? 
 Please give me some examples of this involvement. 
3. What would you consider your expertise? Or specialty? 
Research Question 1 -What HRO constructs applied in ERM are present in reliable 
financial reporting? 
Interview Prompts: 
4. To what do you attribute sustained organizational financial success? 
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5. In passing, I hear some colleagues say you can’t make money by adhering to the 
rules, please tell me your experience on how organizations manage to do that? 
6. Please provide some examples. 
7. Please describe any processes or procedures that promote reliability in your financial 
reporting. 
8. What do you believe makes employees adhere (or not adhere) to these processes or 
procedures? 
9. [Further prompts will depend on the participant’s answers, but will be directed to see 
if HRO constructs are present.]  
Research Question 2 – How can HRO constructs applied in ERM minimize 
organizational stakeholder financial risk-harm? 
Interview Prompts: 
10. Risk-harm is the harm caused by exposing an individual to risk that prohibits their 
best interest. It is in contrast to measured risk you might take to promote a financial 
or other operational or strategic position. Please tell me about your experience in 
minimizing financial risk-harm to third party stakeholders. 
a. Risk-harm is the harm caused by exposing an individual to risk that 
prohibits their best interest. It is in contrast to measured risk you might 
take to promote a financial or other operational or strategic position. 
Please tell me about your experience in minimizing financial risk-harm to 
third party stakeholders. 
b. Outside of “rules and regs,” what organizational factors do you believe 
minimizes risk to those relying on the financial reporting system of this 
organization? (This question intends to address the possible reference to 
the simple reliance on SOX or the ERM/Internal Control framework to 
mitigate risk). 
c. How do you assure your human resource will adhere to the process and 
procedures in place to operationalize the rules and regs?  
d. How do you motivate employees to promote reliability in the financial 
reporting process while also striving for financial success of the 
organization? 
e. Describe your executive compensation or reward plans? (I am trying to 
find out if reward structures are tied to EPS or some other financial 
success measurement, or if there is compensation tied to admitting and 
fixing mistakes or errors). 
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f. Describe your employee bonus or reward plans? (I am trying to find out if 
reward structures are tied to just financial or output success measurement, 
or if they are tied to admitting and fixing mistakes or errors). 
Research Question 3 – How can HRO constructs applied in ERM inform other 
organizations to motivate leadership and employees to promote fiscal fiduciary 
responsibility within their organization while maximizing profitability? 
Interview Prompt: 
11. Describe the enterprise risk management framework you work in.  
12. How does your organization maintain sound financial practices among risk and 
reporting actors? (e.g., training, redundancy, learning…) 
13. What types of programs have you seen help the people do what they are supposed to 
do? (Training, redundancy, learning….) 
14. What human factors that promote financial responsibility can be transferred to other 
organizations so they too can succeed but also limit risk to their stakeholders? 
15. How would you take your experiences of promoting an environment of fiduciary 
fiscal responsibility and apply it to another organization? 
That’s it for my questions, do you have any questions for me? If not, as a reminder, I will 
be sending you the transcript to review and my interpretation of the data for you to 
provide feedback if necessary. In the meantime, I will be in contact with you if I have any 
questions. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions. Thank you so 




Appendix C: Demographics Survey 
*1. Do you agree to participate in the study based upon the information outlined in the 
Informed Consent? By clicking Yes, you are providing your consent and will continue to 
the Demographic Survey. Thank you. 
 
o Yes, I agree. 
2. The industry into which my organization best fits is: 
 
o Computer Hardware and Software 
o Manufacturing 
o Healthcare/Health Products 
o Retailers/Wholesalers 
o Telecommunications/Technology 
o Other Service Provider 
o External Accounting Services 
o Not Listed 
3. My organization is... 
 
o Publicly Traded 
o Privately held and issues reviewed or audited financial statements 
o Privately held and does not issue reviewed or audited financial statements 
4. My organization has been in business this many years (for publicly traded 
organizations, please include years privately held): 
  
5. My organization averages gross revenue of: 
o Under $10 Million 
o $10 Million to $100 Million 
o Over $100 Million 
o I don't know. 
6. Organizational position: 
 
o Internal: C-Suite 
o Internal: Management 
o Internal: Senior 
o Internal: Staff  
o Internal: Other 
o External: Partner 
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o External: Manager 
o External: Senior 
o External: Staff 
o External: Other 






o Not disclosed 
9. Please indicate your credentials, if applicable: 
 
10. Career years in Financial Reporting/Management: 
 
11. Career years in Financial Risk Management: 
 
12. Years with your current organization: 
 
13. Compensation basis: 
 
o Salary only 
o Salary with incentive reward linked to organizational financial performance 
o Salary with other incentive reward 
o Hourly only 
o Hourly with incentive reward linked to organizational financial performance 
o Hourly with other incentive reward 




















Appendix G: Mind Map for “Who Are They?” 
 
 
